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Abstract 
The Development of a Brussels-based EU Strategic Culture: A Case Study of the 
European Security and Defence Policy. 
The study of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) has been dominated 
by various mainstream theories drawn from International Relations and European 
Studies. These have largely neglected the role of ideas, beliefs, values and practices 
regarding the use of police and military instruments, in other words, the strategic 
culture which shapes the security and defence policies of the European Union (EU). 
This strategic culture of the EU has become manifest in the way ESDP officials think 
about the deployment of military and police resources as well as in the way they plan 
ESDP missions. 
After introducing the concept in general terms, the thesis claims that the notion of 
strategic culture can be applied to the EU. Various innovative models of 
categorisation are provided throughout the thesis in order to describe the state of 
development of EU strategic culture. An analysis of the development of the strategic 
culture of the EU is provided since the end of the Cold War up to the year 2007. 
Important developments such as the institutionalisation of ESDP and the 
establishment of influential policy networks are considered in detail. The study also 
takes into account the discourse of ESDP and questions the ideas that stem from it 
through interviews and questionnaires with ESDP officials. A case study of the police 
and military missions of the EU in Bosnia Herzegovina is included in order to show 
how ideas regarding the use of force impact on the implementation of EU missions. In 
conclusion, the thesis claims that the EU has its own strategic culture which is 
characterised by a number of behavioural/structural elements as well as by certain 
ideas, values, beliefs and practices. 
Key Words: European Union, European Security and Defence Policy, strategic 
culture, institutions, networks, ideas, beliefs, 
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Thesis title: The Development of a Brussels-based EU Strategic 
Culture: A Case Study of the European Security and Defence 
Policy 
Chapter One: the Notion of Strategic Culture and its Application 
to the European Security and Defence Policy 
I. I. Research Hypothesis 
The impact of ideas, beliefs, values and practices which make up the strategic culture of 
the EU has been largely neglected by the academic literature with the exception of a 
few notable case studies. The thesis tries to fill this gap by investigating whether the 
EU possesses its own strategic culture. The main assumption of the thesis is that the EU 
has its own strategic culture. Elements of the strategic culture of the EU are manifest in 
the way ESDP officials think about the deployment of military and police resources as 
well as in the way they plan ESDP missions (use of force). The EU strategic culture is 
characterised by a number of behavioural/structural elements as well as by certain 
ideas, values, beliefs and practices that affect the development of ESDP in a particular 
way. 
The thesis first introduces the concept Pf strategic culture and claims that it can be 
applied to the EU. The development of the strategic culture of the EU is studied since 
the end of the Cold War up to December 2007. The historic point of 2007 has been 
chosen as an ending point in the study of strategic culture as it allows for considerable 
time to cover ESDP missions that have taken place in Bosnia Herzegovina. This point 
also covers the enlargement of the EU up to 27 countries, thus providing an updated 
view on the strategic culture of the EU. Various methodological issues are raised in 
Appendix I of the thesis whereas the drafting of the questionnaires and the results 
stemming from them are included in Appendices 11,111 and IV. 
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The thesis addresses the main problems stemming from the currently limited literature 
on the strategic culture of the EU. It also aims at providing an innovative approach to 
the study of the strategic culture of the European Union. For this reason, it develops 
various types of categorisation in order to describe the current state of the strategic 
culture of the EU. The first type of categorisation deals with the structural and 
behavioural elements that characterise the strategic culture of the EU. The second type 
of categorisation focuses on the ideas, beliefs, values and practices of ESDP. 
Furthermore, the thesis takes into account important developments such as the 
institutional isation of ESDP and the establishment of influential policy networks in 
order to study the influence that these formations exercise on the strategic culture of the 
EU. The thesis studies also ideas, beliefs and values through the conduct of interviews 
and questionnaires with ESDP officials. Finally, a case study of the police and military 
missions of the EU in Bosnia Herzegovina is included in order to show how ideas 
regarding the use of force impact on the implementation of EU missions. 
1.2. Introduction to the Study of Strategic Culture 
The study of the foreign and security policies of the European Union (EU) is based on 
theories derived from International Relations (IR) and European studies. A useful 
starting point here is Howorth (2002,2002b, 2003), who Iýas largely focused his study 
of European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) on the role of the biggest EU 
member states (France, Gennany and the UK) as well as the development of influential 
epistemic communities within ESDP institutions. Other scholars such as Lindley- 
French (2002), and Hyde Price (2005b), have studied the importance of member states 
in the shaping of EU foreign policy. According to these two researchers, the attachment 
of the EU member states in their respective foreign and security policies account for the 
slow development of a cohesive European dimension in this policy field. The works of 
Kohler-Koch (2002) and Krahmann (2003), meanwhile, have focused on the emergence 
of various policy networks and their impact on EU policy developments. Scholars such 
as Burgess (2005) and Williams (2001), by contrast, have claimed that the EU is a 
security community or a security regime whose functioning has an impact on the global 
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security system. According to these approaches, the EU has managed to establish its 
own security mechanism that binds member states together towards commonly 
accepted actions in foreign policy. Furthen-nore, studies such as those of Diez (1999), 
Schimmelfenning (2001,2003) and Biscop (2002), finally, consider the importance of 
EU discourse in issues of security. Strategic culture has been the subject of some 
attention in studies of ESDP. Cornish and Edwards (2001,2005), Rynning (2003) and 
Meyer (2005,2006) have used the notion of strategic culture to explain the role of 
ideas, beliefs and practices in ESDP institutions and missions. However, these studies 
require further clarification and enrichment. 
The works mentioned above are important contributions to understanding the way the 
EU deals with foreign and security issues. However, these do not pay considerable 
attention to the role of ideas, beliefs, values and practices regarding the use of military 
instruments (strategic culture in other words) and have largely focused on issues of 
structure and agency. Although the thesis does not ignore the fact that the above 
mentioned elements are important, it takes the study of ESDP one step further by 
establishing a link between ESDP structures and agents and the ideas, beliefs and 
values that motivate policy actors. The thesis claims that the EU possesses its own 
strategic culture and undertakes a study of its foundational elements. It suggests that the 
theory of strategic culture has to be applied in a particular way in order to reflect the 
particular nature of the EU. This is one of the main innovations of the thesis as the 
majority of case studies on strategic culture have been largely conducted on states and 
not on intergovernmental entities. 
In light of the growing importance of ESDP in the external relations of the EU, it is 
vital to try to understand what are the motives, ideas and values that make up this 
policy. This chapter will analyse the notion of strategic culture as it is a useful tool for 
understanding the development of ESDP. The chapter has two main parts. The first 
elaborates the concept of strategic culture; its development and its analytical strengths. 
The second considers how the notion of strategic culture can be fruitfully applied to the 
EU and specifically ESDP. 
7 
1.3. Strategic Culture: the Concept and its Evolution 
Strategic culture has been applied in various ways. It has covered the defence and 
security policies of a range of countries such as China (Johnston, 1996), Japan 
(Katzenstein, 1998), India (Kim, 2004) and Gennany (Longhurst, 2004). It has also 
been applied to regions, although less so, be this Latin Arnerica (Roland, Taras and 
Cochran, 1999) or Scandinavia (Neumann and Heikka, 2005), and to security 
institutions such as NATO (Risse-Kappen, 1996). In applying the notion of strategic 
culture, scholars have tried to explain continuity and change in security policies. In 
addition, they have sought to explain why certain policy options prevail over others for, 
according to Johnston (1995b: 46), strategic culture is: 
44 an ideational milieu which limits behavioural choices". 
As the study of strategic culture can explain the motivations behind policy choices it is 
important to use it in order to study the development of ESDP. 
One can trace the development of strategic culture as an analytical tool back to the 
1970s. During this period scholars such as Snyder (1977), studied Soviet deterrence 
policy and concluded that US analysts had failed to predict Soviet reactions to US 
nuclear policy. This happened because the Americans took for granted the fact that the 
Soviets would react the same way the Americans would in cases of nuclear deterrence. 
However, this kind of 'behavioural prediction' (based on rational-actor paradigms and 
game theoretical modelling) failed to predict the Soviet way of thinking although it 
provided a first insight into Soviet strategic thinking (e. g. the work of Snyder 1977). As 
a result of the failure to understand the motives and perceptions behind policy action, a 
number of scholars (whose work will be mentioned below) came to the conclusion that 
each country had its own way to interpret, analyse and react to international events. 
Due to this assumption, a new wave of literature emerged which focused on the 
development of a new tool of strategic analysis, notably that of strategic culture. The 
concept of strategic culture draws inspiration from social constructivism (see Appendix 
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I). The notion of strategic culture has not been static. Its evolution during the last thirty 
years has led to the creation of three main 'generations' of strategic thinking. 
1.3.1. The First Generation: the Birth of the Concept of Strategic 
Culture 
One of the first generation scholars who came up with the idea of strategic culture was 
Snyder. Strategic culture according to Snyder (1977: 8) can be best defined as: 
"the sum of ideas, conditioned emotional responses, and patterns of habitual behaviour 
that members of a national strategic community share with regard to nuclear strategy". 
Ken Booth in his work Strategy and Ethnocentrism (1979) continued to explore the 
ideational foundations of nuclear strategy and superpower relations. Colin S. Gray 
(1981,1986,1999) was another important first generation scholar who attempted to 
provide an analytical study of the importance of the strategic culture in international 
relations. According to Gray (I 999b: 5 1) strategic culture consists of- 
"the persisting (though not eternal) socially transmitted ideas, attitudes, traditions, 
habits of mind, and preferred methods of operation that are more or less specific to a 
particularly geographically based security community that has had a necessarily unique 
historical experience". 
This first generation of scholars suggested that strategic culture can be an important 
tool in the explanation of policy behaviour. Elkins and Simeon (1979: 127-145), for 
example, suggested that in making policy, individuals usually consider only a few 
policy options which are defined by their cultural experiences. One of the common 
assumptions of the first generation of researchers was that the study of strategic culture 
could shed light on policy by taking into account mindsets and cultural traditions that 
neo-realist and other rational models ignored. The first generation also argued that 
strategic culture evolved slowly under the pressure of new experiences (see the works 
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of Elkins and Simeon 1979, Snyder 1977, Gray 1981). However, although the first 
generation set the agenda for the exploration of ideas and values concerning the use of 
force, much of its work was characterised by a certain amount of national stereotypes, 
unfounded assumptions and problematic methodology that the thesis will avoid. Some 
of these weaknesses were mostly addressed by second and notably third generation 
scholars. 
1.3.2. The Second Generation of Strategic Culture Scholarship 
Another influential but smaller school of thought concerning the study of strategic 
culture emerged in the 1980s. The second generation of scholars adopted a critical 
approach and argued that strategic culture can be used as a policy tool in order to 
promote the dominant values the establishment. The second generation of strategic 
culture scholarship includes the works of Klein (1990), Luckham (1982) and Kier 
(1995,1996). This generation tried to advance the study of strategic culture by 
expressing doubts about the elements used by previous researchers in their analysis. In 
particular, second generation scholars such as Kier (1996: 214-215), expressed a 
growing scepticism concerning the analysis of official discourse. Indeed, according to 
second generation scholars, a distinction must be made between the 'actual' and the 
'declaratory' strategies of a particular security collective. The main aim of this 
reflection was the search for 'the real language' behind the official documentation. 
However, second generations scholars have not managed to come up with a 
comprehensive methodology on how discourse should be studied. 
1.3.3. The Third Generation of Strategic Culture Scholarship 
The analysis of strategic culture was enriched by contributions from a third generation 
of scholars. Third Generation scholarship tends to be more narrowly focused on 
particular strategic elements and more careful when it comes to issues of methodology 
(see the works of Johnston, 1995a, 1995b, 1996, Rosen 1996, Lantis 2002, Longhurst 
2000,2005, Longhurst and Zaborowski 2005). Third generation scholars are critical of 
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the methods of the two previous schools (for instance the Gray - Johnston debate 
mentioned below). Third generation scholars do not uncritically subscribe to the notion 
that strategic culture is 'everywhere' as Gray does (1999b) and engage with the 
development of detailed case studies in order to demonstrate that a particular culture 
characterises a specific country or a collective. 
Many of the problems evident in the studies of first generation scholars stem from the 
wideness of the term 'culture' itself Culture is a loose concept, open to endless 
interpretation. The first generation of scholars did not provide well-defined cases of 
what culture really is and how it can be traced. These problems were further explored 
by third generation scholars who tried to provide inclusive answers to the theoretical 
weaknesses that characterise the first generation. The differences between first and 
third generation of scholars are evident in the Gray (1999b)-Johnston (1995b, 1999) 
debate which evolved around issues of culture. On the one hand, Johnston (1995b: 45) 
provided a 'limited' and thus easier to research version of culture by suggesting that: 
44culture consists of shared assumptions and decision rules that impose a degree of order 
on individual and group conceptions of their relationship to their social, organizational 
or political enviromnent". 
By contrast, the works of Gray (1998,1999a, 1999b) provide a much wider approach to 
culture which includes the context that surrounds policy-making and policy-makers. 
However, the problem with the position of Gray on culture is that, according to 
Johnston (1995b: 46), it is all-encompassing. It cannot be falsified and tested, thus, its 
scientific validity may be doubted. Johnston (1995b: 33) believes that strategic culture 
must be falsifiable or at least distinguishable from non-strategic culture variables so 
that predictions can be derived regarding policy behaviour. There are lessons from the 
Gray-Johnston debate that the thesis subscribes to. First of all, a study of strategic 
culture that attempts to cover all aspects of culture runs the risk of becoming all- 
encompassing, thus lacking depth of analysis. Second, strategic culture has to be 
' verified' and its main elements need to be brought into the light. 
II 
The focus of first and second generation scholars was the state. However, some third 
generation scholars have expanded the use of strategic culture by using it in order to 
study security fori-nations such as NATO (Risse-Kappen 1996: 357-399), and regions of 
the world such as Scandinavia (Neumann and Heikka 2005: 5-23). These works also 
include the studies of Mychajlyszyn (2004), who suggests that there is a Euro-Atlantic 
strategic culture. According to Mychajlyszyn (2004: 191-209), the states of Europe, as 
well as Canada and the United States, share values and beliefs regarding the use of 
force. These values can be summarised as the transparency of defence and military 
policies, the peaceful settlement of disputes, the high levels of cooperation, consultation 
and consensus in the decision-making process as well as the respect for sovereignty and 
territorial integrity. Furthermore, in a study on the 'Western' accepted notion of human 
security Frederic Ramel (2003: 79-104), concludes that, although strategic cultures of 
the Western northern hemisphere share to a certain degree a common culture, they still 
diverge on issues of definition and application of human security. 
1.4. The European Union and the Concept of Strategic Culture 
As the concept of strategic culture has been deployed to explain the policy behaviour of 
multi-national institutions, a few scholars have also attempted to make a link between 
strategic culture and the EU. According to Hadfield (2004: 9), this linkage is possible 
because: 
"while it [the EU] is not a political unit in the traditional nation-state sense, the nature 
and focus of its institutional structures suggests that it too operates as a system of 
inferred symbols, complex language structures, nodes of collective self-reference that 
act in the pervasive establishment of preferences both discrete put permanent". 
Furthermore, according to Burgess (2005: 1), the EU is a security community which is 
inextricably linked to values: 
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"a wide range of principles and practices of the EU make reference, either directly or 
subjacently to a set of fundamental values, whose origin and homogeneity is seldom put 
into question". 
Chapter Two will deal further with the idea of the EU being a security community and 
how different models of the EU security community can affect its strategic culture. 
Although in his work, Rynning (2003a, 2003b) is sceptical about the state of the 
strategic culture of the EU he also recognizes that the EU has the potential to possess a 
strategic culture. This is because, according to Rynning (2003b: 11): 
"the EU represents a collective ambition to create and uphold a liberal order in Europe, 
and member states are committed to enlarging this zone of peace and cooperation. This 
conclusion stands even if European countries through late 2002 and 2003 became 
deeply divided on the issue of Iraq and the question of supporting the US intervention". 
Therefore, a link must be made between strategic culture and the study of ESDP. 
According to Hadfield (2004: 12-13), using strategic culture as a tool of EU policy 
analysis is possible because the concept can be used both for states as well as structures 
with a multi-national dimension. 
Why is a study of the strategic culture of the EU important? First of all, the concept of 
strategic culture itself figures in official documents of the EU, most significantly the 
European Security Strategy (ESS), in which, the High Representative for the CFSP 
Javier Solana has talked about the necessity of forging: "a strategic culture that fosters 
early, rapid, and when necessary, robust intervention" (European Council 2003: 13). 
Without an EU strategic culture it is quite likely that no common vision of the world 
will emerge amongst the EU members. In this case, as Van Staden (2000: 6) claims, the 
EU will be carried along by events and incidents without having a clear view of how 
these should be addressed. This is also the view of Meyer (2006: 3) who claims that: 
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"if the compass needles of key members point in opposite directions, common action 
will become substantially more difficult; the lack of strategic coherence may lead the 
EU to recognise a threat too late, procrastinate a decision or fail at the implementation 
stage on account of insufficient political and public support. ESDP may become simply 
unsustainable once a military engagement proves costly or fails in its immediate 
objective". 
1.4.1. Basic ideas of the Strategic Culture of the European Union 
Where does the strategic culture of the EU stand so far? The works of scholars such as 
Martinsen (2003), Matlary (2006), Cornish & Edwards (2001,2005) and Meyer (2005, 
2006) provide an optimistic view of ESDP by reaching the conclusion that an EU 
strategic culture, albeit with various limitations, is slowly emerging. However, not all 
researchers are so optimistic. The studies of Lindley-French (2002), Rynning (2003a) 
and Hyde Price (2005), argue that security policy remains firmly under the powers of 
the EU nation states as the EU still lacks a common strategic culture. 
According to Cornish and Edwards (2001: 587,2005: 802), the strategic culture of the 
EU can be defined as: 
"the institutional confidence and processes to manage and deploy military force as part 
of the accepted range of legitimate and effective policy instruments, together with 
general recognition of the EU's legitimacy as an international actor with military 
capabilities". 
The expansion of the EU policy sphere in issues of security and defence is also 
mentioned by Cornish and Edwards (2001: 588) who suggests that: 
"there are areas of political-military activity, such as policing actions of various types 
on the external borders of the EU, and the limited application of military force in the 
context of post-conflict reconstruction, peace-building and development aid, where 
perhaps a unique, 'gendarmerie' style EU strategic culture has been germinating". 
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A few of the elements which constitute the strategic culture of the EU will be described 
in the works mentioned below. However, these are still very general characteristics that 
require further elaboration and analysis in the thesis. For instance, Hyde-Price (2005: 
154-155), argues that a European strategic culture is characterized by: the primacy of 
expeditionary operations and the use of coercion but not brute force. Rynning (2003: 
485) seems to agree with this statement as he mentions that the less robust nature of the 
EU: 
"is indicative of the same European inhibition that was seen in Kosovo with regard to 
applying force to win campaigns". 
Furthen-nore, according to Hyde-Price (2005: 155), in the case of the EU: 
44 military coercion will rarely be employed unless it is seen to have a clear ethical or 
humanitarian goal". 
This is in accordance with the analysis provided by Rynning (2003: 485-6), who claims 
that the European use of force will likely resemble that of the doctrine of just war: 
military coercion will take place only when mandated by international law Ous ad 
bellum). Furthermore, the use of force will be severely constrained Ous in bello). 
In addition, Hyde-Price (2005: 154-5) argues that EU states are concerned at ways of 
securing minimal risk in the exposure of their armies, and that they are sensitive when 
it comes to causing collateral damage as European public opinion is ill-disposed to the 
civilian costs of war. Similarly, Cornish and Edwards (2005: 809) claim that: 
"the EU has largely regarded the value of military force as limited, preferring a more 
integrated response that tackles the threat". 
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Similarly, scholars such as Rynning (2003b: 11), express doubts on whether the EU is 
ready to engage in direct and often lethal fights against threats such as terrorism. 
Finally, Meyer (2006: 174) is also very cautious about the EU's capacity and attitudes 
towards the resolution of humanitarian crises. As he argues: 
"only if humanitarian crises pop up on the EU's doorstep in a form which is sufficiently 
in the mass media, can one expect the pressure to act to outweigh concerns over 
divergent nornis on how to fight". 
The above mentioned ideas provide interesting insights to the ideas, beliefs and values 
that characterise ESDP. However, these descriptions have to be tested in order to be 
validated as they mostly stem from mere observation of ESDP missions that the EU has 
so far undertaken. Unfortunately, (with the exception of the more methodologically 
rigorous work of Meyer, 2006), none of the scholars of EU strategic culture has yet 
come up with comprehensive methodological guidelines as to how strategic culture 
should be identified and analysed. The construction of such guidelines is not an easy 
task as the EU is neither a state nor a simple security organization. Therefore, the study 
of its strategic culture cannot conform to previous models of strategic culture analysis 
and so requires an enriched approach. The next section of the thesis deals with the 
'differentiation' of the EU and the implications that this particular differentiation poses 
to the study of strategic culture. 
1.4.2. Why the European Union is Different? Implications of 
Differentiation for the Study of the Strategic Culture of the 
European Union 
Matlary (2006: 108-9), notes that the strategic culture of the EU is 'post-national', 
According to Matlary (2006: 114), the EU is a different actor: one that does not look 
like a Westphalian state and one that is not a simple international organization. Because 
of this peculiarity the study of strategic culture of the EU cannot be based on the idea of 
defence because - contrary to what happened in the shaping of the strategic culture of 
states - the EU does not have a defence policy in the traditional sense. 
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Scholars of strategic culture mention that there are many factors that affect strategic 
culture. The study of strategic culture includes analysis of factors as diverse as 
civic/political culture, tradition, technology, institutional setting, geography, climate, 
resources, the dominant way of political and social life in the country studied, 
organizational culture and traditions, historical strategic practices, institutional 
dynamics, national characteristics, symbols and political psychology (Lantis and 
Howlett, 2007: 82-99). However, due to the 'different' nature of the EU, not all these 
factors can be used in a study of its strategic culture. 
For instance, in the case of the EU, it would be difficult to talk about a unified political 
culture that could shape strategic culture of the EU as much of its politics are still 
dominated by national actors, national political parties and national issues. The same 
would be valid for other analytical elements such as the study of tradition, the dominant 
way of life and national characteristics which form part of various studies on national 
strategic cultures. There are also scholars who mention the importance of the national 
Constitutions and Parliaments on the strategic culture of the states which they have 
chosen to examine (Longhurst on Germany, 2004, Katzenstein on Japan, 1998). 
However, in the case of the EU, ESDP emerged long before the Treaty establishing a 
European Constitution whereas the competencies in the field of security and defence 
were left in the hands of the members states. For all these reasons, the above mentioned 
variables cannot be used in a study of the strategic culture of the EU. The next part of 
the chapter will justify why particular elements have to be taken into account. These 
elements will constitute the main independent variables of the study. 
1.5. Definition of the Strategic Culture of the EuroPean Union 
The thesis will now provide a definition of the strategic culture of the EU as well as 
give an account of how the thesis is going to proceed. After a careful study of the 
definitions of strategic studies that have been mentioned previously, the strategic 
culture of the EU is defined as: 
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the ideas, beliefs, values and practices of Brussels based ESDP officials regarding the 
current and potential use of force though the deployment of police and military 
instruments. These ideas, beliefs, values and practices are manifested in the way ESDP 
Brussels based officials think about the deployment of the military and police resources 
of the EU as well as in the way they plan missions of the European Security and 
Defence Policy (ESDP). The strategic culture of the EU is also characterised by various 
structural and behavioural elements of strategic culture which are manifested through 
the interaction of ESDP officials in institutions and networks. Elements of strategic 
culture are also developed through the historic evolution of the European security 
debate. 
The strategic culture of the EU is shaped by multiple independent variables, the most 
important of which are, the historic framework within which ESDP has been 
promulgated, the development of ESDP ideas through networking and 
institutional isation, the emergence of various structural and behavioural rules as well as 
the development of practices through military/police missions. Building on the 
definition above, the next section deals with those elements that make up the study of 
EU strategic culture and will explain how they are to be applied in the thesis. 
1. Locating Strategic Culture through the Study of History 
The development of strategic culture (continuity or change in ideas regarding the use of 
force through police and military resources) can be seen as a product of various 
historical influences. In one of his very first works Gray (1981: 35-37) defined strategic 
culture as: 
"referring to modes of thought and action with respect to force, which derive from 
perception of the national historical experience, from aspirations for responsible 
behaviour in national tenns". 
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Furthennore, the works of Martha Finnemore (2003) and Theo Farrell (2005) have 
focused on gathering historic evidence which shows that nonns of war have changed 
within the West over time because of external shocks, and other related historical 
events. 
Generally, works on strategic culture clearly argue that strategic culture cannot be 
separated from historical context. In the case of the EU, an analysis of the historical 
evolution which has led to the creation of ESDP is therefore important. When it comes 
to ESDP, it has been suggested that various historic events have been influential in its 
inception and development. For instance, researchers on security issues (Howorth 2000, 
2003, Hyde-Price 2005, Lindley-French 2002), provide an analysis of the political 
developments in 1998 (notably the Anglo-French St. Malo declaration) which were 
crucial for the emergence of ESDP. However, it is also argued that the process of 
change started much earlier (Bailes 1996: 55-64, Howorth 2000: 33-55). In general, the 
historic coverage of ESDP claims that there were many discussions for a 'Europe of 
security' since the creation of the European Community back in the 1950s, but it was 
mostly the pressures emerging after the end of the Cold War which gave new impetus 
to the idea of assumption of security on behalf of the EU (Meyer 2006: 1-13, Howorth 
2000: 33-55, Longhurst and Zaborowski 2005: 159-173, van Eekelen 2006: 10-19). 
New fears stemming from the end of the Cold War led to the birth of new ideas on how 
to deal with post 1989 security challenges (Hyde Price 2005: 137-155). Consequently, 
historic changes brought a change of mentalities which were manifested in the creation 
of new epistemic communities which provided new thinking in issues of security 
(Howorth 2004: 211-234). This process of change led to basic strategic 
reconsiderations and to a favourable approach to the idea that the EU could become a 
security player. 
External shocks and policy failures are very much related to the question of when 
change happens in strategic culture and consequently have to be taken into account in a 
study of ESDP (Lantis 2005: 8). Thompson, Ellis and Wildavsky (1990: 69-70), note 
that cultures remain important when their core principles continue to generate solutions 
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that satisfy human needs. When cultures cease to provide such solutions, when they 
cease to make sense, their constitutive members begin to doubt them, and if plausible 
alternatives are available, members ultimately defect to them. Change takes place when 
new issues need to be dealt with and when old solutions are no longer relevant. 
Problems related to the elements that make up a strategic culture together lead to a 
discussion about its usefulness and consequently to a change or to a reconsideration of 
the policies that constitute it. 
In this light, one can trace a process of policy learning from traumas and failures. For 
instance, it is argued that it was the EU's bad experience in Bosnia and Kosovo that 
finally pushed it to assume military responsibilities (Cornish and Edwards 2001: 588, 
Lantis 2005: 9). The evolution of the EU strategic culture was gradual in nature as 
change of ideas which are related to the use of force happens slowly most of the times 
(Longhurst 2004). Fundamental change may also be a strategic outcome in times of 
severe crisis, or in cases where failure stems from wrong strategic choices. For these 
reasons the thesis will include a chapter on the historic evolution of EU security debate 
after the Cold War and will take into account influential events as well as the actions of 
particular member states that contributed to the establishment of ESDP. 
1.5.2. The role of ESDP policy officials in the Development of 
the Strategic Culture of the European Union 
Many strategic culture researchers (e. g. Kier 1995, Katzenstein 1996, Howorth 2000, 
Meyer 2006) focus on the question of policy elites and their influence in the 
development and maintenance of strategic culture. As strategic culture is related to the 
study of ideas, beliefs and values, policy officials become objects of research because 
they are the 'carriers' of ideas that are the main elements of a strategic culture. 
Therefore, the beliefs of ESDP officials must be studied in detail. The thesis agrees 
with this claim and includes an analysis of questionnaires imd interviews which stem 
from two different groups of EU officials (Appendix III and IV). The first group 
interviewed consists of members of the Political and Security Committee (PSC), one of 
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the most influential institutions in the ESDP decision-making process (see Chapter 
Five). The second sample of interviewees includes EU officials which come from many 
other EU institutions in order to check whether there is a consistency of beliefs 
regarding the use of force within the EU. Further information regarding the choice of 
the two interview samples is included in these Appendices as well as in the Appendix 1. 
Furthermore, the relationship between agents and structure is also taken into account in 
Appendix I as the thesis follows the logic of structuration (Giddens 1984). 
The role of EU officials has to be taken into account as officials are often seen as the 
purveyors of a common historical narrative (Cruz 2000: 278). Furthermore, officials are 
perceived as 'strategic users' of culture who redefine the 'limits of the possible' in key 
foreign and security discourses (Lantis 2005: 10). However, they are not always 
carriers of new ideas and may be cognitively predisposed in certain cases to maintain 
the status quo, a stance which renders them the main obstacles of change. As Johnston 
(1995b: 57) suggests: 
"elites have their own language of discourse which excludes alternative strategies, 
undennines challenges to their authority, mobilises support and otherwise upholds their 
hegemony in the decision process". 
Consequently, the boundaries of the strategic agenda of the EU will be set by the 
language, logic and conceptual categories of the high-echelon ESDP officials and 
decision-makers. 
In addition, officials have their own interests which can be influential when it comes to 
setting up policy-agendas and taking decisions. According to Hadfield (2004: 6): 
"actors are [ ... ] constituted by the range of self-reference and self-interest, generally 
formed endogenously (if reaffirmed exogenously) and which then promote a cohesive 
sense of unity, an intra-unit commonality as well as inter-unit differences throughout 
the wider international structure". 
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Therefore, elites have the ability to promote new ideas which serve their roles and 
interests within a particular collective. However, one should also take into account that 
ideas serve officials only when a set of particular circumstances are fulfilled. According 
to Keohane and Goldstein (1993: 3): 
"ideas influence policy when the principled or causal beliefs they embody provide road 
maps that increase actors' clarity about goals or ends-means relationships, when they 
affect outcomes of strategic situations in which there is no unique equilibrium and 
when they become embedded in political institutions". 
However, although EU officials are influential, it should be also taken into account that 
they are constrained by societal framework of ideas and values that surrounds them as 
well by wider political and institutional forces. Furthennore, ESDP officials can 
become 'entrapped' in their own ideas or in the ideas that are propagated in their 
environment by other policy-makers and institutions. According to Johnston (1995: 40): 
"elites, too, are socialised in the strategic culture they produce, and thus can be 
constrained by the symbolic myths which their predecessors have created. This raises 
the possibility that elites cannot escape the symbolic discourses they manipulate". 
The view that ESDP officials are constrained by beliefs and values is also supported in 
the work of Meyer (2005: 527) who argues that policy officials: 
"draw on pre-existing and usually stable schemata, beliefs and ideas about the external 
world and deeply ingrained nonns about appropriate behaviour". 
In addition, as many policy officials are in Brussels in order to represent their 
respective member state, they also face limitations on their mandate and powers. A 
study on the EU strategic culture cannot ignore the role of ESDP officials neither the 
limitations posed on them by their structural enviromnent. The thesis will focus on 
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whether there is a strategic culture made by EU officials, which are its basic ideas and 
how far EU officials are constrained by various structural and political issues. The roles 
and attitudes of ESDP officials will be explored in detail in Chapters Four, Five and 
Six. 
1.5.3. The Development of Strategic Culture through the 
Influence of Networks 
Although EU officials have played an important role in the development of EU 
strategic culture, they do not act in a vacuum. Elites work in institutions, interact and 
negotiate with each other in order to reach an EU consensus on issues of security. The 
examination of the relationships developed amongst different elites through networking 
can provide interesting findings as far as the planning and execution of policies is 
concerned. Appendix I justifies the choice of policy networks over other similar terms. 
The works of Johnston (1995), Katzenstein (1996), Finnemore (2003), Farrell (2005), 
Howorth (2004) and Meyer (2006) have emphasised the role of elites acting as 'norm 
entrepreneurs' and the influence of policy networks in the creation of new security 
trends. In the case of ESDP, Howorth (2004) clairns that a particular epistemic 
community has been important in the shaping of ESDP and that it consists of 
representatives from the biggest EU states (France, Germany and the UK). Edwards 
(2006: 21) also mentions the importance of the 'big three' group of officials as a 
'directoire' which leads ESDP. Therefore, networks can become a proxy indicator of 
strategic culture as well as the vehicle through which strategic culture is transmitted. By 
showing how influential networks are in ESDP, the thesis will, in parallel, show how 
the strategic culture of the EU has been developed. 
However, questions from previous works mentioned can arise on the 'quality' of the 
cooperation that takes place in ESDP through networking. For instance, the networking 
of the 'big three' EU countries may happen not necessarily because they have reached a 
common strategic culture but because their geopolitical interests and priorities 
happened to converge at a particular time. Therefore, the thesis makes a distinction 
between strategic culture and strategic consensus. A strategic consensus can be reached 
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when the strategic interests of particular policy-makers converge and a decision to 
establish joint missions is possible. However, a strategic consensus does not necessarily 
imply that the elites have reached pen-nanent common ideas, beliefs and values on 
wider geopolitical and strategic issues. Therefore, in terms of ideas, strategic culture is 
'deeper' from a simple strategic consensus as it implies that EU members hold similar 
views on the deployment of police and military instruments on a permanent basis. 
Without a strategic culture, the development of ESDP is still possible. Nevertheless, its 
evolution will be based on coalitions of EU countries that will caucus temporarily for 
their own interests and not in the development of a cohesive group of EU states which 
will be bounded together by common understandings on security issues. 
Another point that should be also examined is how various policy networks interact 
with officials from other EU member states which do not form part of their network. 
For example, although the 'big three' group is seen as influential in the shaping of 
ESDP one must not forget that the EU consists of a wide number of EU states and that 
agreement is necessary amongst them so that an ESDP mission could be implemented. 
Therefore, one should take into account the relationship between the big three and the 
remaining EU member states. In addition, the thesis will also try to locate other 
influential networks (such as the 'neutrals' network and the Greek-Cypriot-Maltese 
group) that have not been studied so far. All these topics will be included in a 
consideration of institutional isation/policy networks in Chapters Four and Five. 
1.5.4. Institutional isation of ESDP and its Impact on Strategic 
Culture 
The thesis claims that structure and agency should be seen as two different entities that 
mutually influence each other (Giddens 1984). Further details are included in Appendix 
I of the thesis. In the case of the EU, Andreani (2000: 83) has, in fact, suggested that 
institutions have always been at the core of the European project: 
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"the process of European integration is a joint exercise in nonn-setting and institution 
building. Institutions are supposed to provide for fairness and predictability, and inspire 
EU countries with a sense of purpose and belonging. Institutional isation raises 
expectations and plays an important role in maximizing capabilities and giving life to 
actions". 
Institutions are seen as important strategic culture shapers for various reasons. As will 
be mentioned in Chapter Three, the development of networks within institutions is a 
fact that has facilitated the development of ESDP. In addition, as it will be argued later 
in Chapter Four, ESDP institutions have become the hubs of policy networks. 
Therefore, institutions and networks have to be studied in parallel. 
More specifically, according to Cornish and Edwards (2001: 595), institutions have 
been important in the shaping of the strategic culture of the EU because: 
"institutionalisation matters in that, inter alia, it establishes strong socializing pressures 
on the part of those participating, both within the formal structures and within the more 
infort-nal processes and procedures that surround them". 
Therefore, a study on institutions has to focus on how far ESDP institutions have 
managed to strengthen the development of the strategic culture of the EU. 
The study of institutions is also important for another reason. ESDP institutions do not 
only interact amongst themselves but are also enmeshed in a wider web of 
relationships. Neighborouring states, big powers such as the US, regional blocs, and 
security organisations such as NATO and the UN, are connected with the policies of the 
EU through institutionalized relationships. Here, NATO has a particular significance. 
Because of a lack of capabilities and experience, the EU has reached a number of 
agreements with the alliance. An inclusive study of the strategic culture of the EU thus 
cannot ignore the relationship between these two entities. The thesis will provide a 
summary of the thoughts that ESDP officials have when it comes to the interaction 
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between their own institutions with other policy actors and will shed light on the 
beliefs of ESDP officials regarding the EU-NATO link. 
While one would stress the importance of institutions in strategic culture one must also 
be cautious about the real impact that these have on ESDP. Institutions cannot create a 
strategic culture 'on their own'. It may also be the case that institutions form the basis 
of negotiations where member states see ESDP as a process of pulling resources 
together in order to serve their own needs and not as spaces of common identity and 
integration. Therefore, institutional isation has many different expressions. These will 
be taken into account in Chapter Two. Some of these forms are described as 'thin', and 
mostly relate to mere intergovernmental interaction that takes place within ESDP 
institutions for the sake of national interests. Chapter Two will also cover 'thicker' 
versions of institutionalisation which are characterised by common values, ideas and 
beliefs. 
Finally, studies which claim that an EU strategic culture is slowly emerging (Cornish 
and Edwards 2001,2005, Martinsen 2003, Edwards 2006, Meyer 2006) mention that it 
is already developing through a 'socialization' process which is considerably 
accelerated by institutional arrangements. Socialization is used in the thesis to describe 
the process by which officials within an EU institution come to acquire similar attitudes 
and values after being engaged in negotiations concerning policy decisions and through 
intensive social interaction. Parts of the questionnaire that will be analysed in Chapters 
Four and Six deal with issues of socialisation and the impact that personal interaction 
has upon ESDP officials. 
1.5.5. Case Study: ESDP Missions in Bosnia Herzegovina 
In her works on strategic culture, Longhurst (2000b, 2004) argues that collective ideas 
and values about the use of force are important constitutive factors in the design and 
execution of states' security policies. In this respect, strategic culture is important 
because it either presents decision-makers with a limited range of options or it acts as a 
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lens that alters the appearance and efficacy of different choices. Analysis of strategic 
culture can thus be seen as an attempt to locate the impact of deep-seated values and 
beliefs when it comes to deciding on ways that a particular mission should be 
implemented (see also Appendix 1). 
It is worth mentioning that the study of strategic culture of the EU is not merely an 
issue related to academic theory. It is a pragmatic discussion as the EU implements its 
own security agenda under the umbrella of ESDP institutions. Therefore, it is vital to 
apply the strategic culture concept in order to analyse ESDP policies in depth. Various 
works on the strategic culture of the EU point to the steady EU development of 
responsibilities in ten-ns of conflict prevention and management as manifested in the 
growing number of ESDP missions. Furthennore, operations are important because 
they can lead to a 'can do' psychology amongst EU policy makers (Cornish and 
Edwards 2005: 807) which, in turn, has a long-term impact on shaping a more dynamic 
strategic culture for the EU. For these reasons, the exploration of the strategic culture of 
the EU would have been incomplete without the inclusion of a case study on ESDP 
missions. 
Here it should be mentioned that strategic action influences learning and change in 
strategic culture. On the one hand, if a particular operation fails, it is very likely that 
major parts of EU strategy will have to be altered. These changes may, in turn, lead to a 
transfon-nation of EU strategic culture. On the other hand, if an ESDP mission is 
successful then strategic thinking may be empowered and consolidated leading to a 
'spill-over' of missions. That said, the thesis favours a cautious approach when it comes 
to the study of missions. Although various researchers (Martinsen 2003, Cornish and 
Edwards 2001,2005) have focused their studies almost exclusively on the development 
of an EU strategic culture manifested through the deployment of ESDP missions, 
sceptics can juxtapose the fact that missions do not necessarily reflect common ideas on 
deploying police and military forces but a temporary convergence of interest that 
evaporates once the missions are over (strategic consensus). Therefore, a successful 
link between actions and strategic culture must be made so that it can be demonstrated 
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that there are common ideas and beliefs which are influential in the planning and 
implementation of ESDP missions. This will be the task of the case study chapter on 
the ESDP missions in Bosnia Herzegovina (Chapter Six). 
1.6. Constraints on the Development of the Strategic Culture of 
the EU 
A comprehensive study of the strategic culture of the EU must take into account the 
difficulties that impede its consolidation. First of all, the supposed intergovernmentalist 
nature of ESDP is commonly cited as a problem. Julian Lindley-French (2002: 809) 
summarized the situation at the beginning of the 2002 by arguing: 
"in 2002, it would appear, there is neither strategy nor policy. Or, put another way, 
there are too many strategies and policies based upon contending strategic concepts. 
This has led to a dangerous paradox in European security policies that has become 
increasingly apparent over the past ten years. In the absence of a functioning 
transnational security concept west European powers, both big and small, react too late, 
with too little, to crises that seem increasingly beyond the scope and range of either 
their diplomatic or military capabilities, built as they are on false strategic 
assumptions", 
Therefore, although there has been a considerable process of strategic convergence 
facilitated by ESDP, Matlary (2006: 107) notes that the EU strategic culture is still at an 
'embryonic' state and requires further consolidation. This condition is due to the fact 
that the member states continue to possess widely different national strategic cultures: 
"from France and the UE, which are used to global military activism, to Germany, 
which needs a UN mandate and parliamentary approval for any use of force" (Matlary 
2006: 113). 
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Other studies have also focused on the differences between the biggest EU nations 
states. Hyde-Price (2005: 139-140) provides an analysis of national differences on the 
use of force amongst France, Germany, Poland and the UK, thus demonstrating the 
difficulties in the road of a development of a cohesive strategic culture. 
In general, it is widely accepted that European attitudes are still characterised by 
considerable heterogeneity. Furthennore, national variations are not easy to overcome 
because they have been shaped by different historical lessons (Meyer 2006: 1). 
According to Edwards (2006: 17), the 'strength and legitimacy of national discourses' 
leaves a limited space for the development of a vibrant supranational. strategic culture. 
The issue of 'national' predominance in matters of security and defence limit the 
inventiveness and dynamism of ESDP as beliefs, ideas and values on the use of military 
and police instruments remain diverse. Furthen-nore, according to Meyer (2005: 52-3), 
national awareness of the ESDP project is still low, thus blocking the development of 
EU strategic culture. 
In addition, pressures stemming from national priorities often lead to a lack of political 
will to cooperate and act through ESDP (Matlary 2006: 118). For instance, the strategic 
culture of the EU remains 'anaemic' because of the lack of capabilities (Edwards 2006: 
17, Cornish and Edwards 2005: 802). This problem may be linked to the unwillingness 
of the EU member states to invest more resources into ESDP as they remain cautious 
about its overall aims. The thesis will answer whether different national cultures can be 
combined in ESDP by reaching a common framework of beliefs and values. 
Unfortunately, the great number of EU states renders impossible the tasks of examining 
their security and defence policies in detail. However, the questionnaire drafted to test 
official opinions also includes sections on the issue of national identities as well as the 
interaction between the ESDP and the nation states (see analysis in Chapters Six and 
Seven). 
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Another challenge to the cohesion of ESDP is the trend of enlargement which is also 
seen as 'problematic' when it comes to the shaping of a unified strategic culture for the 
EU. For instance, Meyer (2005: 52) mentions that: 
"the overloaded agenda and the large number of participants can hamper substantive 
discussions about longer term strategic choices". 
One of the biggest challenges to ESDP posed by enlargement is the deepening of 
divisions concerning collaboration with NATO (Cornish and Edwards 2005: 800, 
Hyde-Price 2005: 137). The EU-NATO partnership has, for decades, had a decisive 
influence on European thinking on issues of security and strategy (Cornish and 
Edwards 2005: 815). However, divisions arriongst EU members on the perceptions of 
NATO remain strong and there is no clear indication how far the EU-NATO 
relationship should go (Meyer 2006: 138-170). The impact of enlargement will be also 
discussed in the thesis as it emerged during interviews with ESDP officials (Chapters 
Five and Six). 
Furthermore, the question of NATO is inextricably linked to the role of the USA in 
security affairs. The Iraq crisis of 2003 demonstrated that due to different national 
perspectives on US foreign policy, EU member states could choose very different 
strategic directions (Cornish and Edwards 2005: 819). Diverging opinions on the 
qu estion of NATO/US involvement in ESDP may lead to a slow down of the strategic 
culture of the EU. For all these reasons, a study of the strategic culture of the EU should 
take into account these divisions and try to examine whether a unified strategic culture 
can emerge by bridging the 'Atlanticist' and the 'Europeanist' perceptions that are 
evident in the policies of EU member states. 
In the case where the 'bridging' of national positions through ESDP is not happening, 
one should not disregard the development of multiple sub-cultures as a possible 
outcome of ESDP. Strategic culture theory takes into account the fact that different 
groups of ideas may coexist within a specific culture. Therefore, a study on strategic 
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culture must also bear in mind that strategic culture may be characterised by 
fragmentation and in the case of the EU, it may consist of a number of sub-cultures that 
overlap, thus creating a circle where common points interact by providing a strategic 
consensus. However, if this is the case, there is also an important space outside the 
circle of consensus which leaves a wide room of manoeuvre for the national strategic 
cultures to perforrn their own initiatives outside the ESDP framework. The 
development of strategic culture may be empowered as long as ESDP institutions 
become powerful and can diffuse their own ideas in a 'top-bottom' manner, thus 
gradually enlarging the above mentioned circle of common action. 
1.7. Innovations of the Study of the Strategic Culture of the 
European Union 
This study of EU strategic culture attempts to fill gaps apparent in similar studies and is 
characterised by various innovations. First of all, the study has extracted structural and 
behavioural elements from a number of multi-national entities (Chapter Two). The 
thesis uses structurallbehavioural elements from entities such as security communities, 
policy networks and institutions in order to see how a 'modus vivendi' is constructed 
within them. It claims that three particular types of strategic culture can be developed 
by taking into account structural and behavioural elements in security communities, 
policy networks and institutions. These three types are called primary, intermediate 
and consolidated type. Second, the thesis provides a link between the development of 
the EU security community and the policy networks and institutions that are 
functioning within such a security community. Third, as noted above, the thesis makes 
a distinction between strategic consensus which is an ephemeral consensus on a 
particular security issue and strategic culture which implies that the EU possesses 
common beliefs regarding a particular strategic question. The study also provides four 
different types regarding the use of force in order to categorise the way the EU deploys 
its military and police instruments. These different types have been extracted from a 
study of the literature on the EU strategic culture and EU actorness (Chapter Two). The 
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main types that are developed are named as Passive Europe, Cautious Interventionist 
Europe, Active Europe and Super Active Europe. 
Furtherniore, the study of history is another step in the extraction of ideas and values 
that have contributed to the development of the EU strategic culture through the 
establishment of ESDP (Chapter Three). The study of history is carried out to 
investigate the way the changing environment has affected their thinking on issues of 
security, thus contributing to the development of an EU strategic culture. Furthermore, 
the study of the Bosnia and Kosovo conflicts also provide interesting insights on the 
way the Europeans perceived the use of force. The thesis follows the perceptions of the 
EU officials regarding the Western Balkans by providing a case study on the ESDP 
Bosnian missions in order to extract beliefs and practices that are influential in the 
development of the strategic culture of the EU (Chapter Six). This is not an exercise 
aimed at describing the problems and challenges of the two ESDP missions in BiH or 
accessing its effectiveness but rather an effort to locate which beliefs are influential 
when it comes to the implementation of EU operations. 
1.8. Conclusions 
Each state and security institution that exercises the use of force through the 
deployment of police and military instruments may possess a strategic culture. The 
thesis argues that this is also the case for the EU. It may be argued that the strategic 
culture of the EU is still an 'embryonic' one or in the process of development. 
However, if this is the case, then this is a time where its main elements have to be 
studied as they forrn the basic constitutive elements that will shape future developments 
in the field of ESDP. There is'already a limited academic debate on the topic of the 
strategic culture of the EU which requires further clarification, elaboration and 
deepening. Ideas, beliefs, practices and values regarding the use of force through the 
planning and deployment of EU military and police instruments form part of the 
strategic culture of the EU and have to be studied in detail. 
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After a consideration of the literature of strategic culture, the thesis will develop in 
relation to four main elements. The influence of ESDP institutions and policy networks 
will be analysed in Chapters Four and Six of the thesis whereas patterns of measuring 
the strength of the strategic culture of the EU will forrn part of Chapter Two. In 
addition, the post-Cold War trajectory which led to the establishment of ESDP will be 
analysed in Chapter Three. The analysis of opinions of ESDP officials will be extracted 
from an extensive questionnaire and interviews (Chapters Four, Five and Six). Finally, 
a study on the strategic culture of the EU cannot be complete without an inclusion of 
case studies. Due to their length and size, the two ESDP missions in Bosnia 
Herzegovina (EUPM and Althea) will be considered in order to discover how the 
strategic culture of the EU has an impact on the implementation of its missions 
(Chapter Six). Various ontological and methodological issues which are related to the 
concept of strategic culture are presented in Appendix 1. The thesis will now focus on 
the categorisation of the EU strategic culture into different models. Chapter Two deals 
with the issue of strategic culture categorisation and provides various models of 
strategic culture. These will be used later in the thesis in order to describe the strategic 
culture of the EU. 
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Chapter Two: 
Categorising Strategic Culture 
2.1. Introduction 
The idea of measuring strategic culture is inspired by the Johnston - Gray debate. In 
this debate, Johnston (1995b) argues that strategic culture needs to be considered 
scientifically. Therefore, one has to prove that strategic culture exists and that it is 
susceptible to measurement. This chapter will provide an account of how measurement 
can be applied to the strategic culture of the EU. 
Chapter One argued that strategic culture can be measured by taking into account 
elements that characterise the functioning of other multinational entities such as 
security communities, policy networks and institutions. This suggestion is extended 
here with the claim that each security community, including that of the EU, has its own 
strategic culture. The decision to conduct a study of institutions, policy networks and 
security communities was made-on the grounds that, as the EU is not a state. Types of 
strategic culture were devised to study the strategic culture that would fit an entity such 
as the EU. Therefore, other multinational entities had to be taken into account that 
would reflect the particular structure of the EU. The analysis of these three concepts 
(security communities, policy networks and institutions) aims to pinpoint those 
behavioural and structural elements that permit these entities to be kept together and to 
consequently possess a strategic culture. These entities are characterised by their own 
different levels of 'maturity' due to different behavioural and structural characteristics. 
These different types of strategic culture serve as a basis for measuring the strategic 
culture of the EU. In addition, as strategic culture is about the role of ideas, beliefs and 
values regarding the use of force, a framework which categorises ideas in different 
types of strategic culture also needs to be developed. This framework will be analysed 
at section 2.5 of the Chapter. 
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As a point of departure, Chapter Two begins by analysing the importance of the notion 
of security community as related to the EU. It claims that each security community has 
its own strategic culture and consequently so does the security community of the EU. 
However, this is not a merely descriptive exercise. The main novelty of the chapter is to 
describe the role that institutions and policy networks play within the EU security 
community and how the strategic culture of the EU is affected by the functions of 
networks and institutions. Inspired by the theory of security communities, the chapter 
argues that the strategic culture of the EU can be categorised in three different types. 
These are the primary, intermediate and consolidated types of strategic culture. Chapter 
Two also develops the notion of security community by suggesting that policy 
networks and institutions play a vital link in its maintenance. Without the development 
of EU policies and the exchange of ideas that is taking place within networks and 
institutions no strategic culture could have emerged in a security community. 
2.2. Security Communities 
The existence of a security community is a basic prerequisite for the emergence of an 
EU strategic culture. Without the emergence of an EU security community (a "no war" 
community), the development of an EU strategic culture would be impossible as EU 
states would have never agreed to act together in the field of security and defence. 
Many scholars claim that the EU is a security community with its own characteristics 
(Williams 2001: 525, Rumelili 2003: 213, Waever 1998: 69). Being such community, 
the EU carries its own values which have an impact on the way it uses its military and 
police instruments, and consequently, on the way it develops its strategic culture. 
The notion of security communities was introduced by Karl Deutsch (1957,1978). 
Deutsch argued that the North American and Western European states were successful 
in creating security communities in which the use of force between members was 
almost unthinkable (Deutsch et al 1957). As elaborated by Nicholas Khoo (2004: 38): 
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"security communities are characterised by the absence of war as well as the absence of 
significant organized preparations for war such as military contingency planning 
amongst its members. Competitive military build-ups or arms races between members 
of the claimed security community should also not be present". 
A natural corollary is that a security community involves a group of states, which have 
become "integrated". According to Deutsch (1957: 5), by such integration: 
'; we mean the attainment, within a territory, of a "sense of security" and of institutions 
and practices strong and widespread enough to assure [ ... ] dependable expectations of 
"peaceful change" among its population. By sense of community we mean a belief [ ... ] 
that common social problems must and can be resolved by processes of "peaceful 
change". 
Adler and Barnett (1998: 17) suggest that a formation such as the EU is an uncontested 
security community and is organised around three tiers: (1) precipitating conditions; (2) 
process variables (transactions, organizations, and social learning) and structural 
variables (power and knowledge); and (3) mutual trust and collective identity. 
Geographic proximity and the new technologies on communications are factors that 
contributed to the creation of the EU security community. However, geographic 
proximity and technology do not necessarily lead to the creation of a security 
community. For instance, the conditions for a security community are not present in 
other areas of the world such as the Asia-Pacific region because the region according to 
Ikenberry and Tsuchiyama (2002: 69): 
"encompasses a diverse mixture of rival great powers, thorny territorial disputes, 
unresolved historical memories, competing political ideologies, painful economic 
transitions, shifting military balances and diverging cultures". 
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Therefore, other factors such as common narratives, religion, societal values and beliefs 
also form an important part in the creation of a security community as they do in the 
development of strategic culture. 
Adler and Barnett also mention the existence of 'pluralistic security communities'. 
According to Adler and Barnett (1998: 3 1), a pluralistic security community is defined: 
"as a transnational region comprised of sovereign states whose people maintain 
dependable expectations of peaceful change". 
Adler and Barnett (1998: 31) suggest that a pluralistic security community has three 
main characteristics: 
"first, members of a community have shared identities, values, and meanings. [ ... ] 
Secondly, those in a community have many-sided and direct relations: interaction 
occurs not indirectly and in only specific and isolated domains, but rather through some 
form of face-to-face encounter and relations in numerous settings. Thirdly, such 
communities exhibit a reciprocity that expresses some degree of long-term interest and 
perhaps even altruism; long terrn interest derives from knowledge of those with whom 
one is interacting, and altruism can be understood as a sense of obligation and 
responsibility". 
The pluralistic version of security community fits the EU. It is a community of states 
that has developed a considerable level of trust which is manifested in the absence of 
military clashes. Furthermore, although the states of this community may still have 
different interests, it is claimed that these can be mutually influenced by group 
interaction. Furthermore, as claimed by Adler and Barnett (1998: 31), a security 
community is characterised by 'shared identities' which can be seen as the departure 
point of strategic culture. 
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The process of constructing a security community is a gradual one and requires a 
considerable amount of time. According to Deutsch (1978: 246-247), the whole process 
starts first with the sharing of a number of small modest tasks. If the security 
community is successful, it then receives more important tasks, and consequently, is 
upgraded to a community of overall amalgamation. The 'internal behaviour' of security 
communities is analysed by Deutsch (1978: 230-44). The process of integration 
includes a process of 'habit breaking'. It is suggested that a new attractive 'way of life' 
has to emerge. This new 'way of life' based on interstate cooperation will give rise to 
expectations of a better future which will render common collective expectations 
credible. New expectations will provide national populations and their political elites 
with a sense of unity, new interests and new ambitions. Interaction, altruism, 
reciprocity, the sense of obligation and responsibility need to be also present in the EU 
security community if some sort of strategic culture is to emerge. Second, the existing 
sense of unity has to be supported by the emergence of an external challenge which 
requires some new and joint response. 
However, the emergence of a pluralistic security community does not automatically 
guarantee its existence for the years to come. A security community is likely to- have 
setbacks and failures. According to Deutsch, there are certain conditions which are 
likely to cause a disintegration of a community (Deutsch 1978: 244). These conditions 
are presented below and will be also taken into account when the challenges of the 
strategic culture of the EU will be taken into account in the chapters to come. 
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Table One 
I Conditions of Disintegration of a security community (Deutsch 1978: 244) 1 
Any steep increase in econornic, military, or political burdens on the community or 
on any participating unit. 
A rapid increase in social mobilization and political participation, faster than the 
process of civic assimilation to the common political culture of the community. 
A rapid increase in regional, economic, cultural, social, linguistic, or ethnic 
differentiation, faster and stronger than any compensating integrative process. 
A serious lag of decline in the political or administrative institutions and 
capabilities of the government and the political elite, relative to the current tasks 
and burdens with which they have to cope. 
A relative closure of the political elite, slowing drastically the entry of new 
members and ideas, and giving rise to hostile counter-elites of frustrated 
potential elite members. 
A failure of the government and the elite to carry out in time needed reforrns and 
adjustments wanted or expected by the population or failure to adjust in time to 
the imminent decline or loss of some privileged or dominant minority position. 
2.3. The Link between Security Communities, Networks, 
Institutions and Strategic Culture 
Adlcr and Barnett simply mention that networks exist within a security community but 
they do not analyse their impact on strategic culture. Furthermore, the literature on 
security communities spends little time in analysing the impact of institutions on how 
these communities develop. This gap needs to be filled in order to explain how 
institutions and networks within the EU security community may influence the strategic 
culture of the EU. The characteristics of security community as well as the 
behavioural/structural elements which are evident within networks and institutions can 
be grouped together in order to reach conclusions regarding the strategic culture of the 
EU. 
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Why a study on strategic culture should take into account institutions? Institutions are 
important for the development of the strategic culture of the EU because they are the 
spaces where ideas and beliefs regarding the use of force flourish. For instance, March 
and Olsen (1989: 160) suggest that institutions are: 
"collections of interrelated rules and routines that define appropriate actions in ternis of 
relations between roles and situations". 
These 'rules' and 'routines' constitute essential elements of the strategic culture of the 
EU and will be taken into account in Chapter Five of the thesis. In addition, the study of 
institutions can provide interesting insights to the practices which stem from strategic 
culture as according to March and Olsen (1998: 948): 
66 an institution can be viewed as a relatively stable collection of practices and rules 
defining appropriate behaviour for specific groups of actors in specific situations. Such 
practices and rules are embedded in structures of meaning and schemes of 
interpretation that explain and legitimize particular identities and the practices and rules 
associated with them". 
Within the EU security community policy networks are also influential in the shaping 
of the EU strategic culture. Policy networks can become influential carriers of ideas 
that can influence the orientation of the strategic culture of the EU. The idea of policy 
networks is used to describe national and transnational dealings of actors. Policy 
networks are formal and informal groups of individuals that emerge within institutions. 
For the aims of the thesis a policy network is described as a group of officials who meet 
in order to exchange views on certain issues and policies (based on Marsh and Smith 
2000, Richardson and Jordan 1979). Contacts between the network members may 
fluctuate in frequency. Policy officials who form a network may agree on common 
actions in order to promote their own policy priorities. 
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Policy networks can be categorised as either loose and tight. (Marsh and Smith 2000: 
6). This is an important distinction as different networks will have a different impact on 
the strategic culture of the EU. A basic characteristic of a loose policy network is that it 
has a consultative (sometimes benchmarking) character. Its members may share 
common interests but do not necessarily share common policy aims. Therefore, the 
difference between loose and tight policy network lies in the fact that: 
"tight policy networks persist in large part, because they are characterised by a large 
degree of consensus, not necessarily on specific policy but rather on policy agenda" 
(Marsh and Smith 2000: 6). 
When it comes to networking within ESDP, a tight policy network represents a 
6 negotiated' order achieved through a process of pragmatic improvisation and 
accommodation that must be continually 'worked at' (based on Richardson and Jordan 
1979: 101). A tight policy network is also characterised by a strong consensus on policy 
priorities and ideas regarding the use of force. In order to be successful, a policy 
network must cultivate good relationships with the other actors that surround it. 
Therefore, a tight policy network must adopt accommodating positions to demands 
from other non network participating EU officials. 
The involvement of policy-makers in tight policy networks does not leave their 
identities unaffected, for accotding to Marsh and Smith (2000: 6) networks: 
"involve the institutional isation of beliefs, values, cultures and particular forms of 
behaviour". 
Therefore, networks can be influential in the shaping of the EU strategic culture as 
according to Marsh and Smith (2000: 5): 
"the relationships within the networks are structural because they: define the roles 
which actors play within networks, prescribe the issues which are discussed and how 
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they are dealt with; have distinct sets of rules; and contain organizational imperatives, 
so that at least, there is a major pressure to maintain the network". 
In addition, an important degree of trust and solidarity characterises a tight network. 
Usually, tight network participants interact in a harmonised way, cooperate successfully 
and develop common initiatives. Network members begin to share some common 
elements of identity. In addition, it is usually the case that tight policy networks are 
more efficient when it comes to problem solving as during times of high uncertainty 
they can be influential in shaping the agenda by promoting certain policy options. For 
these reasons tight policy networks have to be taken into account. Chapters Three, Four 
and Six will study the impact of the most important tight policy networks regarding the 
strategic culture of the EU. 
2.4. Structural/Behavioural Elements of Strategic Culture 
This section analyses the different possible models of strategic culture that the EU 
security community may possess. Adler and Barnett (1998) claim that that each security 
community is characterised by three phases of development (nascent, ascendant and 
mature). The thesis is inspired by this division and claims that, being a security 
community, the EU has its own strategic culture which can also be categorised in three 
different types: the primary, intennediate and the consolidated type. The section will 
deal with these three types in order to extract the structural/behavioural characteristics 
that follow strategic culture in each of these types. These characteristics will be 
grouped in tables that will follow each section. 
In order to fonn types of strategic culture that are characterised by different behavioural 
and structural characteristics the thesis studied the characteristics of security 
communities (Adler and Barnett 1998, Cronin 1999, Laffan 2001, Williams 2001, 
Ngoma 2003, Burgess 2005, Webber 2007), multinational policy networks (Hafterdorn 
1996, Marsh and Smith 2000, Kohler-Koch 2002, Adshead 2002, Krahmann 2003) and 
institutions (Moravcsik 1995, Hall and Taylor 1996, Buhner 1997, George and 
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Borawski 1998, Immergut 1998, Jupille and Caporaso 1999, Puchala 1999, Cornish and 
Edwards 2001, Andreani 2000, Biscop 2002, M. E. Smith 2004, Giovachini 2004, Haine 
2004, Youngs 2004, Beach 2005, Meyer 2005, Duke 2006, Flockhart 2006). The main 
aim of this exercise was to see how structural and behavioural elements that such 
multinational entities possess can be linked to the development of different types of 
strategic culture. The thesis concluded that there are common behavioural and 
structural characteristics in the development of the above mentioned entities that 
overlap. These characteristics can be grouped together in three different types in order 
to characterise different phases of development. After a consideration of the literature 
three main types were devised: the primary, the intermediate and the consolidated type 
of strategic culture. 
2.4.1. The Primary Type of Strategic Culture 
The main structural and behavioural elements that follow the primary stage of strategic 
culture are presented at the table below. 
Table Two 
Primary strategic culture 
Mutual security threat as a reference of cooperation 
Idea that cooperation can be mutually beneficial 
Positive transactions amongst states leading to cooperation 
Emergence of networks/institutions 
National interests predominant 
Tough bargaining 
Personal relationships of partial cooperation but also partial cautiousness 
Policy actors as strategic/sel fish calculators 
National structures generally cautious of EU expansion in security field 
Generally thin consensus on security issues 
The primary type marks the initial phase in the development of strategic culture and by 
elements that characterise the nascent phase of the EU security community. Early in the 
course of the integrative process, a psychological 'no war' community often develops 
that pushes partners of the community to get involved with each other. This is an 
important stage as strategic culture cannot flourish without the existence of a 'no war' 
community. In this model of strategic culture, EU officials and their colleagues in 
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national ministries do not explicitly seek to create a security community but they 
mostly understand that they share similar interests that would be better achieved 
through common action. As interaction just begins to happen amongst different EU 
partners there is no particular strategic culture developed yet. However, according the 
primary type, various common elements regarding ideas and values on the use of force 
can form the basis for the development of the strategic culture of the EU. Furthermore, 
the process of building a security community is encouraged by exogenous forces such 
as changes in technology, demography, economics, the environment, the development 
of new interpretations of social reality and the emergence of external threats (Adler & 
Barnett 1998: 50-3). 
A mutual security threat may convince policy officials of the EU member states that 
cooperation can be mutually beneficial. Positive transactions amongst state officials 
encourage cooperation, which in turns, leads to the establishment of various policy 
networks and institutions. However, this type of strategic culture is characterised by the 
predominance of national interests and by tough bargaining amongst different EU 
officials. The personal relationships that characterise this stage are of initial cooperation 
but also caution. Policy actors can be primarily perceived as strategic/selfish calculators 
that decide to collaborate in order to satisfy their national interests. Therefore, the 
consensus that exists in most security issues is thin. However, the existence of a 
particular threat may lead to the development of thick consensus on dealing with this 
particular threat. 
The tenn 'thin consensus' is used to describe the fragile and sometimes ephemeral 
agreement that exists in various security issues which may lead to gradual initiatives 
amongst EU policy officials in order to deal with problems of security. Policy officials 
of the EU security community may have reached such a c6nsensus to deal with a 
particular security issue because their interests overlap at a particular time in history 
and therefore, a strategic consensus on a particular security problem is feasible. 
However, the existence of strategic consensus does not imply that EU member states 
have reached common views on the nature, causes and remedies of a particular crisis 
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and on the use of the police and military instruments which are necessary to deal with 
it. On the other hand, a thick consensus implies that the EU member states have 
followed a common trajectory which has led to a harmonisation of views regarding a 
security crisis spot. This thick consensus is based not only on the mere convergence of 
national interests but also on the convergence of wider values, beliefs and ideas 
regarding the use of force. It is very rare for such a consensus to be found on a wide 
gamut of issues at the primary type of strategic culture. On the contrary, it is expected 
that the primary type will be mostly characterised by thin consensus or no consensus at 
all in many important security issues. A major crisis may also lead to a thick consensus 
in one policy area, which in turns, will spiral further cooperation in the field of security. 
As far as the primary type of strategic culture is concerned, Rational Choice 
Institutional (RCI) patterns will be influential in explaining the rules that govern the 
institutional dimension of the ESDP. RCI views institutions as a space of 
intergovernmental bargaining where an exchange of favours between national 
governments takes place (Moravcsik 1995, Hyde Price 2005). This strand of thought 
contends that it is the national goverm-nents of member states which determine how far 
EU institutions can go and how much power they can exert. If supranational institutions 
flourish it is because national governments allow them to do so by 'pooling' their 
national sovereignties. According to Rational Choice Institutionalism (RCI), 
institutions: 
"lower the transaction costs of making deals so as to allow gains from exchange among 
legislators that make the passage of stable legislation possible" (Hall and Taylor 1996: 
943). 
The stress of RCI is also on rationality through the appreciation of gains and losses as 
well as through the pursuit of strategic action by policy officials in order to maximize 
the latter and minimise the former. In the case of EU institutions, Andrew Moravcsik 
provides a liberal intergovemmentalist approach which would characterise their 
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function during the primary typel of strategic culture. Moravcsik (1993: 474) 
emphasises the role of national sovereignty in the EU by defining the EU as: 
"a successful intergovernmental regime designed to manage economic interdependence 
through negotiated policy co-operation". 
According to Moravcsik (1993: 474), the process of EU integration can be explained 
through the concept of the lowest common denominator. Member states negotiate their 
interests and they reach a consensus on what action needs to be followed. However, this 
action is based on what is acceptable to all EU participants. Therefore, the outcome of a 
negotiation may be modest and will form a compromise between the most ambitious 
EU members with the most cautious ones (Moravscik 1991: 25-26). The technique of 
the lowest common denominator puts strain to the development of strategic culture as 
the outcomes regarding the use of force are expected to be limited by the most cautious 
members of the EU. 
The primary type of strategic culture is also characterised by the development of new 
networks which act as a framework of intergovernmental bargaining. However, 
although many networks may proliferate not all of them will contribute to the 
development of an EU strategic culture as most of them are loose policy networks 
lacking deep cohesion. However, a few tight policy networks may also emerge that will 
be influential in pushing towards the development of strategic culture as they will put 
the cornerstone on discussions regarding security. The actions of these networks have 
to be studied in detail in order to understand major developments in the shaping of the 
EU strategic culture (Chapters Three, Four and Six). 
2.4.2. The Intermediate Type of Strategic Culture 
The main structural and behavioural elements of the intermediate stage of strategic 
culture are grouped below. 
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Table Three 
Inten, nediate strategic culture 
Increasingly dense networks of relations 
New institutions that reflect fon-ns of coordination 
Relationships of cooperation/path dependency of cooperation 
The emergence of elements of a collective identity based on the existence of common 
ideas (although there is still a parallel existence of continuing national/EU identities) 
Diffused reciprocity in relationships through continuous cooperation 
Socialization: development of new rules of interaction 
Development of trust, aid, respect, understanding 
Coalition of states remain important in stabilizing and encouraging the development 
of the strategic culture 
Emergence of solidarity amongst policy officials 
EU Member states supportive of EU activities in security but also cautious especially 
when it comes to their domaines r6serv6s 
Thin/thick consensus on security issues 
This type of the EU strategic culture is characterised by an expansion of cooperation in 
security affairs but also by a considerable degree of caution as EU member states are 
not yet ready to accept a radical transfer of power to the EU on issues of security. It 
may be the case that member states sometimes agree on deploying common missions 
under the EU flag but there is still a considerable room for national priorities. This type 
is inspired by the ascendant phase of the EU security community. According to Adler & 
Barnett (1998: 53), the ascendant phase of security community is characterised by the 
emergence of- 
"new institutions and organizations that reflect either tighter military coordination and 
cooperation and/or decreased fear that the other represents a threat; cognitive structures 
that promote "seeing" and acting together and therefore, the deepening of the level of 
mutual trust, and the emergence of collective identities that begin to encourage 
dependable expectations of peaceful change". 
It is expected that at this type of strategic culture increasingly dense networks of 
relationships will also emerge which will encourage common understandings in the 
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field of security (tight policy networks). Therefore, some ideas and beliefs regarding 
the use of force through police and military instruments will be commonly accepted 
amongst policy officials. However, there will not be complete uniforinity on ideas 
regarding the use of force and divergences amongst EU officials will be still evident. 
With this particular type, the channels of communication amongst policy officials that 
existed previously are extended and intensified as policy-makers share key expectations 
and forin networks which help to intensify coexisting relations (Adler and Barnett 
1998: 53-55). Extensive interaction amongst EU policy officials leads to a gradual 
rapprochement on various security issues. Both EU institutions and networks play a 
positive role by bridging the differences of officials regarding their views on security 
issues. In addition, this type of strategic culture may be characterised by the 
proliferation of both loose and tight policy networks which are flourishing within the 
newly established institutions. Nevertheless, it is mostly tight policy networks which 
are influential in spreading new security ideas. Furthennore, relationships amongst EU 
officials who are dealing with issues of security are characterised by extensive 
cooperation. 
The result of increasing interaction amongst EU officials leads to the development of 
new rules of interaction which set the basis for rules of social appropriateness, that is 
how it is appropriate to act within an institution as opposed to acting for mere 
maximisation of interests (Checkel 1999, Trondal 1999, Wendt 1996) (see also 
Appendix I). The development of diffused reciprocity marks the development of help 
amongst different EU officials. Trust, aid, respect and mutual understanding are basic 
elements of social appropriateness which will be further taken into account in Chapter 
Five. The idea of social appropriateness relates to how it is appropriate to act within an 
institution as opposed to acting for the mere maximization of interests (Checkel 1999, 
Trondal 1999). There are also signs that point to the emergence of a degree of solidarity 
amongst policy officials. In addition, one can detect the development of a collective 
identity based on the existence of common ideas but such development goes hand in 
hand with the maintenance of a national identity which continues to be strong. 
Coalitions of states remain important in stabilising and encouraging the development of 
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the strategic culture through the development of tight policy networks. However, as the 
intermediate strategic culture can be still seen as a 'strategic culture in the making', it is 
characterised by fluidity. Therefore, within this model, one can find both thin and thick 
consensus regarding security issues. In addition, the level of consensus amongst policy 
officials also depends on the security issue which is on the table. 
The intermediate type of strategic culture is a mixed one as elements of 
intergovernmentalism coexist alongside an increasing willingness to collaborate at the 
EU level. This type of strategic culture cannot simply be explained by liberal 
intergovernmentalist/rational choice approaches as these underestimate the role of 
institutions which contribute significantly to agenda-setting and the setting of future 
policy objectives (Kaarlejarvi 2003, M. E. Smith 2004). Other problems also emerge 
from the idea these approaches have of policy agents as selfish calculators. These 
behavioural assumptions have been disregarded by social psychologists who claim that 
due to extensive human interaction, human beings behave much more in a spirit of 
solidarity than RCI suggests (Cottain et al 2004). Finally, basing RCI/LI on rational 
choice also limits the process of policy making into a mechanistic form of explanation 
which lacks a deeper analysis as the outcome of a particular negotiation does not 
always give the full story (Bell 2005, Hay and Wincott 1998). For these reasons, other 
fon-ns of institutionalism (historical and sociological) are more suitable to explain this 
type of strategic culture. 
For instance, at the intermediate type of strategic culture, institutions and networks can 
create 'path dependencies' which affect the way actors take decisions and the way 
policies are orientated towards certain directions (Hall and Taylor 1996: 938). March 
and Olsen (1998) provide an explanation of this phenomenon by providing a 
historical/sociological institutionalist analysis of the consolidation of rules within 
institutions. According to these two scholars: 
"as competence grows with established rules and practices, the disadvantage of new 
rules and practices increases. As that disadvantage increases, experiments with new 
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rules are decreased. And as experiments with new rules decrease, the chance of finding 
a good new alternative or gaining competence on one that might be superior becomes 
smaller" (March and Olsen 1998: 965). 
Path dependencies have been also explored by currents of sociological institutionalism 
(SI). According to a Sl approach: 
"many of the forms and procedures should be seen as culturally-specific practices, akin 
to the myths and ceremonies devised by many societies, and assimilated into 
organizations, not necessarily to enhance their fori-nal means-ends efficiency, but as a 
result of the kind of process associated with the transmission of cultural practices more 
generally" (Hall and Taylor 1996: 947). 
This is an important statement as it sheds light to the influence that institutions can 
exert on the development of behavioural and structural elements that are influential for 
the strategic culture of the EU. 
Therefore, the intertnediate type of strategic culture requires comprehensive theory in 
order to study the development of strategic culture and to analyse the transformative 
impact that both institutions and networks are exercising on it. 
Historical/sociologicalinstitutionalists seem to offer an approach which fits with the 
intermediate type. They do not fully reject all RCI claims. They accept the fact that 
politics is dominated by a conflict for resources. However, they suggest that by entering 
the game of institutions, actors lock themselves into a 'trap' of interaction and 
negotiation (Hall and Taylor 1996: 939). In addition, historical institutional ists do not 
limit their research to rational gains but also try to provide a mixture of behavioural and 
rational issues. Consequently, historical institutional ists suggest that institutional 
organizations constrain behaviour. For this reason, historical institutionalists employ a 
mixture of calculus/cultural approaches in order to analyse the influence of institutions. 
According to the calculus approach: 
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"institutions affect behaviour primarily by providing actors with greater or lesser 
degrees of certainty about the present and the future behaviour of other actors" (Hall 
and Taylor 1996: 939). 
HI also emphasizes cultural factors based on behavioural issues and stresses. Hall and 
Taylor (1996: 939), thus stress: 
"the degree to which behaviour is not fully strategic but bounded by an individual's 
worldview" 
These worldviews are influential in the development of the strategic culture of the EU. 
According to this approach, behaviour depends not only on rational gains but also on 
the interpretation(s) the actor holds of certain situations. For example, the work of 
Thelen, Steinmo and Longstreth (1992) study the historical evolution of institutions in 
order to trace the daily interaction of actors by suggesting that informal rules and 
modes of behaviour create new patterns of interaction. However, the normative 
transformation of policy actors is also interrelated to exogenous issues (geopolitical, 
socio-economic pressures of the political environment). Thelen, Steiru-no and 
Longstreth (1992) suggest that changes in ideas can occur because a new socio-political 
context might render previous institutional choices obsolete. Second, due to changes in 
the socio-economic environment, the mission and role of institutions might change. In 
the case of the strategic culture of the EU, various exogenous factors may thus be 
influential in its development (e. g. new threats, policy failures due to miscalculations, 
historic traumas such as wars). These factors will be taken into account through an 
analysis of the historic development of ESDP (Chapter Three) as well as during 
interviews with ESDP policy officials (Chapter Four). 
The upgrading of trust and cooperation amongst EU officials that is taking place at the 
intermediate type has a direct impact on the strategic culture of the EU security 
community. One has to take into account the fact that: 
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"the security community paradigm is therefore a socially based phenomenon, which is 
premised on shared knowledge, ideational forces, and a dense normative environment" 
(Ngoma 2003: 19). 
Therefore, according to this type of strategic culture it is expected that a new kind of 
'Europeanised' knowledge, new transactions amongst players and the frequent 
participation in EU organizations will lead to social learning which facilitates the 
emergence of strategic culture. Still, it is worth mentioning that this transformation can 
take a long time for according to Adler & Barnett (1998: 46): 
"identification of ffiend or foe, the social basis of trust, is a judgement based on years 
of experiences and encounters that shapes the cultural definition of threat". 
Nevertheless, at the intermediate type of strategic culture the actors who are members 
of the EU security community begin to transform their behavioural and structural 
environment in which they are acting. This transfon-nation brings changes in attitudes 
which lead to further cooperation among policy officials. 
In addition, tight policy networks will be influential in this type of strategic culture. As 
mentioned previously tight policy networks are characterised by a stronger link 
between the members that make them up. It is also the case that in order to achieve a 
harmonised existence amongst all EU members, policy networks have to diffuse their 
policy ideas to other EU actors that participate in ESDP. Otherwise, the possibility of 
internal fragmentation within the security community is possible. The intermediate type 
of strategic culture is different from the primary type as interaction between 
participating actors intensifies and different national policy perspectives are narrowed. 
EU officials who participate within networks and institutions are now bonded together 
by various personal and professional links. This continuous bonding brings a gradual 
deepening of interaction and more common understandings in issues of security. 
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2.4.3. The Consolidated Type of Strategic Culture 
The following table groups the behavioural and structural elements that characterise the 
consolidated type of the strategic culture of the EU. 
I 
Table Four 
Consolidated strategic culture 
High levels of trust amongst ESDP officials and national governments 
Clear differentiation between those within and outside the ESDP community- 
EU Common entity vs other external entities 
Important changes in security planning 
Consolidation of new rules of behaviour 
Common definitions of security 
Merging of national policies 
Cohesive common identity through thick consensus on security issues 
High level of military integration 
Extensive policy coordination against external threats (Harmonization of security laws 
and policies 
The emergence of supranational interests 
Deepening and consolidation of trust, aid, respect, understanding 
Strong levels of solidarity amongst ESDP members 
EU member states supportive of increasing EU activity in security issues 
Thick Consensus on security issues 
As cooperation is intensified, a type of commonly owned foreign policy emerges that 
periodically expands, thus encompassing new issues leading the EU member states to 
assume a common strategic culture. The role of EU officials who are dealing with 
ESDP issues is important in this respect as they become influential carriers of ideas 
from the EU institutions to their national ministries. Further trends towards closer 
integration lead to the consolidation of the strategic culture of the EU. Mutual aid and 
intensified cooperation become a matter of habit. This process of intensified 
cooperation amongst EU policy officials gradually leads to important changes in 
national military planning. Furthen-nore, the consolidated type of strategic culture is 
also characterised by the emergence of a 'new dimension of identity' as the idea of 
'Europe' becomes dominant in the discourse on security. One of the major outcomes 
that characterises this particular type is the development of a strong 'we-feeling' 
amongst the policy officials of the community as well as a feeling of mutual trust. 
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This particular type of the EU strategic culture can be explained by taking into account 
various sociological explanations regarding the functioning of institutions and 
networks. Various studies that will be mentioned below have focused on how 
institutions can affect the identity of policy makers and alter it significantly. This 
implies that the environment within which actors are acting has to be examined in detail 
in order to understand how 'new' interests emerge or how 'old' interests are refined. 
According to Michael E. Smith (2004: 33): 
"a sociocultural (or socialisation) logic can emerge, in the sense that actors learn to 
reorient their attitudes and behaviour to an institution's norms as they regularly 
participate in the system" (italics in the original). 
Therefore, it is highly likely that due to interaction process amongst EU policy officials, 
their interests will be redefined, altered or enriched. Furthermore, actors who 
participate in institutions are not mere puppets of the nation state: they have their own 
interests and they can go much further from their fellow national-based elites in order 
to redefine their own space of action. In this type, a strong bond amongst ESDP 
officials is expected to emerge which can be explain by SI paradigms. SI perceives 
institutions in a broad sense by including elements of study such as: 
"symbol systems, cognitive scripts and moral templates that provide the frames of 
meaning guiding human action" (Hall and Taylor 1996: 947). 
It is expected that at the consolidated model of strategic culture, institutions will play an 
influential role in redefining the ideas and values of policy officials. Thus, in the study 
of EU institutions, social constructivist scholars look at the'role of persuasion and the 
importance of the communicative discourse (Risse 1994), the location of important 
6norm entrepreneurs' (Checkel 2001) or the way European norms influence the political 
structure of the member states (136rzel 2002). SI emphasises the identity that an 
individual acquires by participating within an institution. In this respect, SI is close to 
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social constructivism as institutions are not only seen as an arena for rational 
calculation but as a space where an actor redefines his/her identity through a process of 
continuous learning. It is expected that a redefined identity through interaction with 
other EU colleagues will encourage the development of the strategic culture of the EU 
and will consolidate the ideas that underpin it. 
In this particular type of strategic culture it is expected that networks and institutions 
are influential in diffusing ideas and beliefs on the use of force, thus transfon-ning the 
way the EU deals with issues of security. It is the logic of 'social appropriateness' 
(Checkel 1999, Trondal 1999) which always prevails. This is also the view of 
Scbimmelfennig (2001: 58) who adds that: 
"the goals and procedures of international organizations are more strongly determined 
by the standards of legitimacy and appropriateness of the international community to 
which they belong than the utilitarian demand for efficient problem solving". 
In addition, if tight policy networks persist and if they are influential in diffusing their 
culture to other EU actors then new 'knowledge' is formed which has a strong impact 
on ideas regarding the use of force. The consolidated type of strategic culture takes 
place when the creation of a common identity due to the consolidation of deep trust is 
happening. At this hypothetical type of strategic culture tight policy networks would 
have achieved the task of diffusing their ideas to the whole EU group of states 
successfully. As all members share the same ideas and values on the use of force, one 
integrated security community will emerge that will have a direct impact on the way 
EU officials think about issues of security. 
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2.5. Categorising Ideas of the Strategic Culture of the EuroPean 
Union 
As mentioned in Chapter One, the strategic culture of the EU needs also to be 
categorised by devising types where ideas, beliefs, values and practices fit in. Various 
scholars have made efforts to categorise the strategic culture of the EU. For instance, 
Howorth (2002: 89) categorised the strategic cultures of EU member states by reference 
to various dichotomies of which the most important in terrns of ideas are: the 
allied/neutral nature of cultures, the Atlanticist/Europeanist orientation of strategies and 
the balance between power projection and territorial defence in the respective foreign 
policies of the European states. Furthennore, Hyde-Price (2005: 154-5) attempts to 
build a model of EU strategic culture by grouping various characteristics of EU 
behaviour such as: limited coercion, the lack of brute force, the imperative of limiting 
collateral damage, the short length of operations and the legitimate use of force. 
Meyer also provides his own model of strategic culture by claiming that the EU fits a 
Humanitarian Power Europe model. According to Meyer (2006: 30, italics in the 
original) when it comes to the EU: 
"one would see a low to medium level of risk tolerance regarding the proportionate use 
of force, moderate to high authorization requirements, a growing attachment to the EU 
as an actor with a general preference for using soft power, and support for goals 
regarding the use of force, which do not substantially transcend beyond the purposes of 
humanitarianism. This outcome could be called Humanitarian Power Europe as an 
expression of using force primarily for altruistic reasons and linked to universal 
values". 
Finally, other EU scholars have focused on providing more theoretical terms for the EU 
external action by categorising the EU as a civilian power (Duchene, 1973: 19), a 'soft' 
power (Hill 1990) and a nonnative power (Manners 2002,2006). These works require 
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further enrichment and clarification so that they can be useful to the study of the EU 
strategic culture. 
Although the current literature on ESDP provides some interesting examples on the 
way the EU decides to act by using police and military instruments, it has not yet 
offered a fully descriptive gamut of types that can be used to categorise the strategic 
culture of the EU. Inspired by the works of scholars who were mentioned above, the 
thesis will create its own types of categorisation based on the ideas, beliefs, practices 
and values that may characterise the strategic culture of the EU. The framework that 
has been invented in the thesis distinguishes four main types of ESDP development by 
taking into account four distinct - but possible ways - of ESDP behaviour. The types 
elaborated in this section are hypothetical ones which cover a wide gamut of possible 
ESDP outcomes ranging from complete passivity in security affairs (minimum 
outcome) to fully fledged assumption of global responsibility in security affairs 
(maximum outcome). 
2.5.1. Passive Europe (PE) 
The first hypothetical type is that of 'passive Europe' (PE). Although it is an unlikely 
scenario it still has to be mentioned in order to cover all possible options of strategic 
culture development. Passive Europe is a negative scenario for the development of the 
EU strategic culture as it implies that there is a rejection of the use of military and 
police force at the EU level. This type implies that ESDP will gradually fade away. The 
field of security and defence will be further nationalised as the EU will have no agenda 
to implement security missions under an EU flag. This type of strategic culture is 
characterised by a lack of consensus on the use of force as EU action abroad will be 
limited to civilian elements such as aid and development. The model is similar to the 
one offered by Meyer (2006: 29) and describes the possibility of the EU becoming a 
'Helvetian Europe'. However, Meyer also mentions that this model does not fit with the 
current activity of ESDP and it is unlikely to reflect EU action in the future. According 
to Meyer (2006: 30), the discussion on the strategic culture of the EU should evolve 
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around the EU acquisition of willingness to intervene in crisis spots which may 
gradually lead to robust strategic culture and even to a more ambitious Europe in the 
future. 
2.5.2. Cautious Interventionist Europe (CIE) 
The second type is that of a 'Cautious Interventionist Europe' (CIE). This type 
describes the transition from a passive strategic culture to one of continuous and 
decisive EU action in security issues. This type is characterised by the cautious and 
qualified acceptance of the fact that the EU has to intervene in certain cases by 
deploying military and police instruments. According to this type, it is expected that 
ESDP officials will collaborate in many ways and that common understandings on 
issues of security will emerge. In addition, it is expected that as the EU has made its 
first steps in mission implementation, the psychology of ESDP policy-makers will be 
characterised by a moderate optimism which acts positively in the development of 
ESDP. However, according to this type, ESDP officials still hold views which still 
converge on various issues regarding the use of force. 
The CIE type of strategic culture is characterised by a 'cautious' approach on the use of 
force because although limited action is accepted by all ESDP policy officials, many of 
them still maintain a lukewann attitude when it comes to the development of extensive 
ESDP missions. In this type, consensus on the use of force amongst EU members is 
moderate because it can only be achieved for particular and limited missions. However, 
some limited initiatives may be considerably larger when a commonly recognised threat 
emerges. Usually the missions that a Cautious Interventionist Europe undertakes are 
low risk with a limited geographic limit. This type is also characterised by a general 
unwillingness of EU states to provide personnel to missions considered to be risky. 
Furthermore, the importance of the UN mandate remains very high because it gives an 
alibi to states which have to follow cumbersome parliamentary procedures to allow for 
the participation of national troops and policemen in ESDP missions without facing 
internal opposition. In this particular model, ESDP still depends on national 
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sovereignty. Furthennore, within the EU one may still see a considerable degree of 
fragmentation as different member states try to promote their own initiatives by 
fonning coalitions of the willing. 
In terms of mission justification, it is expected that under this model various 
humanitarian reasons will predominate in ESDP as the emergence of a clear common 
EU material interests is unlikely to happen. This is due to the fact that nation states still 
have converging material interests. The type is also characterised by a strong Atlanticist 
element as well as a strong commitment to multilateral ism. These two features derive, 
in part, from 'pragmatic' necessity as the EU has to co-operate with various 
international actors in order to gain legitimacy, local knowledge and access to military 
resources. The CIE type will fit the EU if ESDP institutionalisation is a 'work in 
progress'. In this case, ESDP institutions still do not possess all instruments that will 
allow them to exert too much influence. According to the CIE type, consensus on the 
use of force is moderate as member states may still differentiate their preferences on 
issues of security. Finally, if the CIE type characterises the strategic culture of the EU, 
it is expected that ESDP will be put in practice in order to address security (as opposed 
to defence issues). Defence will be still under the control of the Member States as it 
continues to be perceived as a vital national interest. 
2.5.3. Active Europe (AE) 
The next model is based on 'reassertion' of the EU and a considerable increase in the 
number and scope of ESDP missions. If ESDP confonns to this type it is expected that 
the EU will posses a high willingness to act in security crises. This is due to the fact 
that the EU Member States will be convinced of the utility of ESDP. For these reasons, 
the EU will become more decisive when it comes to intervention and the EU states will 
gradually become more willing to participate in ESDP missions. These will also 
become bigger in size and more ambitious in their geographic remit. Due to this fact, 
the accepted risk of EU missions will become also higher. 
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In this type, one can also 'see the development of a cohesive EU security agenda which 
leads to a loosening of national structures and preferences in favour of the 
empowerment of ESDP institutions. Although fragmentation may be sometimes 
unavoidable there is more and more homogeneity of views concerning intervention. 
Furthermore, the AE model is characterised by less controversy in deploying military 
and police instruments as the EU countries begin to share converging worldviews and 
strategic priorities. In addition, a more detailed agenda emerges on the security 
priorities of the EU which pushes ESDP to assume missions which may even lead to 
the defence of particular EU material interests. 
In this type, there is still room, however, for national prioritisation and abstention from 
missions. However, the Active Europe type is generally characterised by a more 
assertive EU stance in international affairs. Assertion may mean that the EU worries 
less about securing American and international acceptance for its missions either 
through US/NATO support or through securing a UN mandate. As the EU becomes 
more confident of its actomess through ESDP and as it possesses clear interests that 
need to be defended, a gradual adoption of more coercive forrns of force may also 
happen so that its aims can be achieved (e. g. by using heavier ammunition in its ESDP 
missions). According to this type, ESDP will be strengthened institutionally. The 
consensus on the use of force amongst EU officials also becomes stronger. Although 
security is the main focus of ESDP, discussions also start to take place on the question 
of defence. It is expected that at the AE type ideas on the use of force will be more 
harmonised thus leading to a more unified strategic culture for the EU. 
2.5.4. Super Active Power Europe (SAPE) 
The final type is based on further EU self assertion and the consolidation of a strong 
notion of EU interest. It is a model that is inspired by the literature which describes the 
actorness of the US superpower (e. g. Kagan 2003) and represents exactly the opposite 
type to that of Passive Europe. According to SAPE, ESDP becomes fully consolidated 
and the willingness of the EU to act in international crises increases. Here, SAPE 
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missions are expected to cover an extensive global and regional geographic remit and 
can be characterised by a high level of risk. As views on the use of force become more 
harmonised amongst EU members it is easier to see a further transfer of power from 
national institutions to ESDP institutions. In addition, as the EU becomes gradually 
empowered there may be a 'spill-over' of activity from the field of security to the field 
of defence which may gradually come under EU guidance. 
Furthermore, as far as SAPE is concerned, the consensus on the use of force is high and 
the difficulties of deploying military and police instruments are increasingly overcome. 
The fragmented nature of ESDP is replaced by a unified vision of security which leads 
to further institutional empowerment of ESDP. This reassertion may lead to further 
changes in the behaviour of the EU. For instance, the importance of the UN mandate 
may become even lower and the strategy of creating an international coalition of third 
party countries may be pushed aside if the EU judges that an important crisis may 
require immediate action. The same accounts for the EU-NATO relationship. It may be 
the case that the EU and the US may continue to cooperate successfully. However, 
there is also a possibility that the EU may construct a strong identity in security affairs 
that may lead to the downgrading of the NATO link in ESDP. Furthen-nore, the EU will 
be willing to use 'coercive' force, for instance by using heavier ammunition or even a 
resort to air strikes. 
The table below provides the three most important strategic culture types described 
above. Passive Europe is not included in the table as most elements that are included on 
the table are not applicable it. Capital letters on the table are used to describe outcomes 
in the majority of the cases whereas lower case letters refer to outcomes that 
characterise the minority of policy outcomes in each model discussed. 
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Table Five. Types of EU Strategic Culture 
Types of Cautious Active Europe Super Active 
Strategic culture Interventionist Europe 
Europe 
Willingness to Low Average High 
act 
Small S/m Sim S/M/L 
(S)/medium 
(M)/large (L) 
missions 
Low (L)/high (11) L L/h L/11 
risk 
Geographic L/e L/E L/E 
remit: Limited 
(L), Extended 
(E) 
Importance of 11 II/M 
UN mandate: 
High (11), 
Moderate (M) 
Europeanised S/e S/E E 
(E)/Sovereign (S) 
nature of ESDP 
Unitary F/u U/f u 
(U)/fragmented 
(F) 
Atlanticist A/e A/E A/E or a/E 
(A)/Europeanist 
(E) 
NI ultilatera list M NI/11 M/u 
(M)/unilateralist 
(U) 
Humanitarian II/M II/M M/11 
(II)/material (M) 
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Difficulty in h/L L 
deploying 
military/police 
instruments: 
High (11), Low 
(L) 
In stitu tion ally W/s S/IVV S 
strength of 
ESDP: Weak 
(W), Strong (S) 
EU Consensus M MAI 
on th6 use of 
force: Moderate 
(M), High (H) 
Security/Defence S S/d S/D 
spill over: (S: 
security, D: 
defence) 
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2.6. Conclusions: Networks, Security Communities, Institutions, 
Ideas and the Measuring of Strategic Culture 
The chapter argued that the EU is a security community which is characterised by 
various structural and behavioural. elements. The chapter also studied the role of policy 
networks and institutions within the EU security community in order to see how these 
can affect the shaping of EU strategic culture. The study distinguished 
behavioural/structural types (primary, intermediate and consolidated) of strategic 
culture that group different structural and behavioural characteristics. Furthermore, four 
other types of strategic culture have been developed in order to categorise ideas 
regarding the use of force as elaborated in section 2.5 of the thesis (Passive Europe, 
Cautious Interventionist Europe, Active Europe, Super Active Power Europe). Chapters 
Three and Four, Five and Six of the thesis will use the above mentioned typologies in 
order to categorise the strategic culture of the EU. The thesis now moves with the study 
of history in order to trace the debates that have led to the development of ESDP. It is 
expected that the study of this period will provide considerable evidence on attitudes 
regarding the use of force. 
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Chapter Three: 
The Historic Trajectory towards the Establishment of ESDP 
(1990-1999) 
1. Introduction 
The chapter claims that the convergence of views regarding the use of force in the 
Western Balkans was the first step in the development of the strategic culture of the 
EU. The humanitarian crises that took place in the 1990s in the Balkans had a strong 
influence on the development of common beliefs in the minds of EU officials who were 
dealing with issues of security. Primary and secondary sources are used throughout the 
chapter. In order to trace ideas and beliefs that were influential in bringing the 
Europeans together in issues of security a number of books, academic articles, memoirs 
and official declarations of policy leaders will be taken into account, Parliamentary 
Reports, Parliamentary debates, reports from national ministries are also part of the 
study. In addition, testimonies from US officials who actively engaged with their 
European colleagues in the Western Balkan crises also shed light on the beliefs that the 
Europeans had regarding the Bosnian and Kosovo conflict. These testimonies will form 
part of the chapter as they provide interesting insights to the use of force. The main aim 
of the chapter is to provide an overview of the ideas and beliefs on the use of force 
which brought the Europeans closer together, thus paving the way for the establishment 
of ESDP. It should be stressed that the thesis uses primary sources from policy 
officials, ministers and Heads of State who were in charge of their member states and 
had direct influence over the formulation of the security policies of the states they 
represented during the 1990s. The study of history focuses on how policy elites and 
policy officials perceived the crises of the Western Balkans (especially the Bosnian and 
Kosovo conflict). The study period that was covered starts from the end of Cold War in 
1989 up to the establishment of ESDP in 1999. The documents that were used in the 
chapter were those that had direct quotes to the Kosovo and Bosnian crises and the 
elements of force need to be used (if any) in order to control these crises. 
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The chapter also provides an analysis of the complex web of institutions and networks 
that became involved in resolving the Western Balkan crisis after the end of the Cold 
War (1989-1999). This description takes place in order to trace how these institutions 
affected the development of strategic culture of the EU by establishing the first 
structural and behavioural rules that are influential in the development of strategic 
culture. The chapter claims that ideas that developed within various institutions and 
networks had a direct impact on the policies of the EU Member States. As the EU did 
not have the necessary institutions and competencies to deal with security crises, much 
of the discussion on security issues took place outside it in structures such as NATO, 
the Western European Union (WEU) and the Contact Group. For this reason, the 
interaction of European officials within these institutions will be taken into account in 
order to analyse their impact on the development of an EU strategic culture. It is 
important to mention that, at this stage of history, the study needs also to cover 
developments amongst the various EU Member states as the EU was still a weak player 
in issues of security. One of the aims of the chapter is to demonstrate that there was a 
gradual convergence of security ideas amongst the biggest EU countries (the UK, 
France and Germany) which impacted on the strategic culture of the EU. In addition, a 
6neutrals' network was also influential in pushing the EU towards the establishment of 
a new security policy. All these developments led to the establishment of a primary 
strategic culture. 
3.2. The EU as an Imperfect Policy-making Mechanism 
Although the Maastricht Treaty of 1992 introduced the possibility of EU involvement 
in security matters it was not up until the Amsterdam Treaty of 1997 and the 1998 UK- 
French St Malo declaration that the path was open for the EU to assume a more 
influential role. During the 1990s the EU did not have an effective mechanism that 
would permit strategic action as the weak institutionalisation of CFSP did not allow for 
any serious decisions to be taken within the EU framework. CFSP emerged in 1993 and 
was too weak to stand on its feet. Furthen-nore, the recognition of Croatia and Slovenia 
by Germany was received cautiously by other European states and made them pursue 
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their own interests rather than searching for an EU consensus (Hazel Smith 2002: 254). 
A cycle of political introversion and cautiousness characterised the EU during the first 
half of the 1990s. During this period many countries were trying to overcome the 
disorientation of the new post-communist era and had to establish new tasks and 
objectives for their foreign policies. In addition, this period was characterised by a lack 
of political will. Richard Holbrooke underlines the unwillingness of the Europeans to 
take decisive action in its early stages of the crisis in the former Yugoslavia by claiming 
that: 
"while both the United States and the European Union initially viewed the Balkan wars 
as a European problem, the Europeans chose not to take a strong stand, restricting 
themselves to dispatching UN "peacekeepers" to a country where there was no peace to 
keep, and withholding from them the means and the authority to stop the fighting" 
(Holbrooke 1999: xvi). 
In institutional terms, the EU lacked a mechanism that would provide effective 
leadership in the development of an EU strategic culture. In general, CFSP was not 
supported by a strong structure with a proper dynamism and depended on the capitals 
of the Member States (Gu6henno 1995: 27). The control of foreign policy was still 
spread across four different Commissioners and four different Directorate-Generals 
which unden-nined the consistency of EU actions (White 2001: 160, Peterson 1998: 5- 
6). Although some Presidencies such as the Dutch and the German did manage to 
secure small leaps forward, Edwards (1997: 190-2) claims the problems with the 
framework of a rotating presidency were evident when it came to providing firm, 
constant leadership for the Western Balkans. In addition, rivalries between COREPER 
officials and the Political Directors on issues of political legitimacy and responsibility 
made the reaching of consensus a very difficult task (Peterson 1998: 7). Because of all 
these bureaucratic problems, Peterson (1998: 6) claims that EU policy in Bosnia 
suffered considerably from delays caused by budgetary and related wrangles over, first 
humanitarian aid and, later, funding for civilian reconstruction. 
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3.2.1. A First EU Vision for Bosnia Herzegovina: The 
Carrington-Cutileiro and the Vance-Owen Peace Plans 
Although the EU could not provide effective leadership during the Balkan crisis it did 
propose two plans for the future of Bosnia. Ideas regarding the structure of Bosnia 
Herzegovina are mentioned below as they have influenced the future development of 
the strategic culture of the EU in this particular area (see Chapters Five and Six). The 
first EU plan for the future of Bosnia was the Carrington-Cutileiro Plan of 1991 based 
on the idea of power sharing and devolution. After its failure, a joint EU-UN plan was 
devised in 1993 named the Vance-Owen Peace Plan (VOPP). 
According to the Vance-Owen Plan, Bosnia Herzegovina would becorne a 
decentralised, peaceful state, with guaranteed freedom of movement throughout its 
territory (Owen 1995: 80-90). The VOPP also provided substantial autonomy to the 
provinces while denying them any international legal character. The Plan provided 
provisions for democratically elected national and local government and a mechanism 
for resolving disputes between them (Owen 1995: 80-90). In addition, it stressed strong, 
internationally monitored human rights provisions (Owen 1995: 89). Overall, the VOPP 
was to guarantee: "a sovereign, independent, multi-ethnic state" (Owen 1995: 104). The 
successful implementation of the VOPP implied that: 
"the EC would have to be able to mobilize a European defence commitment to 
implement the plan without the US" (Owen 1995: 170). 
However, the countries with the biggest military capacities in the EC -such as France 
and the UK- had certain fears about putting troops in Bosnia on their own and therefore 
any EU strategic action was avoided (Owen 1995: 147,152). 
Although the VOPP failed to materialise, it does tell us something of the EU position. 
According to the EU co-chain-nan of the Conference for the former Yugoslavia, David 
Owen), the VOPP had been supported by the then EC12 at every stage over nearly five 
months of negotiations. EU ministers had not been bystanders but intimately involved 
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and consulted on detail regarding the VOPP (Owen 1995: 102,113,114,118,123, 
160). However, a more detailed reading of the Owen memoirs suggests that although 
smaller EC states were committed to the VOPP, the big three EU Member States 
(France, the UK and Gen-nany) started to have their own bilateral approaches and were 
discussing the matter with the USA on a one-to-one basis. According to Owen (1995: 
123): 
"back in London on 21 May (1993) 1 found in my pile of telegrams from the Foreign 
Office one from Washington about a new diplomatic initiative involving the US, 
France, the UK and Russia [ ... ] in this case the British and French governments were 
embarking on a diplomatic initiative in an attempt to heal the Atlantic rift, knowing this 
was contrary to EC policy". 
In the end, the Member States decided to sacrifice the VOPP in order to maintain a 
good relationship with the Clinton administration: 
"it was my responsibility to keep the EC together, but I was now attempting to do so on 
a high-risk policy, with no country in Europe really wanting to darnage relations with 
the new US administration" (Owen 1995: 111). 
Therefore, the opportunity to provide fin-n EU leadership at the beginning of the crisis 
was lost. However, although disagreements regarding Bosnian security within the EU 
were plentiful there was a common platfon-n on the future of Bosnia that served as a 
point of a first consensus. This vision can be seen as the basis for the development of a 
strategic consensus amongst the Member States. Speaking at a Contact Group meeting, 
High Representative for Bosnia Herzegovina Carl Bildt noted: 
64we want to see Bosnia continue as a single, multiethnic and democratic state in which 
the human rights of minorities and the rights of refugees to return are fully recognised 
and respected. We want to see mutual recognition among the states of fon-ner 
Yugoslavia, the development of their economies on market principles and on the basis 
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of regional cooperation, and the establishment of a process of arms control. We 
Europeans are ready to contribute to the international effort to reconstruct the areas 
devastated by war once peace is established and to build stability and prosperity in the 
longer term throughout the region" (Carl BildtOl/11/1995). 
3.3. The Setting of Loose Collaboration Networks with other 
Institutions 
Although European governments were divided on how to deal with the Balkan crisis 
there was still a common emphasis on interacting with other institutions such as the 
UN. As mentioned in the previous chapter, the idea of multilateralism and dialogue is 
evident in the communicative discourse of the EU. As a result of this interaction, loose 
collaboration emerged between the EU and the UN which was not institutional i sed but 
relied mostly on the personal contacts and the goodwill of policy makers of the 
institutions evolved (Interview 12). The various security arrangements that will be 
analysed in this chapter have been characterised as: "a system of 'interlocking 
institutions' with the OSCE, NATO, the WEU and the EU closely knitted together" 
(R[ihle and Williams 1996 in Sjursen 1998: 102). During the first half of the 1990s, 
however, the EU took a back seat thus allowing other organisations to take the initiative 
(Hazel Smith 2002: 234). Four particular institutional relationships will be examined in 
more detail as they contributed to particular developments which have affected the 
shaping of the EU strategic culture. These relationships are those involving the EU and 
the UN, the WEU and EU, the NATO-EU dialogue, and Contact Group interaction. 
3.3.1. EU-UN Interaction 
EU action in the Balkans has been characterised by increasing collaboration with the 
UN. In order to deal with the ongoing crisis, the International Conference on the 
Former Yugoslavia (ICFY) was established in 1992, co-chaired by the former British 
Foreign Secretary, David Owen, on behalf of the EU, and the former US Secretary of 
State, Cyrus Vance, representing the UN. The EC also established the European 
Community Monitoring Mission (ECMM) in 199 1. According to Edwards (1997: 184), 
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there was coordination between the ECMM and UNPROFOR as well the UN High 
Commission for Refugees (UNCHR). The EU-UN interaction was empowered by the 
UN's decision to engage in a dialogue with regional organisations. As a result of the 
need to communicate with regional fora, the UN established biennial UN-Regional 
Organisation meetings which began in 1994 (Stewart 2005: 148). Furthen-nore, the EU 
was represented at UN-Regional meetings by the Presidency and a representative of the 
Commission (Stewart 2005: 149). Previously, there had been sporadic interaction 
between UN officials and the Commission but because of the fragmented nature of the 
EU policy pillars and the weaknesses of UN bureaucracy, it had a limited input in the 
policies of the two entities (Interview 29). However, there was a willingness amongst 
EU officials to collaborate with the UN in issues of security (Interview 12). 
The EU-UN relationship was important because it showed that the importance of 
multilateralism to the emerging EU strategic culture. However, as the UN remained a 
fragmented organisation with different layers of power shared by different 
bureaucracies it was difficult to coordinate the EU-UN relationship effectively 
(Interview 29). The EU-UN relationship continued to rely on the good will of the 
personnel of the two organisations (Stewart 2005: 160-3). 
3.3.2. The EU-WEU link 
Limited cooperation between different EU Member States took place under the WEU 
umbrella long before ESDP. When the OCSE invited both NATO and the WEU to 
undertake peace-keeping roles this opportunity was further exploited by officials from 
France and Gennany who managed to persuade reluctant WEU member states to sign 
the Petersberg Declaration (Bonn 19 June 1992) which for first time committed the 
Europeans to engage in peace-keeping tasks under the WEU umbrella (Interview 30). 
The WEU was characterised by loose policy networks which were too weak to 
influence EU decisions in the spheres of security and defence (Interview 30). 
Nevertheless, the Petersberg Tasks were included in the Amsterdam Treaty of the EU 
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in 1997. Furthermore, the Amsterdam Treaty stipulated that the WEU was an integral 
part of the development of the EU, thus making a link between the EU and the sphere 
of security. However, according to the former WEU Political Director Alyson Bailes 
(16/09/2006): 
"although the smaller countries were collaborating within WEU structures the 
organisation was snubbed by the big three EU countries (meaning France, Germany and 
the UK)". 
A 'socialisation' space for the big three Member States was necessary but the WEU did 
not provide for this. Furthermore, there was no EU consensus on what to do with the 
WEU. Britain refused to link the WEU with any EU issues of security whereas France 
and Germany wished that a link had to be established between the WEU and the 
Council of the EU (Gnessoto 1996: 114). In addition, the military projects of the WEU 
were still at an experimental phase (Gautier 1999: 235). 
It was clear that due to different priorities amongst Germany, France and the UK no 
purely European institution such as the WEU could serve for issues of security and 
defence. However, according to Bailes, it was interesting to notice that a European 
based forum for discussion on security issues such as the WEU was promoting a 
different view of security to that of the USA (Interview 30). A European spirit of 
collaboration was created amongst WEU diplomats who wanted to develop further 
collaboration with their European colleagues. Not only did the WEU served as a 
Europeanised body of dialogue between East and West Europe but it also integrated the 
neutral states into a discussion which was led by European priorities (Interview 30). 
Finally, according to Bailes, the WEU opened up the agenda of the EU adopting a 
civilian crisis management agenda (Interview 30). 
3.4. NATO Interaction with EU States 
A new tight policy network was emerging in the USA that influenced European 
developments. The Clinton administration wanted to prove its human rights credentials 
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by adopting a more active stance in foriner Yugoslavia. According to Allin, American 
liberals embraced the Bosnian crisis as a 'cause cý16bre' (Allin 2002: 16). Since 1993 a 
bipartisan network consisting of both Democrat and Republican Senators had been 
created by important political figures calling for the use of military force, by using air 
strikes and the lifting of the arms embargo against the Bosnian Muslims (Bono 2003: 
74-75). David Owen also claims that these pro-active Clinton Democrats had strong 
views on how to deal with the crisis and were vehemently opposed to the VOPP as they 
wanted more land being given to the Muslims (Owen 1995: 100,108,121,161). The 
group of pro-interventionist Democrats was further empowered by the appointment of 
Madeleine Albright as Secretary of State who wanted a more interventionist policy both 
in Bosnia and Kosovo. Michael Mandelbaum (1999: 8) rightly labels the Kosovo 
bombings the 'Albright legacy' as Albright became an active policy entrepreneur of 
intervention by exerting considerable pressure on the European allies. 
Under strong American pressure, sections of NATO became influential in pushing the 
EU towards a policy of intervention (Bono 2003: 32). However, the new plans 
proposed by NATO could only be achieved by cultivating the support of a wide policy 
network of Gennan, British and US national-policy makers (Longhurst 2004: 60-73). 
As a result of US pressure, NATO became the breeding ground of new security actions 
concerning the Balkans. 
It is important to note that although many EU states were members of NATO there was 
no official NATO-EU relationship at this time. According to Sloan (2005: 194): 
"the relationship between the EU and NATO was informal and lacking much substance 
with meetings taking place on an infon-nal basis". 
Therefore, although there was a willingness on behalf of EU Member States to interact 
with NATO, an institutional framework that would bring NATO and the EU together 
was lacking. Furthermore, the NATO Madrid Summit in 1997 failed to bring 
equilibrium between the US and Europe through its European partners through the 
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European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI) plan. The degree of European 
autonomy in ESDI was far from clear and limitations of the transatlantic relationship 
soon came to the surface (Gnesotto 1996: 23). A solution was necessary so that the EU 
Europeans could maintain a strong relationship with NATO but also possess room for 
manoeuvre on security issues. 
3.5. Contact Group Interaction 
As noted above, although various small developments were taking place that 
encouraged EU Member States to slowly act together on issues of security, a 
6socialisation space' for the big three EU countries (France, Germany and the UK) was 
still necessary to facilitate the construction of a consensus on issues of security. The 
Contact Group served as this socialisation space. Gradually, as a result of frequent 
interaction, a tight policy network emerged. This network was characterised by 
increasingly frequent interaction between the UK, France and Germany. It harmonised 
approaches toward the Western Balkans through the development of the idea that the 
EU should play a more active role in security affairs. 
The Contact Group was first established by Germany, France, the UK, Russia and the 
USA in 1994. According to Pauline Neville-Jones (1996: 46), a UK participant, its aim 
was: 
"to establish an informal but strong policy-making core around which the main 
international players could unite". 
The Contact Group was important because it could exert influence on vast sections of 
national bureaucracies of the three major EU states for according to Neville-Jones, the 
Contact Group was meeting at three levels, the foreign ministers level, the political- 
directors level and the expert/working group level (Neville Jones 1996: 46). 
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Within the Contact Group a different understanding of the Balkan crisis was emerging 
between the three EU partners on one side and the US on the other. This mutual 
understanding amongst the big three EU countries intensified, cooperation and made 
them reach common agreements. Richard Holbrooke, who was in regular 
communication with the Contact Group claims that there was a rapprochement amongst 
the Europeans on the Bosnian question: 
"dealing with the Europeans was delicate and nettlesome throughout the Bosnia crisis, 
and put an unprecedented strain on NATO and the Atlantic Alliance just when the Cold 
War ties that had held us together had also disappeared. Our steadfast allies, who had 
looked to the United States for leadership during the Cold War, were ambivalent about 
the American role in post-Cold War Europe, and especially Bosnia. They had long 
called for greater American involvement but at the same time, they feared that they 
would be publicly humiliated if the United States took the lead" (Holbrooke 1999: 84). 
For their part, the Europeans felt marginalised regarding Bosnia, as the Americans were 
monopolising the initiative to act and were keeping Europeans out of the Dayton talks: 
"... there was a clear undercurrent of resentment among some Contact Group members 
over American "unilateral ism" (Holbrooke 1999: 20 1). 
Furthermore: 
"our colleagues in the Contact Group -France, Germany, Great Britain, and Russia - 
were disturbed that we planned to negotiate first and consult them later, reversing the 
previous procedure, in which the five nations tried to work out a common position 
before taking it to the parties in the Balkans -a system that was cumbersome and 
unworkable" (Holbrooke 1999: 84-5). 
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Relations between the three European states and the USA reached a point of crisis 
similar to the Suez Canal Crisis of 1956 (Owen, 1995, Holbrooke 1999). Much of the 
trust between USA and its European allies was waning: 
"when I noted that the UN seemed reluctant to try to open the roads around Sarajevo, 
Pauline Neville-Jones exploded, charging that I was trying to "set the UN and the 
Europeans up" to be blamed for a failure' (Holbrooke 1999: 201). 
As a result of this lack of trust, France, Gennany and the UK aimed at reaching a 
compromise amongst themselves and then presented their views to the Americans. For 
instance, according to Holbrooke, the Contact Group Europeans had agreed on Carl 
Bildt being the civilian chief in Bosnia and then announced it to the Americans 
(Holbrooke 1999: 209). 
Furthermore, Holbrooke (1999: 223) claims that there was a European interest in 
Bosnia because most of the resources for the peacekeeping and reconstruction operation 
would be funded by the Europeans. 
It must be stressed that within the Contact Group the EU was not represented. 
However, decisions of the Contact Group were gradually presented and discussed in the 
European Councils. In addition, David Owen (1995: 255-92) suggests that the other EU 
states which were not members of the Contact Group gradually accepted the actions of 
the Contact Group and were at least relieved with the fact that the three bigger EU 
states were taking the Bosnia issue seriously. In addition, EU members were briefed 
about Contact Group actions during the meetings of the Foreign Affairs Council 
(Schwegmann 2000). Furthermore, when Italy joined the Contact Group in 1996 this 
meant that all the major EU countries were participating in it. 
The trilateral initiatives that were elaborated within the Contact Group by the national 
leaders of France, the UK and Germany become common as time progresses. For 
instance, after an examination of documentation from state ministries, common 
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interaction within the Contact Group is mentioned often in post 1997 speeches of 
Jospin (13 April 1999,5 May 1999), Wdrine (30 April 1999) and Blair (8 March 
1999). It is interesting to note that by early 1997 the three EU Contact Group members 
had seized the initiative to find a solution in Kosovo by monitoring the Kosovo crisis 
and calling for dialogue between the conflicting parts (see Contact Group Statements of 
24 September 1997,9-10 December 1997,8 January 1998). In summary, the 
importance of the Contact Group was that it was slowly aggregating different national 
perceptions of the big three states into one. The good understanding amongst the three 
EU states would be further consolidated by the emergence of new pro-interventionist 
policy networks amongst the three foreign ministries whose actions would throw the 
seeds of the EU strategic culture. 
3.6. Bilateral and Trilateral Policy Networks Involving the Big 
Three EU States 
The development of policy networks at the level of bi lateral/tri lateral diplomacy 
amongst the big three EU countries was influential in paving the way towards the 
establishment of ESDP. These networks were also influential in bringing different 
strategic perspectives together, thus encouraging the establishment of an EU strategic 
culture through the development of ESDP. For this reason, the development of policy 
networks amongst the UK, France and Gennany will be studied in detail. 
Franco-British cooperation was vital in the establishment of ESDP. Due to UK 
involvement in the Balkans, two very pragmatic 'lessons' were assimilated into the UK 
strategic thinking which made the UK willing to cooperate with the French (Howorth 
2004, Smith 2002, Allin 2002). First of all, it was feared that Americans would not be 
willing to manage the crises in the borders of the EU for too long. Second, Franco- 
British co-operation on the ground in the Balkans (through LJNPROFOR) had led to a 
bilateral cooperation between the militaries of both countries. Common Balkan 
initiatives meant that French and British army personnel were working together in the 
Balkans. Furthermore, ideas were exchanged and common policies were fon-nulated 
between the national ministries of defence of the two countries (Howorth 2004: 217). 
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As policy cooperation between the two countries intensified, the Ministries of Defence 
of France and the UK were seeing the process of collaboration more positively. As both 
countries moved from a position of deterrence to a position of Balkan intervention they 
were forced 'into one another's anus' (Howorth 2004: 217). Patterns of common 
cooperation also emerged within NATO (Sloan 2005: 187). This feeling of bilateral 
cooperation was further enhanced by the Anglo-French leadership during the 
Rambouillet Conference which although brought limited results, still proved that both 
countries could assume a degree of leadership (Howorth 2004: 224, Gnessoto 1999: 
210). 
In addition, it was troops from the UK and France which had led the UN military 
protection forces in Bosnia. The UK and France were also major contributors to IFOR 
and SFOR operations (Hazel Smith, 2002: 255). The result of this interaction was an 
increasing amount of cooperation at the level of ground operations. At the outset 
IFOR/SFOR cooperation between France and the UK was not problem free. Allin 
(2002: 39-40) mentions the tensions between French and British troops during missions 
as there was no common language. However, these difficulties were curbed as 
cooperation was intensifying. Furthen-nore, Howorth mentions the impact of operations 
cooperation on the bilateral cooperation as a 'bottom up' approach (Howorth 2004: 
211-234). This was also the conclusion of a House of Commons Research Paper (00/80, 
2000: 13) which clearly states that: 
"the St. Malo initiative built upon earlier cooperation in the field of security and 
defence undertaken by France and the UK that took place in Bosnia and West Africa 
and existing agreements between the two countries' navies (1996), armies (1997) and 
air forces (1998)" . 
According to Howorth (2004: 231), the French were willing to reach a realistic 
compromise with the British. The French way of thinking moved closer to the British 
which is characterised: 
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"not by Grand projects of massive defence reinforcement but on insisting on vigilance, 
inventiveness and flexibility" (Bailes 1995: 98). 
As the two major representations of Europeanism and Atlanticism were gradually 
drawn together it was possible for the two countries to reach a consensus that would 
pave the path towards the ESDP. However, this rapprochement was not so great that 
national differences on matters of security would be completely erased. 
In parallel, Franco-German cooperation was influential in making Germany a more 
assertive partner in security issues. Close Franco-Gen-nan cooperation led by President 
Mitterrand and Chancellor Kohl had led to the Petersberg Tasks (Gautier 1999: 235). 
Common initiatives and policies in the field of defence demonstrated that a cohesive 
bilateral network was in place. Thus, plans were adopted by the two countries that 
supported the view that the WEU would be strengthened and a European intervention 
force based initially on a combined unit of French and German troops would be 
established (Fitchett, 199 1 d). As an initial step, France and Gen-nany declared that they 
would expand their current bilateral military cooperation and that a second phase of 
security cooperation would start in 1996. From 1995 the Germans were also working 
on a European defence plan which would have to be implemented beyond the year 
2000 in order to make the EU ready to deal with crises and reinforce trends of defence 
manufacturing cooperation (Fitchett, 1995b). 
Discussions had taken place between the nucleus of French and German decision 
makers about an EU security dimension but the UK was still opposed. However, ahead 
of the Amsterdam Treaty France and Germany also called on the EU to appoint a 
foreign policy chief who would report directly to the European Council (Bremner, 
1997). Germany also encouraged Paris to pursue a security dialogue with London and 
Chancellor Schroeder promoted a triangular Bonn-Paris-London relationship as the way 
forward in dealing with security issues (Fitchett, 1998j; Lichrield, 1998a ). The German 
role was influential because Germany was somehow the balancing actor between 
France and the UK by bringing France closer to US/UK positions (Haftendorn 1996: 
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553, Gautier 1999: 236). Furthen-nore, the Gennan contribution was vital because the 
Germans insisted that an EU plan on European security should be a lot more than ESDI 
and far more than a simple exercise of updating military capacities (Hafterdorn 1996: 
553). 
In addition, the declarations of the French Foreign Ministry demonstrate that there was 
strong cooperation on the Kosovo issue between the three countries from an early point 
of the crisis (see Daily Briefings of by the Foreign and Defence Ministries 
Spokespersons 1999). As a result of this increasing interaction between the three 
nations, the creation of a Paris-Bonn-London triangle emerged. Intensive cooperation 
was taking place amongst sections of the Ministries of Foreign Affairs of the three 
countries. According to Howorth: 
"the Foreign Office had been in a constant exchange of information with the Quai 
d'Orsay and the Auswdrtiges Amt and CFSP/ European Security Units have been 
established with the aim of co-ordinating policies with the two European capitals" 
(Howorth 2004: 220). 
The socialisation process that took place amongst the three nations begun to bear fruits 
as: 
"the teams of officials working on a new approach to European defence in the 
Ministries of Foreign Affairs (MFAs) and MODs in Paris, London and Bonn/Bcrlin 
were getting to know one another, to generate something of a wavelength, and to speak 
a language which, while not identical, was at least mutually comprehensible" (Howorth 
2004: 221). 
This is also confin-ned by the declaration of the French Prime Minister Lionel Jospin 
(19990 who claims that: 
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"the convergence of views of France, the UK and Gen-nany as expressed in Saint-Malo 
and Toulouse meeting has pen-nitted a forward push to the project of a Europe of 
defence" . 
In the case of the UK and France, the St. Malo declaration bridged the two major 
positions within the EU (Atlanticist/Europeanist) into a common document that 
recognised the necessity for the EU to act by using its own structures. It was agreed that 
EU action would be implemented through NATO but also by using its own autonomous 
capabilities. The St. Malo declaration was a nice surprise for the Spanish and the 
Italians (Gautier 1999: 241) but also for many other countries which were not members 
of the Contact Group but were in favour of a European pillar on security issues (Siani- 
Davies, 2003: 21). Therefore, a path was found that unblocked the reservations of the 
big three EU states regarding a Europeanised plan in security and defence and also 
satisfied other EU Member States. As a result of the St. Malo declaration, ESDP was 
established which served as a major hub of strategic ideas. 
3.7. The Neutrals Policy Network 
Increasing cooperation within the Contact Group coincided with the entry of three 
neutral states into the EU in 1995. As the big three realised that a European approach 
was necessary due to deadlock between them and the US in the Contact Group, so too 
did the neutral group of countries add its support for a European-led policy on security 
and defence (Interview 22). Therefore, the influence of the neutrals in the discussion on 
EU security is important because it came at a time when the security debate in Europe 
was still open and when in terrns of numbers the neutrals constituted almost a third of 
EU states. 
In order to influence the debate of security a tight Finno-Swedish policy network 
emerged between sections of the Foreign Ministries of these two countries (Miles 2000: 
181-200). The two countries were searching for a solution to the problem of neutrality 
and had similar views on issues concerning the use of force, the supremacy of the UN 
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and the importance of European autonomy (Interviews 13,22). These views had to be 
somehow incorporated in the plans of the big three so that a common security policy 
could be developed. Common patterns of interaction and cooperation between the two 
countries can be traced. For example, the foreign ministers of the two countries gave an 
end to the speculation on whether they would join NATO by declaring that this was not 
a solution they would consider. According to the Foreign Ministers of Finland and 
Sweden, Tarj a Halonen and Lena Hjelm-Wallen (15/03/1997): 
"if Finland and Sweden were now to reconsider their policy of non participation in 
military alliances, it would not add to the stability of our countries, nor to the stability 
of our immediate neighbourhood. That is why there is no need for Finnish and Swedish 
membership in NATO. The enlargement of NATO is a serious, demanding and 
continuous process. Parallel to this process, Finland and Sweden will be contributing 
actively toward security in Europe". 
Furthen-nore, there was an influential Finno-Swedish memorandum in April 1996 
which proposed the incorporation of the Petersberg Tasks into the Amsterdam Treaty 
(Miles 2000: 196). Swedish-Finnish cooperation was also apparent during discussion of 
the Amsterdam Treaty. According to Miles: 
"the two states worked together on issues of foreign policy by emphasising their non- 
aligned status and suggesting that they would not obstruct the evolution of'a military 
dimension in CFSP as long as it is done through the WEU" (Miles 2000: 1995). 
The influence of the Finno-Swedish bilateral network was enhanced as Ireland and 
Austria joined their demands (Tonra 2000: 227). In addition, Austria forced the pace of 
European security interaction by calling the first meeting of EU defence ministers and 
the first informal meeting between the Presidency of the EU Council and the NATO 
Secretary-General (Phinnemore 2000: 219). The result of the neutrals output into the 
EU process was that a new 'acquis' had to be constructed which had to take into 
account their neutral status. As a result, a new policy turn happened that impacted on 
82 
the development of the EU strategic culture as the momentum was slightly away from 
the ESDINATO solution. A new EU-centred solution was necessary to address the 
deadlock (Interview 22). 
3.8. Divergences between the Europeans and the Americans: the 
Shaping of a European Strategic Agenda 
The Kosovo crisis further strengthened the opinions of those policy-makers who 
wanted an EU voice on issues of security. According to Alyson Bailes (1999: 314-5), 
the St. Malo declaration came from European frustration in the early stages of the 
Kosovo crisis. Furthermore, according to Allin, Penska and Mason, the headline goal of 
the EU grew directly out of the Kosovo and Bosnian experiences (Allin 2002: 66, 
Penksa and Mason 2003: 262). Because of their limited capabilities, the Europeans 
realised that they were too weak to intervene on their own in the Western Balkans and 
had to collaborate with the. Americans on an extensive basis (Interviews 1,4j. 
However, the Yugoslav crisis became the epicentre of a process of 'mutual othering' 
between the USA and the Europeans that the thesis will now analyse in more detail. 
Although the issue of capabilities kept Europeans and Americans together, there was a 
division over how elements of force should be used in Kosovo and Bosnia that acted 
positively in the establishment ESDP. These divergences are taken into account 
because they are related to the use of force that the Europeans would like to exercise, 
thus they are part of their strategic culture. 
Divergences in tactics between the Europeans and the Americans can be traced back to 
the beginning of the Bosnian crisis. The Kosovo crisis further intensified the problems 
between the Europeans and the Americans (Daalder and O'Hanlon 2000). In the case of 
Bosnia Herzegovina, David Owen claims that there had been frequent tensions between 
the two sides of the Atlantic (Owen 1995: 116). The Europeans had a growing 
resentment for the Washington Joint Action Programme on Bosnia with the British, 
French and German expressing strong concerns about it (Owen 1995: 175-177). 
Furthermore, the Europeans were unhappy with the American 'lift and strike' policy 
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that the Americans were eager to practice in Bosnia (Owen 1995: 159). According to 
Holbrooke (1999: 103): 
"I have no doubt the Europeans would have blocked or minimized the bombing were it 
not for Washington's new resolve". 
There are testimonies that demonstrate that a European voice was different from that of 
the USA, especially concerning UN involvement in the area: 
"the Americans were aiming for a less UN involvement in the Bosnia talks" 
(Holbrooke 1999: 202). 
Furthennore: 
"the United States neither shared the Europeans' view of what the UN's peacekeeping 
mandate in Croatia or humanitarian mandate in Bosnia-Herzegovina was designed to do 
politically, nor accepted the limitation of impartiality on the UN's military 
involvement" (Owen 1995: 366). 
During the Kosovo crisis the differing approaches between the USA and Europe 
became even more evident. American geostrategic priorities were different from 
European ones, a fact that made Europeans worry about the real commitment of the 
Americans in the region. This was also manifested in the US Military Strategy Review 
of 1995 which focused on Korea and Iraq with Bosnia not being a US priority (Clark 
2002: 46). According to Clark (2002: 447-8): 
"this meant that NATO was depending for leadership on a nation whose priority 
securities lay elsewhere". 
These differences were inflated during the 1999 NATO bombing of Serbia (Operation 
Allied Force). According to NATO SACEUR Wesley Clark, NATO came close to 
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crumbling many times (Wesley Clark 2002: XL). For some European countries, 
intervening through NATO raised many difficult questions. The incapacity of air strikes 
to impede ethnic cleansing became a major point of discontent (Heisbourg 1999: 220). 
In addition, the Operation Allied Force was viewed negatively by the publics of many 
countries including Greece, Italy, Austria and Spain (Kennedy 2000: 118, Phinnemore 
2000: 219) and caused problems for countries such as Austria which refused to allow 
NATO airplanes to cross its air space (Grant 1999: 9). 
The problem of the legality of the Kosovo operation was another important issue. 
According to Ortega, this fact would also have an impact on the strategic culture of the 
EU in the future because it: 
"implies that military intervention by EU forces without Security Council authorisation 
will be very unlikely" (Ortega 2001: 115). 
The question of legality and whether it is still important for the strategic culture of the 
EU will be taken into account in Chapter Six of the thesis. Although in public the 
leaders of NATO nations were defending the Kosovo Operation on the grounds of 
legitimacy it is evident from primary sources that Europeans wanted a clear UN 
mandate. For instance, according to Wesley Clark (2002: 125) there was: 
"French and Gennan insistence that force could not be used against Milosevic unless 
specifically authorised by the United Nations. This was an attempt to curb domestic 
opposition to strikes". 
In the case of the UK, Albright also mentions: 
"I called Robin Cook, who said his lawyers had told him a Council mandate would be 
needed if NATO were to act. I told him he should get himself new lawyers. If a UN 
resolution passed, we would have set a precedent that NATO required Security Council 
85 
authorization before it could act. This would give Russia, not to mention China, a veto 
over NATO" (Albright 2003: 384). 
Indeed, the region of fon-ner Yugoslavia constituted a land of paradox for the EU-US 
relations. On one hand, it empowered the relationship between Europeans and 
Axnericans by leading to common actions in Bosnia and Kosovo through NATO. 
However, it was also the interaction between the two blocs that led to a European 
differentiation and to the need to move on with ESDP. According to Duke: 
"ironically, it was on major transatlantic differences that the Europeans appeared to find 
most solidarity" (Duke 1997: 42). 
This was also the view of Wesley Clark who provides a long list of different 
approaches between the Europeans and the Americans: 
"the United States was increasingly committed to the idea of strategic strikes, going 
after the heart of Milosevic's power. The Europeans, or at least the French and a few 
others, were more interested in limiting the strikes to Kosovo, trying to hit the ground 
forces, and avoiding actions that might antagonize or damage Serbia further", (Clark 
2002: 237). 
Furthennore: 
"the other Allies began to be increasingly demanding too. It was British law that targets 
struck by any aircraft based in the United Kingdom had to be approved by their 
lawyers, the French demanded greater insight into the targeting and strikes, and of 
course there had to be continuing consultation with NATO headquarters and with other 
countries, too" (Clark 2002: 224). 
In addition, Clark (2002: 449) suggests that there is a different perception on the use of 
force between the Americans and the Europeans: 
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"the American view focuses on the outcome of the conflict; it recognizes that consensus 
for the use of force is difficult to sustain, and that public opinion coalesces behind 
success. The French view was far more far-sighted; it sought minimal physical and 
psychological impact on Serbia and the Serbs with the aim of speeding post war 
reconstruction and reconciliation. The Americans and French positions also reflected 
their distinctive historical experiences, cultures, and geography". 
Furthermore, when it carne to using force it is evident that the Europeans had a 
different view on air targets. Wesley Clark mentions that the Europeans were usually 
unwilling to hit civilian targets (Clark 2002: 249), as well as being more sensitive to the 
issue of collateral damage and civilian casualties (Clark 2002: 314-6), with a barrage of 
criticism about Serb civilian casualties especially from France, Belgium, Luxembourg, 
Italy and Germany (Clark 2002: 339,353-4). In addition, the US was at odds with its 
Allies on the question of where and how to use air strikes. According to Clark (2002: 
430): 
was always the Americans who pushed for the escalation to new, more sensitive 
targets, [ ... ], and always some of the Allies who expressed doubts and reservations". 
Furthermore, Americans believed the best way was to strike as much and as quickly as 
possible whereas the Europeans wanted the operation to focus on where ethnic 
cleansing was talking place (Clark 2002: 449). In addition, Secretary of Defence 
William Cohen in a PBS, interview suggested that the US would have used a more 
radical approach if it was alone: 
"if we were to carry out and act unilaterally, we would have a much more robust, 
aggressive, and decapitating type of campaign [ ... ] the difference here, of course, is 
that we're acting as an alliance". 
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There was also a different approach between the US and the Europeans on what means 
should be used to fight the Serbs. The Bosnia campaign had highlighted these different 
approaches. To the Europeans the 'lift and strike' approach in 1993: 
"looked like a recipe for the expansion of the fighting, not its ten-nination" (Clark 2002: 
37). 
The Kosovo Operation highlighted the different perspectives between Americans and 
Europeans on issues of strategy: 
"the Americans favoured a strategic air campaign, the European militaries were more 
ready to move in on the ground" (Clark 2002: 319). 
As early as the autumn of 1998 some European states were willing to place forces on 
the ground (Clark 2002: 450). According to Clark (2002: 450-5), these troops would be 
made of a French sponsored extraction force which would station in FYROM and it 
would consist of 2,000 troops supported by the UK, Germany and Italy. The Americans 
insisted that there would be no US ground force. American unwillingness to participate 
put Clark is an awkward position as he was the overall commander but represented a 
nation that would not participate in such a mission. This was a difficult issue for the 
Europeans to accept because, within NATO, commands were distributed on the basis of 
who provided the most troops (Clark 2002: 154). 
In addition, although the Kosovo Operation was against the Milosevic regime, the 
Europeans contrary to the Americans did not want to give the impression that they were 
favouring the KLA. The issue of remaining 'relatively' neutral towards the KLA was 
still important for the Europeans (Clark 2002: 37). According to Madeleine Albright: 
"in my conversation with Europeans, even during the war, I had detected deep 
scepticism toward Albanians" (Albright 2003: 426). In addition, the US meetings with 
the KLA "nettled the Europeans" (Albright 2003: 386). 
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Furthen-nore: 
"... Hubert Vddrine and Robin Cook wanted to be sure a NATO-led peacekeeping force 
would be authorised to take their (meaning air strikes) place. Otherwise the Europeans 
feared that power in Kosovo would be seized by the KLA" (Albright 2003: 394). 
The issue of leadership and the European willingness to take over were again part of the 
Kosovo Operation debate: 
"while the Americans wanted a clear chain of command under American leadership the 
Europeans insisted that the European diplomat on the ground have the authority over 
the force. Both the French and the British agreed on this" (Clark 2002: 64). 
Certain technical issues also complicated the transatlantic relationship. For instance, the 
Americans did not want to use the Apache Helicopter in the Kosovo operation because 
there was the fear of losing them in the battle. However, the Europeans thought that the 
Apaches were vital (Clark 2002: 424). Finally, divisions emerged on the issue of 
policing: 
"the Europeans insisted that the international police would only monitor; they couldn't 
possibly "enforce" because they didn't know the laws. The Europeans remained firm on 
this view. " (Clark 2002: 63). 
These incidents led to a lowering of trust between the two sides. For instance, it was 
felt by the Europeans that Clark's public declarations exceeded his political guidance 
(Clark 2002: 104-5). In addition, French-US trust was tarnished when the Americans 
thought that the French were leaking important NATO info to the Serbs (Clark 2002: 
175). 
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All these difference regarding the use of force that were mentioned above reinforced 
the idea that Europeans should put their act together in issues of security as reliance on 
the USA could not be taken always for granted. ESDP was nQw seen as a pragmatic 
necessity. According to the then French Prime Minister Lionel Jospin: 
"the test of the Balkans has allowed the crystallisation of a European conscience in 
issues of defence [ ... ] Europe should be equipped with proper tools for the preparation 
and implementation of decisions which have to do with the strategic planning and the 
analysis of crisis situations. Europe should dispose military capabilities through the 
European pillar of NATO or due to the autonomous European means. " (Jospin 
18/6/1999). 
3.9. The Impact of the Balkan Crisis on Attitudes toward the Use 
of Force 
Where does the study of history lead us when it comes to the shaping of the EU 
strategic culture? The chapter supports the idea that the EU in the western Balkans 
came to accept responsibility to act through the use of military instruments. It claims 
that the EU Member States gradually accepted the utility and legitimacy of military 
instruments as policy tools as a result of the Bosnian and Kosovo crises. Furthermore, 
the Balkan crisis according to Robert Cooper, Director General for External and 
Politico-Military Affairs, has led to a policy of 'Brusselisation' of the Balkan policy 
which is now largely discussed and decided in Brussels (Interview 31). However, 
although a process of European socialisation took place due to the Balkans experience 
it is questionable whether such a process is valid for other parts of the world. The 
geographic remit of ESDP is an aspect that needs to be studied further in Chapter Five 
of the thesis. 
The second main theme from this chapter points to the fact that NATO is an important 
organisation for some EU states. During the 1990s, willingness emerged on behalf of 
the Europeans to provide a Europeanised structure for security provision that could be 
used especially when priorities between the two blocs would diverge. Europeans did 
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not wish to be cut off from NATO and neither could they conduct military operations 
on their own as they lacked the necessary military infrastructure. However, as it was 
previously explained, the policy stimulus has gradually shifted from NATO domination 
towards shared EU/NATO initiatives. However, whether there is the political will that 
will allow ESDP to assume a fully independent stance vis-A-vis the USA in issues of 
security is a topic that will be further investigated in Chapter Five of the thesis. 
In any case, the study of the two Balkan conflicts provides clues that support the 
argument that the Europeans have their own way of perceiving how force should be 
used. This European tendency will be further taken into account in Chapter Six of the 
thesis when the ESDP Bosnian missions will be analysed. The chapter also claimed that 
during the Bosnia/Kosovo operations the Europeans were not happy with the 'lift and 
strike' policy the USA was promoting. Furthermore, the Europeans were generally 
sensitive on the question of air targets. They were unwilling to hit civilian targets and 
uneasy when it came to collateral damages and civilian casualties. Primary material 
provide evidence that the Europeans have a particular way of seeing a conflict and 
reacting to it. However, although the European cautiousness of 'hard' elements of 
power (such as air strikes) is evident, one must still investigate which elements of force 
should be avoided. Chapters Five and Six of the thesis will investigate whether these 
sensitivities are long-term values which form part of the EU strategic culture. 
The current chapter also demonstrates that the Europeans were committed to forms of 
multilateral ism. For instance, the Europeans, compared to the Americans, were more 
willing to collaborate with the UN. It is evident though that the Europeans generally 
sought to involve other organisations in discussions concerning the Balkan crisis. 
However, relations were not always as productive. For instance, although networks of 
cooperation have been established between the UN and the EU they have not served to 
bring a strong empowerment of the bilateral relationship. The section on the EU-UN 
network suggests that communication between the two organisations was crippled by 
bureaucratisation, the fragmented, overlapping power amongst their sections and lack 
institutional isation of the bilateral relationship. This institutional weakness had a direct 
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impact on the development of an EU strategic culture which was not characterised by a 
cohesive EU-UN dialogue. Primary sources on Kosovo point to the fact that certain EU 
countries had problems with the lack of a clear UN mandate during the Serbia 
bombings which leads to the assumption that an ESDP action without a UN mandate 
will be difficult in the future. This claim will be further investigated in Chapters Five 
and Six. 
3.10. The Development of a Primary Strategic Culture? 
Chapter Two categorised the behavioural and structural elements of strategic culture in 
three main models: primary, intermediate and consolidated. By studying the period 
from 1990 up to the establishment of ESDP in 1999, it can be argued that various 
structural and behavioural elements amongst the EU Europeans point to the emergence 
of a primary strategic culture at this particular period. 
Primary strategic culture stems from a mutual security threat, which in the case of the 
EU, is the instability of the Western Balkans area. This threat has led to the idea that 
cooperation amongst EU states can be mutually beneficial. The positive transactions 
that have taken place amongst various EU policy makers led in the late 1990s to the 
first steps towards cooperation. As a result of the Western Balkan crisis, new networks 
emerged that became influential in the shaping of ideas which make up the EU strategic 
culture. Networks brought new interaction amongst the Europeans and facilitated the 
development of common understandings in the Western Balkans case. This increasing 
interaction amongst EU officials facilitated the establishment of ESDP and reinforced 
the idea that institutional isation of the EU security should move forward. 
However, as it was mentioned in the chapter the process of cooperation has taken a 
long time to materialise as officials from different states have held different views on 
issues of western Balkans security. Intensive bargaining is evident as the big three had 
to negotiate continuously in order to reach an agreement that would allow the EU to 
become a security player. An agreement that would allow the EU to assume a security 
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role was finally reached as officials became convinced by the threats stemming froin 
the Balkan wars. Another influential network which consisted of the-neutral EU states 
also acted in favours of an EU dimension in the field of security, thus pointing the way 
to the establishment of ESDP. However, at this particular decade, relationships amongst 
officials from EU member states can be seen as of partial cooperation but also strong 
cautiousness. The process of cooperation was slow and only in the second half of the 
decade more extensive patterns of cooperation can be traced through networking. 
Finally, although the Western Balkans became a point of strategic consensus for the 
Europeans, such a process did not take place regarding other parts of the world. 
3.11. Conclusions: the 1990s: A European Strategic Culture in 
the Making? 
The Western Balkans crises of the 1990s provided an opportunity for the strategic 
culture of the EU to appear. The chapter claims that EU Europeans had their own way 
in perceiving the conflict in the Western Balkans. The study of history demonstrated 
that the EU is inextricably linked to a network of multilateral relations with other 
organisations and states that justifies the idea of multilateralism. Other ideas such as the 
rejection of air strikes and the fear of collateral damage also emerged in the study and 
need to be followed up once Chapter Six deals with the EU operations in Bosnia 
Herzegovina. 
The fear of US disengagement from issues of European security is evident in the 
discourse of policy-makers. The chapter also claimed that for the Europeans the lack of 
the legal remit of the Kosovo air strikes was problematic. Still, although problems 
persisted on the question of legality the EU member states supported the NATO-led 
operation. Are the Europeans afraid that similar legal dilemmas will emerge in the 
future, thus not been willing to commit themselves to a UNSCR prior to ESDP 
mission? Chapter Five will deal with the question of UN legality and the influence that 
such an issue exercises on the strategic culture of the EU. 
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The decade of the 1990s was a period of adaptability as the Europeans tried to deal with 
the escalating humanitarian disasters in the Western Balkans. The idea of responsibility 
of the Balkan security can be justified but Chapter Five will have to investigate whether 
this feeling of responsibility is valid for other parts of the world. During this period it 
can be claimed that the EU possessed a primary strategic culture which was the 
outcome of interaction among policy officials in institutions and networks. The next 
chapter considers whether networks and institutions that have been developed since the 
late 1990s within ESDP structures have managed to move the strategic culture of the 
EU beyond the primary model. 
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Chapter Four 
The Role of ESDP Institutions and Networks in the Shaping of 
EU Strategic Culture 
4.1. Introduction 
This chapter considers the behavioural/structural elements of ESDP as manifested in 
institutions and nctworks. It uses material extracted from interviews with officials (see 
Questionnaire, Appendix III) as well as secondary sources. Findings of the 
questionnaire will be used in this chapter in order to shed light on the impact that ESDP 
institutions and networks have on the shaping of the strategic culture through the 
development of internal structural and behavioural. rules. The choice of institutions has 
not been random. Those chosen reflect the political aspect of the strategic culture of the 
EU (hence attention to the PSC) but also its operational (technical planning and 
implementation) aspects (hence the analysis of the European Union Military Staff 
(EUMS), the European Union Military Committee (EUMC) and the Committee for 
Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management (CIVCOM). 
The focus on the behavioural/structural elements of the strategic culture of the EU was 
justified in Chapter Two on the grounds that due to the different backgrounds and 
nationalities of the ESDP officials, a common pattern of behaviour (or rules of 
engagement) has to be developed in order to facilitate interaction, co-existence and a 
synthesis of opinions within ESDP structures. As a point of reference, the second 
chapter of the thesis explored the behavioural and foundational elements of 
multinational/multi-cultural entities such as security communities, intergovernmental 
policy networks and institutions in order to delineate the main elements that keep these 
entities united. It concluded that the strategic culture of the EU can be developed in 
three main types - the primary, the intermediate and the consolidated. The chapter 
claims that the type that fits better with the current strategic culture of the EU is that of 
the intermediate strategic culture. 
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The chapter provides an account of the importance of institutions and networks in the 
shaping of the strategic culture of the EU. It begins with an ESDP diagram and an 
account of the basic inter-institutional relations amongst EU institutions. The following 
section (4.2) makes some general remarks about the nature of ESDP institutional isation 
and its impact on the strategic culture of the EU. Afterwards, the importance of 
institutions in the strategic culture of the EU will be emphasised by analysing the role 
that the PSC, the EUMS/EUMC and CIVCOM play in the ESDP policy process. 
Finally, the chapter ends up with a study of the role of the most important ESDP policy 
networks in the post-St Malo era as developed within the PSC. 
4.2. ESDP in Practice: the Institutional Dimension 
Table I provides a basic outline of the main institutions that interact in order to shape 
ESDP. At the top lies the European Council which brings together the heads of 
governments and states of the EU plus the President of the European Commission. The 
European Council defines the general priorities of ESDP. The General Affairs and 
External Relations Council (GAERC) consists of the foreign ministers of the Member 
States who discuss the agenda of the European Council. The ministers of defence of the 
EU member states can meet either inforinally or in conjunction with the GAERC 
(Missiroli 2004: 59). GAERC works in close collaboration with the Secretary-General 
and High Representative for CFSP (SG/HR) (currently, Javier Solana) as well as with 
COREPER 11. 
The PSC also interacts with GAERC and COREPER 11 as it implements ESDP policy 
decisions and makes its own policy recommendations regarding the direction of ESDP. 
The role of the PSC is of vital importance for the ESDP as it is responsible for the 
planning and functioning of the ESDP missions. The PSC is supported in its work by 
the EUMC, the EUMS and CIVCOM. Other smaller institutions include: the EU 
Satellite Centre in Torrejon, Spain, the EU Institute for Security Studies in Paris and the 
European Defence Agency (EDA). These institutions will not be part of the thesis as 
their contribution to ESDP is still limited. 
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T able Six: ESDP Institutions 
European Council 
Heads of States and 
Governments 
COREPER 11 
Permanent 
Representatives 
GAERC: General Affairs and 
External Relations Council 
(Foreign Ministers) 
European PSC: Political & Security 
Commission Committee 
EUMC: EU EUMS: EU Military 
Military Staff 
Committee 
(based on Howorth 2007: 69, Meyer 2006: 114) 
General Secretariat of the 
Council of the EU 
Secretary General/High 
Representative for CFSP 
Directorate General Politico- 
Military Affairs (DG-E) 
CIVCOM: 
Committee for 
Civilian Aspects of 
Crisis Management 
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The role of four ESDP institutions (PSC, EUMC, EUMS and CIVCOM) in the shaping 
of an EU strategic culture will be analysed in detail in this chapter with principal 
attention being given to the PSC. The PSC was chosen as the primary body of research 
for number reasons. First, it has been described as the 'linchpin' of the ESDP by the 
official Council decision of 22 January 2001. In addition, as it will be argued further in 
this chapter, the PSC managed to increase both its influence and to expand its activities 
considerably, thus rendering itself into an irreplaceable policy-shaping and gradually a 
policy-making body in issues of ESDP. As the diagram above shows, the PSC remains 
at the centre of the decision-making process and has influential relationships with other 
important EU institutions. The PSC interacts extensively with the GAERC. PSC 
ambassadors have to represent national views in issues of security during PSC 
meetings, thus being important policy actors between their nation states and the EU 
level. Therefore, a study of the PSC can provide important information on the 
interaction of ESDP officials at both the EU and the national levels. Finally, the PSC is 
the institution that debates and discusses ESDP issues more frequently than any other 
EU institution; it fonnally convenes at least two times per week (plus other unofficial 
meetings), compared to GAERC (once a month) or the European Council (four times 
per year). 
The thesis does not neglect the fact the ESDP is an intergovernmental policy. The 
foreign ministers and the heads of the EU states remain responsible for the strategic 
decisions which affect the direction of the ESDP. Unfortunately, direct access to the 
ministers and heads of the EU member states is an impossible task. The difficulty in 
talking to the most important policy-makers sets an important limitation upon the 
research. However, as mentioned in the first chapter of the thesis, the study of the EU 
strategic culture requires a direct interaction with ESDP officials so that their ideas and 
beliefs regarding the use of EU police and military instruments can be taken into 
account. Therefore, a sample of ESDP officials had to be chosen from an influential 
ESDP institution that would allow the thesis to reach solid conclusions regarding the 
state of the strategic culture of the EU. As access to the elected policy makers that make 
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up the GAERC is problematic, the study had to focus on the PSC. However, before 
providing an analysis of the role of the PSC in the development of the strategic culture 
of the EU, some general remarks will be made regarding the institutional isation process 
of ESDP. 
4.2.1 General Remarks on ESDP Institutions 
First of all, it is worth mentioning that the ESDP has had a very short life. In fact, 
ESDP institutional isation is still a work in progress as most recent developments such 
as the establishment of the EDA only took place in 2004. The first ESDP operational 
institutional activities date from 2003 onwards, thus the experience of ESDP 
institutions in planning and implementing missions is limited. It should be also 
mentioned that during their first years of their existence, ESDP institutions such as the 
PSC, EUMC, EUMS and CIVCOM had to define their agendas, establish working 
relationships with other relevant bodies and find their role within the complicated 
institutional system of the EU (Interview 1,10). To give an example, according to 
Schuwirth (2004: 242): 
"the full establishment of the Military Staff took around one year and included complex 
internal activities like designing and solving infrastructure and infon-nation technology, 
managing the influx of personnel, their working conditions and their internal training, 
clarifying their status within the EU and establishing the necessary budgetary 
conditions". 
According to interviewees, a similar time was needed for making operational other 
ESDP institutions such as the PSC, the EUMC and CIVCOM (Interviews 1,10). In 
short, ESDP institutionalisation is a very recent process and this has had an impact on 
the influence that ESDP institutions exercise on the shaping of an EU strategic culture. 
Therefore, the first conclusion regarding ESDP institutional isation is that as these 
institutions have had to deal first with internal issues and find a 'modus operandi' with 
other EU institutions a lot of time was consumed on practical issues regarding the 
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arrangement of their functions. The process of EU strategic culture development was 
intensified once the institutional tasks were clearly defined and once the institutions 
acquired a clearly defined policy role. According to interviewees, it should be stressed 
that this is a very recent period ranging from 2001 onwards (Interviews 1,10,18). 
In addition, other EU structures involved in issues of security (e. g. the Council and, the 
Commission) needed time to find ways to integrate new ESDP institutions into their 
working methods. The acceptance of an ESDP dimension within the EU was not an 
easy process. As Howorth (2002: 106) claims, a military presence within EU structures 
sent shock waves through the EU. However, the idea that the EU should acquire such a 
dimension was gradually accepted (Haine 2004: 46). According to Howorth (2003b: 
18): 
"the relationship between different ESDP institutions, between new and old members, 
between national capitals and Brussels, and between political and military functions has 
proved to be generally smooth". 
Indeed, the acceptance of the ESDP institutions is seen as an achievement in its own 
right by all interviewees. 
However, although in general ESDP institutions have managed to consolidate their 
roles and functions, they are still constrained by intergovernmental decisions that date 
back to 1999. In fact, ESDP institutions emerged after a politicized process between 
two blocs of EU states. The first bloc of EU countries (that included, Belgium, 
Luxembourg and France) argued in favour of institutionalization which would grant 
extensive powers and freedom of action to ESDP. Another bloc of countries (led by the 
UK and the Netherlands) was in favour of a more limited version of ESDP. As a result 
of this division, ESDP institutional structures suffered considerably, as they emerged, 
with the exception of the PSC, mostly as small entities with limited resources and 
powers. 
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The thesis will now move to the study of particular ESDP institutions and their impact 
on the shaping of EU strategic culture. 
4.2.2. The Political and Security Committee (PSC) 
The PSC monitors international developments and plays a- vital role during the pre- 
operational phase which precedes an ESDP mission. It exercises political control 
through the strategic direction of ESDP operations. This includes the power to amend 
operational plans as well as the chain of command. The PSC reports to the Council of 
the EU at regular intervals and organises operational contributions of non-EU states. It 
has a coordination role as well as a consultation role with other ESDP institutions such 
as the EUMC, the EUMS and CIVCOM. Furthermore, it consults with outside bodies 
such as NATO. The PSC consists of the Pennanent Representatives of the Member 
States who have an ambassadorial status. The PSC ambassadors are based in Brussels 
but they also take part in regular meetings in national capitals in order to brief their 
6national' colleagues as well as be briefed on national issues. In this respect, PSC 
officials constitute important policy information carriers and policy shapers both at the 
national and EU levels. 
In the first two years of its inception, the PSC had to find its own position within the 
institutional machinery of the EU. Various, 'turf wars' between different institutions on 
'who does what' had to be resolved so that the PSC could move on with its tasks. For 
example, a division of labour had to be worked out within the institutional triangle of 
COREPER, the PSC and the Council of Ministers. The respective roles of COREPER 
and PSC was partially determined at the Seville European Council in June 2002 when it 
was decided that the Council would meet monthly in two separate modes, one for 
'general affairs' business (prepared by COREPER I and II) and the other for 'external 
relations' business (relevant to COREPER II and the PSC) (Howorth 2003b: 19). As 
COREPER 11 deals with a wide range of political, commercial, economic and 
institutional affairs, it has less time to dedicate to ESDP issues which have been 
delegated to the PSC. At present, the ESDP related work of COREPER II is limited to 
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checking the legal status of PSC decisions as well as providing advice on financial 
issues regarding missions. As both PSC and COREPER Il ambassadors work for their 
respective national representations and share the saine offices in Brussels (in respective 
national representation buildings) interaction amongst them is frequent and the 
relationship is regarded by PSC officials as smooth and mutually supportive. 
Questionnaire respondents suggest that the PSC plays a vital role in the policy-making 
of ESDP and that it is deserves to be called the 'linchpin' and the 'policy director' of 
ESDP. According to all PSC interviewees, the PSC has been an influential institution in 
the shaping of ESDP (Appendix 111, section 2, question 1). 
1. The institution in which I work has been influential in shaping ESDP. 
1. Agree 18 
2. Mostly agree but also depends on the circumstances 4 
3. Mostly disagree but also depends on the circumstances 0 
4. Disagree 0 
5. Don't Know/Don't Answer 0 
In theory, the political authority of the ESDP is in the hands of GAERC, whereas 
managerial authority rests with PSC. However, PSC officials mention that the PSC has 
managed to consolidate its predominance in ESDP affairs and has the responsibility of 
reaching decisions which the GAERC then accepts. In addition, the PSC is usually 
chaired by the Permanent Representative of the Member State then holding the EU 
Presidency. Due to this institutional arrangement, the PSC also manages to influence 
the work of the Presidency on issues of security and defence. Furthen-nore, PSC 
meetings are attended by four representatives of the Council Secretariat as well as by a 
Commission official in order to ensure policy-continuity and cross-pillar cooperation. 
Relations amongst the different EU institutions which interact with the PSC have been 
generally good and the level of EU intra-institutional cooperation has been described as 
satisfactory by all PSC interviewees. 
The PSC is also an important institution because it binds officials together in a pattern 
of continuous interaction and collaboration, thus contributing to the development of 
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common ideas in the field of security. According to interviewees, most of the time there 
is a good degree of cooperation among PSC colleagues which, in turn, contributes to 
the development of strategic culture (Appendix 111, Section 2, question 2). 
2. Most of the time there is a good degree of cooperation with rny ESDP colleagues. 
1. Agree 20 
2. Mostly agree but also depends on the circumstances 2 
3. Mostly disagree but also depends on the circumstances. 0 
4. Disagree 0 
5. Don't Know/Don't Answer 0 
Within the PSC, officials have developed what Meyer (2005b: 52) claims is: 
64an esprit de corps, a sense of group identity and common thoughts on the idea of 
developing ESDP as well as high levels of mutual trust and an understanding for each 
others' positions". 
Indeed, all PSC interviewees mention that within the PSC there is a good friendly 
atmosphere which contributes to the development of confidentiality amongst its 
personnel. The high degree of trust that exists within the PSC is manifested in the 
frequent exchange of very sensitive and confidential information. Both the behavioural 
elements of trust and confidentiality are influential in the development of an EU 
strategic culture. 
Friendly interaction and cooperation are common words in the description of the PSC's 
work. These two conditions lead to the development of diffused reciprocity as 
manifested in a non-institutionalised pattern of mutual help amongst officials. Without 
such frequent interaction, the emergence of an inten-nediate EU strategic culture would 
be an unlikely outcome. Thus, some more experienced officials have made a 
comparison between the predecessor of the PSC, the Political Committee (Po. Co) by 
claiming that the lack of frequent interaction amongst officials led to no progress in 
issues of security as Po. Co. Political Directors were based in their national capitals 
(Interview 18). Furthen-nore, one can detect a 'path dependency' of stable coexistence, 
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cooperation and interaction that is common amongst the relationships of the PSC 
officials since the establishment of the PSC. Indeed, the timetables of the PSC officials 
are characterised by an increasing level of overlapping social agendas as well as private 
meetings and 'dinner diplomacy' which bind them even closer together. For instance, 
an official gives a characteristic description which fits with the lifestyle of the average 
PSC official: 
'6we spend most of our time amongst ourselves rather than being with our families. The 
work in the PSC dominates our lives. Relationships amongst the colleagues are 
constructive. There is a very frequent exchange of opinions, a synthesis of views and 
also the necessary help when someone needs it" (Interview 12). 
In addition, cooperation amongst officials has increased over the years (Appendix 111, 
section 2, question 2). 
3. The degree of cooperation amongst employees within ESDP institutions has 
increased over the years. 
1. Agree 14 
2. Mostly agree but also depends on the circumstances 3 
3. Mostly disagree but also depends on the circumstances 0 
4. Disagree 1 
5. Don't Know/Don't Answer 4 
For instance, PSC officials mentioned that the frequency of meetings and the number of 
decisions reached within the PSC have followed an upwards trend since the 
establishment of the PSC (Interview 12). There has also been an expansion of the issues 
and policies discussed within the PSC. The expansion of themes tackled by the PSC 
and the increasing number of decisions reached can be also seen as a positive factor in 
the establishment of an EU strategic culture as consensus can be reached in other policy 
areas. However, the PSC has been a victim of its own success as it is characterised by a 
rising workload. As it stands, the PSC lacks the necessary institutional resources to deal 
with all its tasks. Certain ambassadors, especially those coming from smaller Member 
States, have thus complained about the workload and the overwhelming exchange of 
104 
papers which is difficult to be incorporated into the national systems (Interviews 6,7, 
8). The problem that such a bureaucratic blockage creates to the development of an EU 
strategic culture is that the ESDP agenda cannot be transferred to the national capitals 
in depth. Therefore, the process of hannonisation of national policies is further 
undennined, thus not allowing the strategic culture of the EU to be consolidated. 
The PSC has played a positive role, in bringing uniforinity to views regarding the use of 
police/military resources. For instance, PSC officials mentioned that considerable 
pressures are exercised on members of the group in order to alter positions that do not 
fit with the 'mainstream', that is, with the views of the PSC ma ority. Pressure and 
conviction by argument are frequent but are not exercised on issues that are considered 
to be 'nationally sensitive' for a particular country. The result of this group pressure is 
that it is common for PSC officials to alter their primary positions to ones which are 
closer to the mainstream views of the group. In addition, PSC officials also witnessed 
the increasing emergence of 'third party mediation' as a way of solving conflicting 
issues and bridging the differences over different strategic positions. Third party 
mediation takes place when a discussion between two or more countries involved 
reaches a deadlock. In this case, it is very common for a third 'neutral' official to take 
the initiative to form a new proposal and present it to both sides which will then accept 
it most of the times. Conviction by logic as well as third party mediation can be seen as 
facilitating factors in the development of an EU strategic culture as they encourage the 
establishment of commonly accepted ideas in the field of security. However, the fact 
that certain countries are 'coerced' into the adoption of particular decision also leads 
one to believe that the strategic culture of the EU has not reached the smooth process of 
policy harmonization that would characterise a consolidated strategic culture. 
According to PSC interviewees, the natural tendency of allying with other PSC officials 
is also seen as a positive factor in the creation of an EU strategic culture (interviews 1, 
10). The threat of the national veto within the PSC is very rare and usually left as a tool 
of 'last resort'. The rejection of the veto as a way of accepted behaviour facilitates the 
formation of common positions that, in turn, help develop strategic culture. The fact 
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that a diplomat may stand on one's own is seen as an anathema as it is widely 
acknowledged that PSC diplomats do not want to be isolated. An insistence on a 
position that is rejected by the large majority of the PSC is seen as an inappropriate 
strategy that must be avoided unless the matter discussed is of particular urgency to the 
national capital. 
The work of the PSC is also characterised by a high degree of continuity. Although 
PSC Axnbassadors regularly change (approximately every three years) regular help to 
newcomers and a tendency to welcome them into the PSC structures contributes to a 
positive feeling of belonging amongst the new members of the PSC. As a result of this 
practice, newcomers are very quickly integrated into the spirit of cooperation that is 
predominant in the PSC. Due to the process of osmosis between old and new PSC 
members an 'institutional memory' has been developed, thus binding PSC officials 
into common working methods, agreed agendas and accepted patterns of behaviour. 
Such institutional memory also facilitates the maintenance of ideas that make up the 
strategic culture of the EU for when new PSC members join, the work of the PSC does 
not have to start from scratch. 
A positive path dependency in the shaping of the strategic culture of the EU is the 
continuous engagement of PSC officials in a search for policy consensus. This 
behavioural element of intense cooperation contributes to the establishment of a 
consensual strategic culture. One of the main tasks of the PSC officials is to reach 
consensus, even if this presupposes a frequent 're-writing' of national instructions. 
PSC officials admit that sometimes national guidelines can be very rigid and can be 
seen as unacceptable by the other PSC colleagues. In such cases, the role of the PSC 
officials is to try to minimise the differences between the national positions and the 
predominant PSC position which contributes highly to the development of the strategic 
culture of the EU. 
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When it comes to the appreciation of the work carried out by the PSC, the answers of 
the participants from interviewees can be grouped into three main categories (Appendix 
111, section 2, question 5). 
5. How much does the national capital value the work of the institution for which 
you are working? 
1. Quite a lot. There is frequent interaction between my institution and the national 
capital 12 
2. There is a substantial interaction but there is still room for improvement 6 
3. Not a lot. 4 
The first category mostly includes the states from the old EU12. Officials from these 
states mostly suggest that there is a good degree of interaction between their national 
capitals and the missions in Brussels and a growing interest in ESDP developments in 
general. However, even amongst these states there are still differences on how much 
influence a PSC ambassador can exercise. For example, a British official claims that in 
the case of the UK there is a very strong interaction between the PSC Representative in 
ESDP and the high echelons of the FCO, a situation which contrasts with that of the 
French Representatives (Interview 10). However, although the UK national 
representation office enjoys a very good relationship with the FCO, this has not 
necessarily led to a major change of British national priorities. According to one British 
official, while the UK is taking part in ESDP it is also committed to many other 
different missions (e. g. Iraq) and therefore attributes less importance to ESDP than 
France or Gennany (Interview 10). 
The second category of states includes the post neutral states which joined the EU in 
1995. Due to their particular status, it is claimed that it took a couple of years for them 
to understand how ESDP works and how they can get fully involved in it. For example, 
a Swedish official adds: 
"it took us time to understand the nature of ESDP and what it is for. At the very 
beginning of its formation'the Swedes were very lukewarm about it with no enthusiasm 
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on the policy and a high degree of scepticism. I can say that interest in ESDP was only 
raised in 2002/3 so quite recently really" (Interview 13). 
For Finland, it is also mentioned that a similar period was necessary so that the national 
bureaucracy would become more interested in ESDP developments even if the Finnish 
Presidency was influential in bringing new thinking to Finnish elites -(Interview 22). 
However, both the Swedish and the Finnish Presidencies acted positively in bringing 
new thinking to Foreign Ministries and preparing the ground for more pro-active 
stances in ESDP issues for both countries (Interviews 13,22). In the case of Austria and 
Ireland, it can be argued that, although the two countries participate in ESDP, the 
national bureaucracy is still struggling to bring together resources and personnel that 
will facilitate the assimilation of ESDP at the national level (Interview 8). 
The third group of states includes some of the East European EU members which are 
still struggling to understand the utility of ESDP. In general, as far as these countries 
are concerned, interest in ESDP is still low in the national ministries with much of the 
security discussions still dominated by attention to NATO. East European PSC officials 
also mentioned that they are struggling when it comes to convincing their colleagues in 
national ministries of how important their tasks are. Although policy ideas may flourish 
within the PSC, they claimed that it can be difficult to feed them to the national 
mechanism. 
An East European official describes the situation by claiming that: 
"sometimes I feel frustrated. There is no reply from the national government on certain 
policy ideas and the image of ESDP is still comparatively low to my country. This is 
also the case for most of the Eastern European states. We are still trying to find out a 
place in ESDP. This also has to do with the fact that for issues of defence the main 
security provider is NATO and many cannot understand why we need ESDP" 
(Interview 14). 
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The fact that a considerable number of EU states lack a strong allegiance to ESDP 
poses a clear challenge to the establishment of a consolidated EU strategic culture as 
the danger may be that the EU will be divided into two camps - between the ESDP 
enthusiasts and ESDP sceptics. Because of the high number of Eastern EU countries 
in ESDP it is difficult to imagine that a consolidated EU strategic culture will emerge 
soon as the two blocs have different perceptions of how ESDP should develop (see also 
Chapter Five). 
Although problems of national assimilation of the ESDP agenda are evident, the role of 
the PSC in establishing an EU strategic culture can still be seen as positive. There are 
cases when the PSC ambassadors claimed that they have managed to bring closer the 
national governments to an EU dimension. However, a full EU harnionisation of views 
regarding security issues is still a distant prospect. It may be the case that gradually 
further interaction amongst EU officials combined with the successful initiatives that 
the ESDP undertakes can have a multiplier effect which may lead to a consolidated EU 
strategic culture in the future. Nevertheless, for the time being all PSC officials 
mentioned that the tasks that the ESDP undertakes are modest, thereby the impact they 
have on the individual strategic cultures of the Member States is limited. Although 
cooperation has taken place, actual coordination of security policies is still a developing 
process and harmonisation of security attitudes still remains weak. These are signs 
which point to an intermediate EU strategic culture. 
The problematic status of coordination and harmonisation does not facilitate the 
fon-nation of a consolidated EU strategic. Furthermore, although respect and trust have 
been common characteristics of the work carried out by the PSC, the same cannot be 
said when it comes to the levels of solidarity which would have attributed a sense of 
consolidation in the strategic culture of the EU. For instance, the degree of solidarity is 
minimum when various national sensitivities dictate an allocation of a big amount of 
resources to ESDP (e. g. when some EU countries try to put the issue of common 
defence on the table) or when US policy initiatives put some EU countries in a 
disadvantaged position. In these particular cases national instincts overshadow 
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European commonalities. Therefore, there is still a parallel existence of a national 
identity along with enriched EU elements. This is also another characteristic of the 
intennediate strategic culture of the EU. 
Although the role of PSC officials as strategic culture shapers faces certain limitations 
it is still of considerable importance to the development of the strategic culture of the 
EU. The function of PSC officials as ESDP agenda transmitters to the national level is 
vital to the creation of an EU strategic culture because PSC officials can convince their 
resPective member governments about the utility of ESDP activities. All interviewees 
mentioned that the role of the PSC official is to provide good briefings from Brussels to 
the national capital and to spot further opportunities for cooperation between one's 
country and other Member States. Evidence from interviews demonstrates that PSC 
officials have been successful in the transfer of the PSC agenda to national capitals. 
Even in the most problematic cases, the PSC Ambassadors have been influential in 
altering national positions (even slightly) towards a more positive approach in ESDP 
issues. For instance, the majority of PSC officials suggested that due to their ESDP 
posts they have considerable influence over the fonnulation of the ESDP policy of their 
respective member state-with the exception of some East European officials- 
(Appendix III, section 2, question 6). 
6. Due to my ESDP post I have considerable influence over the formulation of the 
ESDP policy of the state I come from. 
1. Agree 14 
2. Mostly agree but also depends on the circumstances 4 
3. Mostly disagree but also depends on the circumstances 3 
4. Disagree 0 
5. Don't Know/Don't Answer I 
Furthermore, the 'bridging' role of PSC arnbassadors between the national and EU 
level was stressed in all the interviews conducted. All PSC officials mentioned that 
although their main function is to represent their particular government, this does not 
prohibit them from constructing EU positions which are parallel to national interests 
(Appendix III, section 2, question 7). 
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7. My main function is to strike a balance between the national and the EU 
position but national interest always comes first. 
1. Agree 14 
2. Mostly agree but also depends on the circumstances 8 
3. Mostly disagree but also depends on the circumstances 0 
4. Disagree 0 
5. Don't' Know/Don't Answer 0 
Part of the PSC's success lies in the fact that the work of a PSC official often involves 
networking at the national level so that his/her ideas can be easily transmitted and 
implemented in the national policy making process. There is a common tendency 
amongst PSC officials to build good working relations between the national capitals 
and the PSC. The professional background of the PSC officials facilitates cooperation 
between national capitals and Brussels as these officials are usually experienced 
diplomats who already enjoy a good relationship with and are respected in their 
national ministries. Usually, information gathered within the PSC is quite valued by the 
national ministries although the degree of appreciation varies from country to country 
and depends on the issue discussed as well as the quality of the infon-nation itself. PSC 
officials play an active role in the shaping of national positions as they provide their 
national capitals with information and advice that they judge as appropriate. The 
gathering of information is another tool of influence in the hands of the PSC officials as 
only they can choose and present particular pieces of infonnation which can strengthen 
their particular arguments when their views are presented to the national governments. 
One of the positive functions of the PSC is that it binds the national and EU levels 
closer together by encouraging the development of common understandings which are 
influential in the development of the strategic culture of the EU. Although PSC officials 
have certain 'no -go' areas, they also enjoy considerable room for manoeuvre. During 
the interviews, PSC officials claimed that they have a wide margin of flexibility in 
deciding upon which 'national interests' have to be defended and what the national 
position should consist of during negotiation (with lower levels of flexibility declared 
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in the cases of some Eastern European officials). Flexibility is seen as another 
important facilitating factor in the development of an EU strategic culture for it allows 
consensus on various issues to be more easily reached. Flexibility has become an 
unwritten rule of PSC interaction. All interviewees claimed that PSC officials have to 
demonstrate a level of flexibility themselves, and can expect their colleagues to 
reciprocate flexibility in every day negotiations. Therefore, a logic of 'diffused 
reciprocity' has become part of the PSC's working methods. 
In addition, PSC officials who come from smaller EU Member States point to the fact 
that on many issues their countries do not have a clearly defined national interest. 
Consequently, the shaping of consensus in such cases is easier. This is because officials 
coming from smaller states usually expect other more experienced officials to take the 
lead on issues in which they have limited experience (Interviews 1,5). As a result of 
such 'policy gaps' at the national level, it is up to the PSC officials in Brussels to 
decide what the national position is. Therefore, PSC officials can also 'enrich' national 
policies by adding new dimensions to them. This phenomenon of enrichment further 
encourages the development of EU strategic culture as PSC officials can adopt 
accommodating positions that fit with the mainstream opinion of the PSC. 
Nevertheless, the process of 'national' incorporation into the works of the PSC has its 
limits as EU member states will not sacrifice what they consider as core national 
interests. This is also another sign that points to the fact that the EU possesses an 
interinediate strategic culture as Member States are supportive of ESDP activities but 
also cautious when it comes to their own domaines r6serv6s. PSC officials mention that 
because of national rigidities various opportunities of establishing cooperation amongst 
EU countries have been lost due to 'stubbornness' stemming from the national capitals. 
One should take into account that as the 'green light' to move forward in particular 
issues is given from the national capitals, Member States can have either a positive or a 
negative impact on the shaping of the EU strategic culture. This impact depends on the 
government structures, party/coalition politics, as well as the attitudes of the national 
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officials appointed to national and EU posts. A PSC official summarises succinctly the 
limitations of the PSC work by claiming that it can be considered as: 
"the art of the possible" (Intmiew 10). 
PSC officials need to have realistic expectations of what an expected outcome may be 
and always try to reach a consensus. The establishment of the strategic culture of the 
EU was a process that began with the tackling of security issues that were considered as 
non-divisive. This is also another sign of the interinediate strategic culture that the EU 
possesses as not all security issues are covered by the PSC. For instance, during the first 
two years of its existence, the PSC was short-circuited by national capitals. A very clear 
example of such tactics was the 2003 Iraq crisis when the PSC: 
"was kept at arm's length from what was a very important policy decision in issues of 
security" (Howorth 2003b: 18). 
However, the PSC interviewees that experienced the crisis of Iraq perceived the 
exclusion of the topic from the agenda as positive so that the unity of the group would 
not be called into question (Interview 12). This decision can be also seen as a sign of 
maturity reached amongst the colleagues who 'agreed not to disagree' in order not to 
jeopardise good working relationships. Yet the exclusion of Iraq from PSC discussions 
can be also seen as a sign of weakness to address the main security challenges that 
affected EU foreign policy at this particular time. If the trend of avoiding divisive 
issues within the PSC continues, then the possibility of establishing a consolidated EU 
strategic culture that will address important security challenges remains dim. However, 
PSC officials also point to the fact that the work remit of the PSC has been 
continuously extended, thus encompassing more policy areas. This policy expansion on 
behalf of the PSC has a positive influence on the development of an inclusive EU 
strategic culture. 
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Finally, national sovereignty is seen as the cornerstone of ESDP by PSC officials even 
if it sometimes poses difficulties in their work. This is another characteristic of the EU 
inten-nediate strategic culture. It is interesting to note that on the question regarding the 
empowerment of ESDP institutions, PSC officials are reluctant to allocate more powers 
to ESDP institutions if such moves challenge national sovereignty (Appendix 111, 
section 2, question 8). 
8. More powers should be given to ESDP institutions even if this goes against 
national sovereignty 
1. Agree 4 
2. Mostly agree but also depends on the circumstances 9 
3. Mostly disagree but also depends on the circumstances 9 
4. Disagree 0 
5. Don't' Know/Don't Answer 0 
Interviewees claim that their answers can partly be explained due to the belief that 
Member States will never make such a move. However, this tendency is also a result of 
the temporary nature of PSC placements. PSC officials work mostly as expat 
'nationals' and see the ESDP experience as another stage of their lives but not the only 
and final stage of their career. Furthen-nore, many PSC officials serve ESDP at the later 
stages of their careers where their cultural experiences have already been shaped by 
work at the national level. Limitations regarding the length of the stay of PSC officials 
has an impact on their function as influential shapers of the EU strategic culture. Most 
PSC officials will return to the national ministries and consequently, they have an 
interest in maintaining the national capitals as the main sources of power. Therefore, 
PSC officials do not want to be seen as 'going native' and want to remain a trustworthy 
link to their ministries. 
4.2.3. The European Union Military Committee (EUMC) and the 
European Union Military Staff (EUMS) 
The EUMC is a forum for military consultation amongst EU Member States. It is made 
up of the Chiefs of Defence Staff (CHODs) and deals with early warning, situation 
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assessment and strategic planning. It also provides the PSC with advice on military 
matters. For every crisis management operation, the PSC, together with the EUMC, is 
charged with evaluating contributions to the mission. The EUMC is chaired by an 
officer from a Member State whose mandate runs for three years. The EUMC delivers 
to the European Council, via the PSC, the unanimous opinion of the CHODs on all 
matters of military relevance. The Chair also attends sessions of the Council of the EU 
when issues of security and defence are discussed. 
The role of the EUMS, meanwhile, has been to establish objectives in relation to 
capabilities, concepts (doctrines) and internal procedures. It also has responsibility for 
overseeing the process of capabilities modemisation (as identified in the Helsinki 2003 
Headline Goal and the 2010 Headline Goal). Between 1999 and early 200 1, the EUMS 
built upon the 'acquis' gained by the WEU in planning for the Petersberg Tasks (Bono 
2004b: 447). By late 2002, the EUMS had drafted military policy and concept papers 
tackling topics as diverse as command and control, rules of engagement, logistics and 
communications. It has also contributed to the development of the broader politico- 
military policies, concepts and procedures, such as an EU exercise policy, information 
policy, and a handbook of crisis-management procedures (Howorth 2003: 19). 
In short, EUMS and the EUMC have been in charge of the development of new 
technical terms, practices and linguistic codes that have facilitated the shaping of 
common procedures in the deployment of missions. When it comes to the every day 
building up of ESDP, EUMC/EUMS interviewees claimed that ESDP has developed in 
a double manner: through bottom-up and a top-down approaches (Interviews 24,33). 
The top down approach occurs when certain initiatives and policy ideas are pushed 
through either the GAERC or the PSC. The bottom-up approach, meanwhile, happens 
when the EUMS and the EUMC put forward their views on ESDP missions, thus 
adding flesh to the bones of ESDP ideas. As a result of the work of the two institutions, 
the 'bottom up' contribution to ESDP has been empowered considerably, thus, 
contributing positively to the creatiodof common technical/operational aspects that 
underpin the strategic culture of the EU. 
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According to interviews, relationships amongst EUMS/EUMC officials have been 
characterised by high levels of trust and cooperation (Interviews 43,54). Within the 
EUMC/EUMS there are no 'political' disputes (as may be sometimes the case in the 
PSC) as both the EUMS/EUMC work on missions that have been already delegated to 
them. Furthermore, all EUMS/EUMS interviewees supported the view that participants 
make their best effort to reach agreement on how missions should best be implemented. 
Here, the question of safeguarding lives of EU personnel is always under consideration 
and this helps foster consensus (Interviews 24,33). Therefore, it can be argued that the 
consensual atmosphere which is evident in the political level (PSC) has also been 
apparent at the technical/operational level of ESDP (EUMC/EUMS). The high degree 
of consensual interaction amongst officials thus acts as a positive factor in the 
establishment of the EU strategic culture. 
All officials interviewed noted that within the EUMC/EUMS a frequent interaction of 
views and ideas occur on policy issues, with a good level of understanding regarding 
the national difficulties of troop/police deployment and a willingness to cooperate in 
order to reach agreements (Interviews 24,33,55). The development of a path 
dependency of cooperation and understanding can be traced in the interaction of the 
EUMS/EUMC officials. Secrecy is a vital part of the EUMS/EUMC internal methods. 
As a result, EUMS/EUMC officials share many views orally. Due to the predominance 
of the internal rules of secrecy, a high degree of trust is embedded in the interaction of 
officials. Secrecy has also fostered a sense of group identity for both institutions, and it 
has become an influential factor in the establishment of strong personal relationships 
amongst the EUMS/EUMC personnel. 
Furthermore, EUMS/EUMC personnel have noted the importance of solving 
disagreements at the lowest possible level within their institutions. They argued that 
issues should not be left to escalate because, if this happens: 
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"the ownership of a policy' may be lost and transferred to the national level" 
(interviews 24,33,54). 
For this reason, officials try to bring issues to 'digestible' proportions, as disagreements 
can be exploited by national level elites who may wish to limit ESDP. The efforts of the 
two institutions to maintain policy initiatives at the EU level also facilitates the 
development of the strategic culture of the EU on technical issues as ESDP as 
fragmentation through re-nationalisation is avoided due to the consensual functioning 
of the two institutions. However, the high level of national cautiousness of the EU 
member states vis-h-vis the work of the two institutions is also a sign of the 
inten, nediate strategic culture of the EU. 
The high degree of national cautiousness vis-A-vis ESDP has also had an impact on the 
size and resources attributed to these two institutions. Thus, Brok and Gresch (2004: 
183) claim that while there are some 3,000 officers employed at NATO's Supreme 
Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) there are only 200 personnel who carry 
out command and planning duties at the EUMS's Cortenberg building. 
Certain interviewees also point to the fact that the two institutions remain at some 
distance from national operational headquarters with the latter continuing to possess 
their own differentiated priorities and agendas (Interviews 24,33). EUMS/EUMC 
officials will regularly elaborate on phenomena of 'national consciousness' as Member 
States could have made better use of the EUMC/EUMS. In addition, there is a lack of 
an in-depth knowledge and expertise at the national level about the work carried out at 
by the EUMS/EUMC. According to EUMC/EUMS officials, an increased interaction 
between the national and EU levels is seen as an important challenge for these two 
institutions and is a vital prerequisite for the further development of EU strategic 
culture (Interviews 24,55). 
Officials also claim that although the work of the EUMC/EUMS managed to create a 
common vocabulary in technical issues there are still strong national perceptions on 
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various issues which put limitations to the work carried out by the EUMS/EUMC 
(Interview 23,54). All officials interviewed said they would like to acquire more 
flexibility in dealing with their agendas. However, the reluctance of the member states 
to give them more freedom sets important limitations on what can be achieved. For 
instance, one EUMS official claimed that the work carried out by his institution in 
coordinating the EU member states in cases of natural disasters did not prove successful 
as member states wanted to maintain their own national mechanisms and deal with 
physical crises on a one to one basis (Interviews 54,55). Thus, in certain respects, 
EUMC/EUMS interviewees supported that the EU possesses a strategic culture in 
transition which requires further consolidation. 
More positively, cultural differences regarding the working methods of EUMC/EUMS 
have been eroded. It is individual personality rather than national background that has 
been the dominant factor in one to one interaction amongst officials. According to an 
official: 
"culturally there is not a general trend in how countries will act as reactions mostly 
depend on individual choices. Due to the work carried out in ESDP there is now a way 
of thinking and a policy training which mostly works on a similar basis" (Interview 33). 
Thus, through the development of certain common practices, training sessions and 
strategies, new EU methods are invented and new rules have become part of a 
'European acquis' at the technical level. The strategic culture of the EU has gradually 
been reinforced through such developments. 
The permanent operation of the EUMC/EUMS also means an on-going process of 
policy-making has occurred. According to an official: 
"we are not starting from zero. There is a collective memory. Committees get mandates 
and form their own programmes" (Interview 55). 
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The permanent nature of these agreements may in the long terin foster a strategic 
culture which can consist of clearly defined operational procedures. For the time being, 
with a few exceptions, ESDP is still characterised by small missions and the tasks 
perforined by the EUMS/EUMC are still minimal. The small scale rernit of these tasks 
poses limitations to the development of an EU strategic culture as major operations are 
still under national auspices. For instance, interviewees mentioned that important 
operations such as Iraq and Lebanon are happening outside of the EU framework 
(Interview 54). However, all EUMS/EUMC officials have also expressed their 
satisfaction as ESDP is currently expanding and new important missions are planned in 
the Balkans (Kosovo) and Africa (Chad). 
It should be also noted that the work of the EUMS/EUMC has been highly valued by 
the PSC. The relationship amongst the three institutions has been described as 
constructive and mutually beneficial by all EUMC/EUMS interviewees. This is another 
sign of the increasingly dense institutional networks that characterises the intenriediate 
strategic culture of the EU. To give an example of such appreciation, a PSC official 
expresses her admiration for the technical work carried out in the EUMS/EUMC 
institutions: 
"I thought that much of our work would only stay in paper and nothing would come out 
of it. But when I visited the Potsdam Headquarter I realised that what has been 
discussed had taken flesh and bones. All the language that we have been using and the 
technical details that have passed from the EUMS were implemented in practice" 
(Interview 7). 
4.2.4. The Committee of Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management 
(CIVCOM) 
CIVCOM is composed of national representatives as well as officials from the 
Commission and the Council Secretariat. It discusses proposals for civilian missions, 
develops strategies for the deployment of police and rule of law missions, formulates 
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recommendations and gives advice on civilian aspects of crisis management to the PSC. 
According to CIVCOM officials, the levels of trust, cooperation and aid has been high. 
In theory, the role of CIVCOM has been upgraded due to the political emphasis of tile 
role of civilian crisis management. However, various weaknesses inhibit the role of 
CIVCOM as a promoter of a consolidated strategic culture in the field of civilian crisis 
management (CCM). 
In the first place, an initial lack of enthusiasm for the development of CCM in the 
capitals of most EU member states has had a direct impact on the institutionalisation of 
CIVCOM. For instance, CIVCOM Committee members have had to improvise in 
developing their structures (in contrast to the PSC where was used as an institutional 
basis). According to CIVCOM officials, the lack of an EU tradition in CCM as well as 
the lack of attention to CIVCOM structures on behalf of Member States has resulted in 
weak institutional practices within CIVCOM (Interviews 27,48). Although since 200S 
further moves have taken place in order to encourage better coordination between the 
national and the EU levels, CIVCOM officials complained about the cautious approach 
of Member States when it comes to initiatives that may lead to an expansion of 
responsibilities (Interviews 27,38,48). However, there is a basic consensus both within 
CIVCOM (but also gradually developing in the national capitals) on the fact that the 
EU should develop an effective CCM dimension. This leaves room for optimism as 
such a consensus may gradually lead to a development of an EU strategic culture in the 
field of CCM. However, all CIVCOM interviewees mentioned that the strategic culture 
of the EU is a work in progress and requires consolidation. 
Another challenge that CIVCOM faces is the division of the CCM tasks in the different 
EU pillars, and the division between the Commission and the Council on competencies 
in this particular field. These institutional battles continue to take place because there 
are still overlapping but distinctive frameworks -a Commission and an ESDP 
framework. For instance, military crisis management is characterised by second-pillar 
intergovernmental procedures, whereas reconstruction, institution building and 
development assistance are under the first pillar'(Gourlay 2004: 407). This lack of 
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policy coordination between the two pillars still remains an impediment to the cohesion 
and effectiveness of ESDP as well as for the creation of a CCM strategic culture. As an 
example, both the Commission and the Council gave been involved in drafting separate 
reports and thus in a wasteful duplication of resources (Dempsey 2004: 196). Rummel 
(2002: 462-3) provides a fair criticism of this division when he argues that the 
intersection between all the different institutions involved in ESDP is disadvantageous 
because: 
"goal setting and budget allocation are decided in separate institutions, political 
decision-making and implementation of intervention policies happen on different 
levels. If both decision-making processes do not come to a synthesis, the ESDP would 
hardly be able to fulfil its task, especially in the area of peacekeeping". 
However, there have been also recent moves to combine ESDP/Commission elements 
in CCM in order to provide a more cohesive approach. According to a highly ranked 
Commission official, both the Council and the Commission have realised that such 
division has been counterproductive and needs to be tackled so that a unified EU front 
could be presented in external relations (Interview 32). An apparent willingness to 
bring the different pillars together allows for a degree of optimism regarding the 
development of an EU strategic culture with a solid CCM dimension. 
4.3. The Role of Policy Networks in the ESDP Era 
Chapter Four examined the role of networks in the establishment of ESDP. This section 
follows up post-1999 network activity and describes the development of networks 
within the most influential ESDP institution, the PSC. These networks are studied 
because their actions have a particular impact on the strategic culture of the EU. 
According to the intermediate strategic culture model, coalitions of states are important 
in encouraging further developments which impact upon strategic culture. This section 
takes into account the views of officials that participate in three networks that will be 
studied in detail below. The section also considers the opinions of network putsiders in 
order to test the influence that these networks exercise in ESDP. As mentioned in 
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Chapter Two, the development of networks can have a positive influence in the 
development of an EU strategic culture only if the policies that a network promotes can 
be accepted by a wider circle of non-network members which co-exist within the same 
institution. If such a process of policy assimilation is not taking place, then networks 
may bring the fragmentation of ESDP into small groups of countries whose only 
interest would be to promote national prerogatives by using the EU framework in order 
to further their national ambitions. In such a case, the development of a consolidated 
EU strategic culture would be unlikely to happen. 
The Questionnaire covered the issue of networking in section 2. It is interesting to 
mention that the first reaction of the respondents when it comes to the question of 
networking is that in most cases choosing with whom to network depends on the 
circumstances, the countries already involved in a particular area as well as the 
geographic area where a putative ESDP mission might take place. Personal relations are 
also a very important factor in deciding to whom one should talk first, with high 
degrees of consultation and interaction taking place amongst friends. When PSC 
officials were asked whether there is a pattern of collaboration, groups which are linked 
to issues of culture, history and geography can be traced. For instance, many national 
representatives tend to work with their neighbours, because certain security issues do 
not only affect their country but a wider geographic area. However, as this section 
cannot cover all ESDP personal networks due to their multiple numbers, it will focus on 
the most influential networks within the PSC. 
The section claims that the trilateral network amongst France, Germany and the UK 
remains active in the post-Malo era. This is a tight policy network that has been 
influential in shaping the agenda of ESDP. The Neutrals network has been also 
influential, although various internal developments may partially transform its 
structures in the future. Finally, a new tight policy network has emerged since the 2004 
enlargement involving Greece, Cyprus and Malta. This particular network is influential 
when it comes to the PSC-NATO relationship and so its actions have had an important 
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impact on the way the transatlantic relationship evolves, thus influencing decisively the 
strategic culture of the EU. 
4.3.1. The Trilateral UK-French- German Policy Network 
Chapter Four argued that cooperation between France, the UK and Germany has been 
an important factor in sustaining ESDP active. The trilateral network amongst France, 
Germany and the UK is also evident within the PSC and plays an influential role in 
harmonising the different views of the three countries on issues of security. According 
to one official: 
g6once a discussion within the network begins no matter how problematic it is it will 
lead somewhere. Although different opinions exist a compromise must be somehow 
reached" (Interview 1). 
It is also claimed that network participants really understand that an ESDP without the 
participation of their countries is not possible and thus reaching agreements amongst 
them is seen as a priority (Interview 1,10). 
Both internal network players and external network officials see networking amongst 
the big three EU Member States as positive in the shaping of common attitudes that 
facilitate the establishment of an EU strategic culture as the process of networking 
slowly but steadily bridges different perceptions in security issues (Interviews 1,10,19 
22). Network officials also mentioned that although different perceptions exist amongst 
capitals on certain issues, the trilateral network of the big three has led to certain 
important ESDP initiatives (Interviews 1,10,19). For instance, it is claimed that the 
Battlegroup concept was elaborated first among these three nations before being 
presented to the other EU states (Interview 10). This is not the only case where such 
collaboration has occurred for, according to some PSC officials, the three have worked 
on various political and technical initiatives in advance, again before presenting them to 
their colleagues before meetings (Interview 4,18). The three states have also been 
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influential in believing that the Balkans and Africa should be priorities for the EU 
(Interviews 1,10,19). Therefore, one of the more positive contributions of this trilateral 
network has been that it pushes the strategic culture of the EU towards an embrace of 
more ambitious missions. 
However, the big three network has also been characterised by certain limitations which 
have an impact on the development of the EU strategic culture as its influence is limited 
by preferences that stem from national capitals. For instance, due to UK sensitivities 
regarding the sovereign nature of the field of security, as well as the primacy of the 
transatlantic relationship, UK, French and German network officials claimed that a new 
policy reorientation on behalf of the UK would be necessary so that the network will be 
able to contribute more to ESDP (Interviews 1,10,19). It is interesting to note that, 
according to British officials, ESDP has been perceived more as a tool of the UK and 
less a means of promoting the European project. Wrand (2006: 143) describes the UK 
position by arguing that the British: 
"show no exaggerated enthusiasm for the 'European' or 'defence' aspects of ESDP, but 
are willing to undertake and influence the course of a policy aimed at solving security 
crises". 
Therefore, the British are interested in the 'policy' dimension of ESDP but are not keen 
to develop it in an autonomous direction. In this respect the British are cautious of any 
French plans which attribute to ESDP a vision of traditional French grandeur (Interview 
10). 
On the issue of network/non-network members' relationship, it can be argued that ideas 
stemming from the network have been gradually accepted by other PSC colleagues. 
Although it would have been expected that diplomats from other countries who do not 
forin part of the 'group of three' would see the trilateral cooperation sceptically, 
interviewees give a different picture. As a non-network PSC officials add: 
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"we expect that the bigger EU countries would have a bigger say in ESDP. The 
trilateral cooperation is good as far as we are infon-ned about it and as far as our 
considerations are taken into account" (Interview 15). 
Another official also mentions that: 
"it is natural for these three countries to take the initiative because they provide most of 
the resources and most of the money for operations. If they find a common ground it 
also helps us reach an easier consensus" (Interview 5). 
This is a common view amongst many of the PSC interviewees. In addition, off"icials 
from other EU states mentioned the lack of leadership on ESDP which is linked to the 
lack of coordination between the UK and France and said they would like to see further 
interaction between the two countries so that problems could be solved. According to 
one official: 
"there is not a particular group of countries which take the lead and this creates 
problems as policies are delayed. It would be good if the two [meaning the UK and 
France] could find a solid common consensus but their priorities are different. 
Sometimes their priorities overlap but sometimes they do not" (Interview 46). 
Therefore, a common trilateral leadership necessary for ESDP is still not occurring 
(Interviews 1,10,19,46). 
Although initiatives may begin through tri-lateral discussion, as happened with the 
Battlegroup initiatives, they still remain open for other countries to join in. Indeed, 
many officials emphasise the 'openness' of the ESDP project as one of its major 
advantages (Interviews 1,5,7,10,19). This openness is positive for the development of 
an EU strategic culture as all Member States can participate in initiatives that stem from 
a network and get accustomed to a particular way of strategic thinking. Therefore, 
although initiatives which stem from the trilateral network may have a strong 'national' 
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dimension they need to be 'Europeanised' in order to survive. It will be increasingly 
difficult for the bigger member states to avoid the questioning and the disapproval of 
their 26 colleagues if they decide to move on their own ignoring the others. According 
to the German Ambassador to the PSC: 
"we do not like to form directories. Any idea that ESDP is conducted by the three of us 
(France, the UK and Gennany) is false. And even if we wanted to do it, it would be 
impossible because the other member states would not accept it" (Interview 19). 
Therefore, an added value of the PSC as an institution is that, although it allows the 
establishment of networks, it maintains network activity in accordance with the 
mainstream opinions of the group members, thus reaching a successful synthesis 
between network and non-network actors. This synthesis of opinions also forms a basis 
of consensus for the strategic culture of the EU. 
4.3.2. The PSC Neutrals Policy Network 
Another network that continues to be active within the PSC is the network of the 
neutrals. As mentioned in Chapter Four, this network was influential in the fon-native 
stages of ESDP. It continues to interact often and has been influential in integrating 
gender issues into ESDP (Interview 22). Another case where the neutrals policy 
network has acted as an influential group has been through the promotion of human 
rights as part of ESDP officials' training (Interviews 13,16,22). Furthermore, the 
network has been influential in maintaining the UN as a basic point of reference for 
ESDP action because of national political reasons, thus influencing the strategic culture 
of the EU towards a UN-friendly direction. Finally, the network has been influential in 
lending support to the small scale flexible Battlegroup concept (Interview 13,22). 
However, certain changes have taken place within this particular network which have 
altered the balance of the group. Countries such as Finland and Sweden have been 
successful in 'reinventing themselves', thus moving to an active involvement in ESDP 
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issues (Interviews 4,13,18). These two countries have been joined on certain issues by 
the Baltic States which prefer to ally with them. Furthermore, Ireland and Austria, 
which belong to the neutral group, are less flexible in ESDP issues due to the control 
that their national parliaments exercise on their foreign policies. Furthen-nore, Ireland 
and Austria continue to remain anchored to their neutral status (Interviews 8,16). As a 
result, Finnish and Swedish officials have become more autonornous policy players and 
have assumed a new ESDP 'actomess' outside the network. This new stance is also 
seen as a positive development for ESDP as these countries have moved from a stance 
of ESDP-cautiousness towards a more committed ESDP involvement. The two 
countries have also been influential in the promotion of an ESDP African agenda which 
pushed the EU towards the implementation of the Chad mission. 
4.3.3. Greece, Cyprus and Malta in the PSC 
A new network comprised of Greece, Cyprus and Malta that has been formed since the 
2004 EU enlargement. The network comes together on many aspects of ESDP but is 
strongly linked together because of the NATO question. As both Cyprus and Malta are 
not part of NATO's Partnership for Peace programme, they are excluded at Turkish 
insistence from receiving NATO infon-nation when ESDP-NATO talks occur. When it 
comes to Berlin Plus talks and joint EU-NATO missions, Malta and Cyprus have to 
leave the PSC consultation room and return when NATO-related items have been 
exhausted. Greece, Malta and Cyprus insist on the fact that they should be equally 
informed on all ESDP issues and react to NATO exclusion by blocking the 
development of further cooperation between NATO and the PSC. Therefore, although 
this network consists of small peripheral countries, it has an influential role in the 
shaping of ESDP as many officials claim that, unless there is a solution for the 
Cypriot/Maltese question, the PSC-NATO relationship cannot move forward, thus 
pushing the EU strategic culture towards a more NATO autonomous path. If the 
Cyprus-Malta-Turkey blockage will not be solved, it will pose further limitations to the 
ESDP-NATO partnership. 
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4.4. Conclusions 
The chapter claimed that the EU fits mostly with the type of the intermediate strategic 
culture. This type of strategic culture is characterised by increasingly dense networks of 
relations as well as by the existence of personal relations of cooperation and diffused 
reciprocity. The development of trust, aid, respect and understanding is also taking 
place within ESDP institutions and networks. However, some of these behavioural 
elements are not as developed as in the case of the type of consolidated strategic 
culture. Nevertheless, there has been considerable progress from the primary strategic 
culture that characterised the EU in the 1990s. 
It can be also argued that ESDP institutions have managed to pass a first very crucial 
test: they have contributed positively to the development of ESDP. Institutions have 
been characterised by internal cohesion and by a lack of big internal debates. ESDP 
institutions (and especially the PSC) have managed to consolidate themselves as an 
important shaper of EU strategic culture. The EUMC/EUMS have also managed to 
promote their own 'bottom up' agenda. However, although, the institutional microcosm 
of Brussels has proved generally friendly to them, the national capitals have remained 
cautious and puzzled regarding the real role of ESDP institutions. ESDP institutions 
need to make a second step of progress and become more involved with national 
security institutions in order to consolidate their influence. 
As the EU possesses an intermediate strategic culture, policy coordination and the 
harmonization of national policies does take place, but the pace of change is slow due 
to the predominance of national priorities. Furthermore, as the strategic culture of the 
EU is still 'a process in the making', it is to be expected that some ideas regarding the 
use of force will be common amongst EU Europeans. However, one cannot yet talk 
about a total conversion of ideas regarding security issues amongst the EU Member 
States. In the intermediate strategic culture of the EU, ESDP officials can be seen as 
'owners' of both a national and an EU identity. This hybrid identity will be further 
analysed in the following chapters of the thesis. 
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Chapter Five 
Ideas, Beliefs, Values and Practices of EU Strategic Culture 
5.1. Introduction 
The previous chapter provided an account of behavioural and functional, elements that 
affect the strategic culture of the EU. This chapter focuses on the study of ideas, beliefs, 
values and practices that make up this strategic culture. The questionnaire and the 
interviews were conducted with a sample of PSC officials (see Appendix 11 for more 
details). Various reasons noted in the previous chapter (sections 4.2 and 4.2.2. ) account 
for the choice of the PSC as the main institution of the study. The first part of the 
questionnaire asked for some general observation on ESDP and focused on issues such 
as the geographic remit of ESDP, the importance of the UN and the transatlantic 
relationship, the question of EU autonomy vis-A-vis NATO, the status of 'third' party 
participation in ESDP missions as well as the challenges that ESDP is facing. In 
addition, in order to see what kind of strategic culture exists at the EU level, it is 
important to measure to what degree ESDP has been influential in bringing national 
security policies closer to each other. Therefore, the second part of the survey dealt 
with the impact of ESDP on EU member states. The figures that are mentioned in the 
tables below are numeric figures unless otherwise stated. 
The sample of participants has been carefully selected in order to provide a balanced 
number of officials from different countries (small/big states, South/North states, East, 
West States). Twenty-two officials participated in the survey. Part of the work carried 
out in Brussels also included the tracing of biographical data of the interviewees (such 
as previous career, government positions, party affiliation if possible). The interviews 
were carried out from the period of January 2007 up to December 2007. The 
questionnaire was first given to PSC officials during the interview meeting. After 
officials have filled in the questionnaire they were also interviewed on questions 
included in it so that more details regarding ESDP could be obtained. All officials who 
participated in the questionnaire/interview sessions were reassured about the 
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confidentiality of the survey. As a result of anonymity, ESDP officials could express 
their opinions freely and elaborate further on issues that they considered as important. 
Further details about the drafting of the Questionnaire are included in Appendix 11. 
5.2. Data/Interview analysis 
5.2.1. General Assessment of ESDP 
1. Do you feel that ESDP has been a success since its launch? 
1. Agree 20 
2. Mostly agree but also depends on the circumstances 2 
3. Mostly disagree but also depends on the circumstances 0 
4. Disagree 0 
5. Don't Know/Don't Answer 0 
A very large majority of respondents indicated that they are happy with the progress of 
ESDP. However, this does not imply that ESDP is a 'problem free' policy as 
respondents claim that ESDP is still 'a policy of limitations' 'a policy in flux' or 'a 
work in progress' with much remaining to be done so that ESDP can develop further. 
The volatile state of ESDP has an important impact on the strategic culture of the EU 
because consensus is constructed on an ad hoc basis depending on the mission under 
discussion. Therefore, the security policies of most EU member states are still 
characterised by their national 'peculiarities' and preferences that will be examined in 
the following sections of the chapter. These preferences and peculiarities act as a 
hindrance to the development of a consolidated EU strategic culture. 
However, a degree of optimism is stemming from the success of past and present ESDP 
missions. This success has strengthened the belief that due to ESDP cooperation 
different national mentalities can be 'bridged' together in the future. As a consequence 
of increasing activity there is a spill-over effect in security issues that acts as an 
empowering element of the strategic culture of the EU. As new plans proliferate, 
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Brussels increasingly becomes a space of strategic interaction. PSC officials mention 
that new policy initiatives spread from previous initiatives and new discussions are 
generated due to ongoing ESDP missions. For instance, the planning of the 
Chad/Kosovo operations is due to the successful operations that were previously 
deployed in the surrounding areas (Interviews 1,2,11). In addition, the success of all 
ESDP missions has helped to consolidate the idea that the EU can become an effective 
security player. Such an idea can be seen as a prerequisite for the development of 
strategic culture. The feeling of self-confidence has led to the strengthening of 
cooperation which is also a positive factor in the development of EU strategic culture. 
Nevertheless, the overall success of the EU operations did not have the transformative 
effect that would lead to the creation of a consolidated strategic culture based on thick 
consensus. As will be discussed later in the chapter, the EU Member States share some 
strategic culture elements but diverge in other respects. Therefore, although ESDP is 
seen as a success, interviewees also mention that convergence on ideas regarding the 
use of force happens gradually. The slow pace of convergence did not seem to worry 
most PSC officials because according to one of them: 
"the European approach is based on doing small steps. Progress is slow but it is 
happening" (Interview 4). 
This ongoing progress in ESDP is a positive factor in the development of an EU 
strategic culture. In addition, all PSC officials claimed that a lot has been already been 
achieved, particularly if one takes into account that ESDP is a very recent policy and 
that in the past, such a policy would have been an anathema for many EU countries. 
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5.2.2. ESDP Resources 
2. Is ESDP equipped with adequate military and civilian resources? 
1. Agree 2 
2. Mostly agree but also depends on the circumstances 8 
3. Mostly disagree but also depends on the circumstances. 12 
4. Disagree 0 
5. Don't Know/Don't Answer 0 
The picture on the civilian and military capabilities of ESDP is characterised. by a 
mixed assessment with most of the answers being located in the second and third 
category. However, during the interviews all respondents emphasised the fact that 
although ESDP has so far been a success, it urgently needs a major programme of 
investment that will help it to upgrade both its military and civilian resources. PSC 
officials also mentioned that a lack of resources acts as a hindrance to the development 
of a consolidated strategic culture because most ESDP operations can only be of small 
scale. However, PSC officials h1so admitted that a slow process of capabilities 
modernisation is underway. This has led to positive results by bridging the capabilities 
gaps amongst EU countries and by making their forces more inter-operable (Interviews 
3,6,12). It is also mentioned that setting common targets such as the Headline Goal 
20 10 promotes further interaction amongst EU officials and leads to common initiatives 
that the EU states subscribe to. 
The explanation that some interviewees offered for the slow modernization of 
capabilities is that Member State military and civilian instruments are inextricably 
linked to individual historic experiences and cannot change overnight (Interviews 1, 
18). For instance, the priority of defending national territory against a particular enemy 
is still very strong in certain countries (e. g. Greece, Poland, and Cyprus) and poses a 
challenge to the development of an EU strategic culture which mostly lies in the field of 
external security missions (Interviews 3,6,12). The volatile geopolitical environment 
that some EU countries face renders them less willing to spend more on ESDP at the 
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expense of traditional defence priorities, thus slowing down the development of ESDP. 
This problem also highlights the division within these EU states which want to assume 
more out of area missions and others which perceive defence as one of their major 
policy priorities. This division is negative for the development of a consolidated 
strategic culture. 
5.2.3. ESDP Success as a Factor of Strategic Culture 
Development 
3. Do you feel that so far ESDP missions have been successful in p 
rights, the rule of law and the protection of civilian populations? 
romoting human 
1. Agree 18 
2. Mostly agree but also depends on the circumstances 4 
3. Mostly disagree but also depends on the circumstances 0 
4. Disagree 0 
5. Don't Know/Don't Answer 0 
The response to this question was largely positive with most respondents opting for the 
first answer. All PSC Representatives emphasised the fact that the missions the EU 
ought to undertake are those whose aim is the protection of human rights, the 
establishment of the rule of law and the protection of civilian populations. This 
consensus forras the basis of the strategic culture of the EU. However, as noted below 
when it comes to deciding upon the implementation of such missions, divisions 
amongst Member States are apparent (Interviews 7,18). Unfortunately, conflicting 
political priorities and a lack of political will hinder the development of a consolidated 
strategic culture. 
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5.2.4. The Geographic Remit of ESDP 
4. ESDP should mostly focus on operations which should be implemented in the 
following regions (multiple choice): 
1. The Balkans 19 
2. The Middle East 4 
3. Caucasus 10 
4. Western Newly Independent States (Moldova, Belarus, Ukraine, Russia) 4 
5. Africa 14 
6. The Mediterranean 2 
7. South East Asia/Oceania 2 
8. Latin America 0 
Chapter Three described a process of 'Balkan' socialisation for the Western European 
countries that has taken place since the early 1990s and was the direct consequence of 
the Bosnian and Kosovo crises. Indeed, answers from officials suggest that the trauma 
of the Western Balkans has had a positive impact on pushing the Europeans to work 
together on issues of security. Questionnaire results point to the high degree of 
responsibility regarding ESDP missions in the Balkans. Interviews further reinforce the 
notion that the region of the Balkans is inextricably linked to the development of ESDP. 
According to one PSC Representative: 
"the first target of having a Headline goal of 60,000 troops was very much planned on 
the basis of the IFOR mission in Bosnia" (Interview 19). 
Interviewees also mentioned that in this particular area the EU has finally managed to 
get its act together because the nature of the threat to European security has been too 
important to ignore (Interviews 1,10,12,18). In addition, the humanitarian aspect of 
the Balkan crisis is cited as a major reason for justifying ESDP intervention (1,7,10, 
12). Interview and questionnaire data suggest that a thick consensus has been developed 
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regarding the necessity of ESDP missions in the Western Balkans. In addition, all PSC 
officials stressed the fact that ESDP missions are important because they provide 
security in a very fragile geopolitical environment. ESDP is therefore seen as a tool of 
security provision for the 'near abroad' region of the EU. 
The relatively large number of operations in the area of the Western Balkans (two 
missions in Bill, one in Fon-ner Yugoslavic Republic of Macedonia and the planning of 
the Kosovo mission) has had a positive impact on the development of an EU strategic 
culture as EU officials have met and discussed these operations on a regular basis. For 
instance, ESDP missions in Bosnia Herzegovina have brought various officials together 
for a period of over four years. During this time, ESDP officials have had the chance to 
get to know each other in depth, discuss various issues concerning the future of the area 
and take common decisions. The traumas of the past also occupied an important place 
in the minds of EU officials who claimed that a failure to deal with the Balkans in the 
early 1990s should never be repeated (6,10,18,19). One can even talk about a process 
of 'Balkan' EU maturity which is followed by the belief that, first, decisions need to be 
reached on time, second, the EU has to assume the ownership of security in the region 
before a crisis erupts and, finally, that EU action needs to take place in a united and 
coordinated manner. 
The assumption of responsibility for the area of the Balkans has had an impact on the 
behaviour of the EU officials. When an internal EU disagreement on the future of this 
region occurs they are cautious of not letting it escalate into a divisive crisis (5,13,17). 
A recent example of successful efforts to han-nonise different positions is manifested in 
the discussions over the implementation of the Kosovo ESDP mission during which 
Member States, notwithstanding their different national positions on the question of 
Kosovo autonomy, agreed to contribute to a future ESDP mission in this region (10,12, 
17,22). Robert Cooper, DG-E Director General, also claims that there has been a 
'Balkanisation' of the EU agenda. Cooper claims that a process of power transfer has 
been taking place as most decisions on this region are now reached in the EU capital 
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(Testimony 3 1). Therefore, the region of the Western Balkans is the point of departure 
for the development of an EU strategic culture. 
Many PSC officials also suggest that once the Western Balkans is stabilised, the EU 
will be able to assume missions in different parts of the world (Interviews 10,19,20, 
21). Questionnaire results suggest that Africa figures very highly as the next region 
likely to see major ESDP action. However, the case of Africa is very different from that 
of the Balkans. Because of the large size of the continent and the different historical 
and colonial experiences of EU Member States, it is still difficult to talk about a 
common European position on Africa. Furthermore, Africa does not constitute a direct 
threat to the EU member states as was the case with the Balkans. However, it is 
interesting to mention that the main justification for African missions is based on 
humanitarian purposes. Therefore, Africa can act as another consensus building 
exercise for ESDP. Nevertheless, it is also interesting to note that while some countries 
have no direct strategic interest in Africa, or strong historic links with it, they are still 
willing to participate in missions in the continent (e. g. the cases of Nordic States or 
Ireland as manifested in their interest to participate at the Chad ESDP mission). One of 
the basic reasons behind these positions lies in the fact that ESDP officials and their 
Member States do not want to be cut off from ESDP initiatives and want to be 
perceived as active players within ESDP (Interviews 5,15). Other reasons for 
justification are based on a humanitarian belief that ESDP can act positively to stabilise 
countries in Africa (Interviews 13,16). In the case of France, it should be also stressed 
that issues of post-colonial prestige are also part of its African ESDP agenda (Interview 
17). 
Active participation in Africa also has its limits, as many interviewees mention that 
their share in such missions will be limited. With the exception of France and the UK, 
who posses the capabilities to act, there is very little enthusiasm amongst officials for 
large scale missions in Africa (Interview 7). Indeed, one can see a striking difference 
when a comparison is made with many EU countries which are lagging behind in 
technical expertise and capabilities. For instance, French and British officials suggested 
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that when it comes to the geographic remit of the ESDP there are no limitations as to 
where ESDP should extend, a fact which reflects the long established position of both 
France and the UK in global military operations (Interviews 1,10,14). This gap in 
knowledge, expertise and resources amongst EU member states also acts as an obstacle 
to the development of a thick ESDP consensus on Africa. Therefore, the development 
of the strategic culture of the EU is further hindered by capabilities gaps as there is a 
clear dichotomy between the UK and France and the other EU member states. 
Furthennore, the high risk factor of African intervention renders a long-ten-n mission 
prohibitive for most Member States which are very sensitive to the possibility of 
endangering the human lives of their troops/policemen. The sensitivity over the risks 
involved in such operations still demonstrates that most EU member states are 
unwilling to assume a number of missions which are far away from Europe, require 
large scale assistance, overstretch national capabilities and may put into danger the 
lives of the personnel. Therefore, the 'high risk' factor that some missions contain puts 
into question the ambitious discourse of the ESS which mentions that the EU has 
assumed a global responsibility to act. According to one official: 
"although we participated in the Congo mission this does not mean we can take over 
every problematic African spot. For instance, when it came to Somalia there was not 
much appetite of Europeans to intervene. The question of having too many bodybags 
preoccupied the minds of the officials" (interview 13). 
The same argument is also valid in other parts of the world, especially the Middle East. 
For instance, although the crisis in Lebanon was a possible scenario for ESDP 
intervention, the EU did not manage to act on this particular area because of the 
inherent risks involved (Interview 19). According to another official, this 'selective 
interventionist' approach may have a direct impact on the strategic culture of the EU as 
it may limit its geographic remit and scope: 
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"the fact that we take the 'risk factor' into account is good in ternis of troop/civilian 
missions security but it may also lead to an artificial crisis management where we do 
the simplest and the smallest tasks and we avoid the most troublesome ones" (Interview 
22). 
In addition, when it comes to dealing with geographic areas far from the Balkans many 
officials claim that reaching consensus is a more delicate and difficult process. 
According to one ESDP official: 
"there is still not a common view of the world. We are at an early stage of development 
and it takes time for ideas and policies to move forward" (Interview 15). 
An East European official likewise complained about the fact that although the EU 
Member States have reached a consensus on the necessity to act in the Balkans, the EU 
is less self-confident when it comes to dealing with crises which are located even a few 
hundred kilometres away (for instance the Moldova-Transdniestra issue). According to 
another official, in this geographic area Europeans refuse to take full responsibility as: 
"they still see it as a far away region" (Interview 14). 
In addition, the fact that Russia has vital interests in the South Caucasus and the Black 
Sea also inhibits enthusiasm for action on the part of some Member States 
(Interviews 12,15). Indeed, the South Caucasus region comes third in questionnaire 
preferences and is mostly chosen by Eastern EU officials (although an ESDP rule of 
law mission has already taken place in Georgia). 
Therefore, although there is a thick consensus on the region of the Balkans, decisions 
regarding intervention in other geographic areas are characterised by a thin consensus. 
A consolidated strategic culture requires a harmony of geographic priorities among EU 
Member states. Questionnaire results regarding the geographic remit of ESDP point to 
the fact that such a harmonisation of views has not yet taken place. However, all ESDP 
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officials mentioned that much of ESDP relies on the flexibility of the Member States. 
This is made clear when officials noted that geography is an entirely political matter 
(Interview 1,10,15,19). The politicisation of a particular crisis can lead to a 
deployment of ESDP mission as has been the case with the Western Balkans. On the 
other hand, if a crisis is not noticed and if political agents in national capitals do not 
consider it of a high priority then it is unlikely that the EU will intervene (e. g. Western 
Sahara, Eritrea). Therefore, politicisation of a particular crisis may have a galvanising 
effect for the strategic culture of the EU and the lack of it may have a debilitating effect 
leading to ESDP inertia. 
5.2.5. The Importance of a United Nations Security Council 
Mandate for ESDP 
5. ESDP operations should be carried out with a UN mandate and under tile 
authorization of the UN Security Council 
1. Agree 12 
2. Mostly agree but also depends on the circurnstances 4 
3. Mostly disagree but also depends on the circumstances 4 
4. Disagree 2 
5. Don't Know/Don't Answer 0 
Although it is difficult to name which missions will be implemented without a UN 
Security Council resolution officials claimed that ESDP missions do not necessity 
require a UN Security Council mandate in order to be implemented. According to one 
ESDP official: 
"in cases of evacuations of nationals from a particular crisis point no UN Security 
Council resolution will be sought. Another scenario where a UN Security Council 
resolution may not be sought is when two conflicting sides within a particular state or 
area agree to invite the EU to take over" (Interview 22). 
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Another official also mentioned that a UN mandate is important for military missions 
but it is not necessary for the civilian missions of ESDP (Interview 9). 
It is surprising to see that even amongst the Nordic countries, which are considered the 
most fervent supporters of the UN, the primacy of the UN in their policies seems to be 
losing ground. For Finland, acquiring a UN Secufity Council resolution is no longer a 
pre-requisite in order to participate in an ESDP mission whereas for Sweden a UN 
mandate is still important but mostly for intemal reasons. According to a Nordic PSC 
Representative: 
"many political parties and the Left in particular would be very sceptical of a mission 
without a UN mandate. The UN mandate is necessary in order to legitimise a decision" 
(Interview 13). 
On this basis, many actors perceive the acquisition of a UN mandate as a 'facilitating 
instrument' of EU unity. PSC officials claimed that the impact of the Kosovo crisis as 
well as the more recent split over the legitimacy of the Iraq war are incidents that 
should be avoided in the future (Interviews 1,2,3,6,12,19). A UN mandate is a useful 
tool because it helps to unite the EU member states and legitimises the decision for 
military/civilian intervention in the publics of EU member states. However, a few 
officials also stated that the NATO bombings against Serbia in 1999 which were 
conducted without a clear mandate acted as a precedents for action outside the UN 
(Interviews 6,10,13). Therefore, as an official claims: 
46once it is done it can always happen again" (Interview 9). 
East European officials try to justify the limited importance of a UN mandate on 
grounds of practicality. For instance, it is mentioned by some officials that getting a 
Security Council resolution can be a difficult, slow and bureaucratic process. An East 
European official justified in this context the importance of flexibility. 
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"ESDP has to be more flexible. In this respect de-linking ESDP from the UN makes 
ESDP even more flexible and independent. This is another way of seeing independence 
[] not only by cutting NATO out of ESDP" (Interview 9). 
Interview data also demonstrates that the profile of the UN is lower in the minds of East 
European elites. This is an interesting point of divergence between East and West 
European Member States. West European representatives who do not think that a UN 
mandate is a prerequisite to intervene, still believe that getting it is a good development 
for ESDP because it legitimises its decisions both at the national and global levels. 
However, when it comes to most East European representatives (with the exception of 
Hungary) getting a UN Security mandate is perceived as another problem in the 
effectiveness of ESDP because it creates one more bureaucratic step in an already 
complicated structure of policy-making. 
By contrast, there are still certain countries which have particular parliamentary and 
political problems in endorsing ESDP action without a Security Council mandate (e. g. 
Ireland, Austria, Greece, Belgium, Cyprus and Germany). In addition, due to the 
elections of left-wing governments in Portugal (2005) and Spain (2004,2008), the 
importance of the Security Council authorisation has become an influential element in 
their foreign policies and one of the basic political trademarks of their centre-left 
goverm-nents. However, it can be argued that the importance of a UN Security Council 
resolution seems to be losing ground amongst many EU countries. Escalating 
humanitarian crises, the urgency to act at particular crisis points, the push from certain 
policy-makers and national leaders to assume responsibility quickly are all mentioned 
as reasons that might lead to a by-passing of the 'slow' and 'bureaucratic' UNSCR 
process. 
Therefore, the strategic culture of the EU is not based on the wide acceptance of a UN 
mandate as a prerequisite for ESDP missions in the post 2004 enlarged EU. However, 
such a mandate is seen as a facilitating factor in deploying an ESDP mission. Data from 
the interviews suggested that the divergence over the issue of the UN may lead to 
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cohesion problems in the future as certain countries may want to move to ail ESDP 
mission without a UN Security mandate whereas other states would like to follow 
strictly UN Security Council resolutions. So far, it is interestihg to note that ESDP 
missions are legitimised by UNSCRs. However, the diverging priorities of the nation 
states on the importance of the UNSCR may have a debilitating effect in the shaping of 
a consolidated EU strategic culture in the future as it may lead to conflicts regarding the 
legitimacy of ESDP operations. 
5.2.6. Multilateralism in the Strategic Culture of the EU 
6. ESDP ought to involve in its operations countries other than EU member states. 
1. Agree 17 
2. Mostly agree but also depends on the circumstances 5 
3. Mostly disagree but also depends on the circumstances 0 
4. Disagree 0 
5. Don't Know/Don't Answer 0 
In this question positive responses form the great majority of answers. Interviewees 
mention that ESDP ought to involve countries other than EU Member States. 
Therefore, the claim of multilateralism in the communicative discourse of the EU is 
valid and constitutes an important characteristic of the strategic culture of the EU. In 
addition, it is also claimed that third party participation has been a trend in ESDP since 
its inception, thus establishing a habit of outside involvement. However, PSC officials 
mentioned that cooperation differs from country to country. In this respect, it can be 
argued that there is a form of 'varied multilateralism' that characterises the strategic 
culture of the EU. For instance, interviewees said that there is a very particular 
relationship with Russia. The Russian use of force (e. g. as manifested in Checlinya) 
further complicates the strategic relationship amongst the two countries and indicates 
that the Europeans have a different perception on deployment of police and military 
resources in the area (Interviews 12,14,16). 
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PSC officials also raised reservations regarding the American use of police and military 
instrurnents in common EU-NATO missions (Interviews 1,5,13) The US use of force 
through its police and military instruments is characterised by various PSC officials as 
counterproductive and excessive (Interviews 1,4,5,7,12). The difference in EU/US 
mentalities regarding the use of force instruments in the Balkans (as described in 
Chapter Four) is still evident today. More details on the EU/US 'othering' regarding the 
use of force will be provided in Chapter Six on implementation of the ESDP Bosnian 
missions. On the other hand, the relationship with Canada in security missions is seen 
as exemplary (Interviews 1,6,7,10). There is a very good understanding between 
Canada and the EU consisting of a good interaction and frequent exchange of policy 
practices. It is also claimed that there is a positive common basis on security issues and 
a similarity in 'style and substance' on the use of force that does not exist with Russia 
(Interview 6,22). In addition, the EU-Canada relationship is not characterised by the 
differentiation regarding the tools of force as it the case with the US. According to one 
official: 
"we have an easy and wann relationship with Canada. We are both democratic and 
share the same values. This is not the case when we talk with the Russians who seem to 
have a post-imperial mentality" (Interview 22). 
Furthennore, the EU has collaborated with the African Union (AU) in its EUPOL 
Congo mission. The EU gives emphasis to the fact that the AU should be empowered to 
deal with regional security issues. However, when it comes to everyday dealings with 
the AU the reality is very different. Cases of human rights abuse and different practises 
in policing highlight a different perception on the role of police and military 
instruments between the EU and the AU (Interviews 1,18,19). For instance, in the 
Congo ESDP mission the two bodies had a different way of perceiving the crisis and 
dealing with it. According to one PSC official: 
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"on behalf of the EU we wanted to see a distinction between the tasks of the police mid 
the army. This was something that many leaders of the AU could not really understand" 
(Interview 7). 
Therefore, there are different EU/AU perceptions regarding the use of force as 
manifested in ESDP missions. These different perceptions have influenced the way 
Europeans perceive multilateralism as they have become more cautious on this 
particular bilateral relationship. 
The question of Turkish participation in ESDP is also of vital importance as it is 
inextricably linked to the future of the ESDP-NATO relationship. There is a basic 
consensus on Turkish participation in ESDP missions. However, EU Member States are 
divided on how far EU-Turkish cooperation should go, with some of them (Cyprus, 
Malta and Greece) being openly hostile to the Turkish blockage of the PSC-NATO 
relationship as well as with the Turkish ambitions over ESDP. The exchange of 
information in joint NATO-EU operations is a major unresolved issue as Cyprus and 
Malta want to have access to NATO information and participate in an ESDP of 27 
member states (Interviews 5,11). However, Turkey blocks any EU-NATO initiative 
that includes these two nations. The problematic dimension of the Turkish cooperation 
poses two challenges for the strategic culture of ESDP. On one hand, it puts to the test 
the involvernent of third party members in ESDP; on the other, it acts as a hindrance to 
the development of a strategic partnership between the PSC and NATO. These 
challenges may in the long-term affect more the thinking of the Europeans regarding 
ESDP issues, thus having an impact on the strategic culture of the EU. 
In the case of the UN it can be argued that the UN is indeed important. However, there 
are certain difficulties in the relationship of these two organisations. Certain officials 
clearly stated that the UN is a different organisation from the EU. It has a complex 
structure which makes it more difficult when it comes to establishing a strong EU-UN 
relationship and linking the two bureaucracies together (Interview 18). The UN was 
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described by some officials as 'bureaucratic' and 'slow' and one official even went so 
far as to claim that the UN does not suit European needs for intervention because: 
"the UN nowadays is about Third World countries which want to participate in 
missions" (Interview 13). 
The issue of third country participation was not disputed in principle by any PSC 
official. Therefore, when it comes to the discourse of multilateralism it can be argued 
that in theory, the EU is open to collaboration and welcomes third party contributions. 
However, in practice, relationships with other third parties are not conducted on the 
same basis. Therefore, although a consensus exists on the question of multilateralism 
through third party participation, there are differences of opinion on how far various 
one-to one relationships with the above mentioned countries/organisations should be 
developed. The sarne is also valid for regional/international institutions such as the AU 
and the UN. This phenomenon creates a pattern of 'varied multilateral ism' which 
characterises the strategic culture of the EU. 
5.2.7. The NATO-ESDP Link 
7. EU Operations should be carried out using NATO resources 
1. Agree 8 
2. Mostly agree but also depends on the circumstances 8 
I Mostly disagree but also depends on the circumstances 4 
4. Disagree 2 
5. Don't Know/Don't Answer 0 
The results of the questionnaire and the discussions that followed it show that a very 
high number of PSC officials wanted to carry out operations using NATO resources. 
Duplication of resources is seen as unnecessary and has to be avoided although officials 
also mentioned that it is inevitable (for practical reasons of quick implementation) that 
the EU is gradually moving to small-scale duplication in certain areas. None of the PSC 
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officials denied the fact that NATO has an important role to play in security issues. 
Even when some PSC officials claimed that NATO is very much based on a Cold War 
framework, they also mentioned that its importance in security and defence issues is 
indisputable (Interviews 1,10,12,18,19). One official suminarised the issue by 
claiming that: 
I 
"even if we don't like NATO we have to be in it because it still maintains security. The 
Turkish-Greek dispute would not have been so quiet if NATO was not there" 
(Interview 19). 
Therefore, there is a basic consensus within the PSC that NATO still has an important 
role to play in security and defence. However, as the next section will demonstrate, this 
constitutes only a thin consensus as disagreements amongst PSC officials exist 
regarding the depth of EU-NATO cooperation as well as the degree of autonomy that 
the EU should possess. 
5.2.8. ESDP Autonomy vis-a-vis NATO 
8. The EU should develop capabilities that will allow it to deal with crises 
independently of NATO 
1. Agree 8 
2. Mostly agree but also depends on the circumstances 5 
3. Mostly disagree but also depends on the circumstances 2 
4. Disagree 7 
5. Don't Know/Don't Answer 0 
On the issue of autonomy the EU is quite divided. This division is referred to among 
the respondents as the most important problem in the development of a consolidated 
EU strategic culture. Three different strands of thought can be traced regarding the 
degree to which ESDP missions should be linked to NATO. The first strand includes 
the countries that are cautious of NATO and would like to see a further Europeanisation 
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in the field of security and defence, although some of them are NATO members (e. g. 
France, Belgium, Luxembourg, Greece, Cyprus, Malta, Ireland, Finland, Sweden and 
Austria). A second category includes states which are more flexible on the question of 
NATO and look toward both the EU and the Alliance for security guidance. This group 
includes countries such as the Netherlands, Portugal, Hungary and Italy. Although these 
countries can be characterised as quite pro-Atlanticist they also have strong European 
credentials and would like to see a gradual empowenrient of ESDP. A third group of 
states is that of the fervent Atlanticist EU member states. This group includes countries 
such as the UK and the East European Member States. For the East European states the 
accession to NATO acted as a new security guarantee against the Russians (Interview 
6). In addition, NATO accession also had a deeper ideational impact as East European 
officials claimed that NATO membership forms part of their new Western identity and 
orientation. According to one official: 
"NATO had a twofold significance for us. It is about securing the country from a 
possible Russian threat but it was also the first important organisation that welcomed us 
in the West" (Interview 6). 
Therefore, it is of no surprise that East European states are quite sceptical when it 
comes to the question of the EU assuming further autonomy vis-A-vis NATO. However, 
PSC officials mentioned that gradually countries arc becoming more willing to act 
autonomously since 2006 (Interviews 10,19). This modest trend of autonomy also 
affects some of the East European countries (e. g. Hungary). Some practical issues that 
will be mentioned below may also play in favour of the establishment of a more 
autonomous EU strategic culture in the future. 
First of all, geography may be key to the development of an independent EU strategic 
culture as PSC officials said that transatlantic cooperation depends on the geography 
and the nature of each mission. According to a national representative: 
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"for certain cases unless we do a mission under a European flag there is no other way a 
successful mission can be done" (Interview 16). 
Other ambassadors supported this argument by adding that in some parts of the world 
both the Americans and NATO are not welcome. For instance, in the case of the Acch 
mission, the Indonesians would have never accepted American involvement, whereas 
they were willing to allow intervention under the EU flag (Interview 4). As for certain 
geographic spots the possibility of acting with NATO is limited, the door opens for 
more European autonomy. Therefore, the idea of 'variable geography' vis-A-vis NATO 
is developing in the minds of ESDP officials which implies that certain areas should be 
tackled by the EU only, whereas other crisis spots should be dealt with the help of 
NATO. This tendency may be also nourished by US unilateralism and an unwillingness 
to intervene in various troubled spots (e. g. in Africa and Latin America). Furthen-nore, 
the Americans, who are the major actors behind NATO are not always willing to talk to 
their European colleagues on various crisis management issues and sometimes prefer to 
act unilaterally. This is a fact that irritates even some of the most fervent Atlanticist 
officials (Interviews 4,6). In addition, as noted above, the question of 'third party' 
participation also plays an important role in the EU-NATO relationship. The Turkish 
blockage in EU-NATO cooperation may push ESDP further away from NATO towards 
a more autonomous direction, because at present there is not even a common dialogue 
between NATO and the PSC. 
However, due to strong pro-NATO forces that act within the EU, it is evident that the 
strategic culture of the EU will remain for the time being one which possesses a 'double 
nature': part of it will be closely related to NATO but it will also possess some room 
for independent planning and action. The EU room for autonomy may expand in the 
future if the EU Member States decide that this is necessary. However, for the time 
being, it is difficult to reach a clear consensus on the role of NATO in ESDP because 
there are two opposing blocs (NATO-cautious and NATO-loyal countries) which have 
different views. This division is seen as the most important obstacle by PSC officials in 
the development of a consolidated EU strategic culture. 
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5.2.9. ESDP and the Question of Defence 
9. In the future the EU should assume responsibility for issues of defence. 
1. Agree 3 
2. Mostly agree but also depends on the circumstances 3 
3. Mostly disagree but also depends on the circumstances 0 
4. Disagree 16 
5. Don't Know/Don't Answer 0 
The idea that the EU may gradually assume defence responsibilities is seen as a distant 
option. The EU's strategic culture, in other words, has developed around security not 
defence issues. In this respect, most respondents stated a clear preference for the EU to 
prioritise humanitarian/civilian missions as they saw here an opportunity for the EU to 
establish an active and important role. This is justified on the grounds that there is a 
need to address sufficiently the civilian tasks of crisis management. Defence is also 
regarded with skepticism (for example, among the East European States and the UK), 
because it could lead to a gradual weakening of NATO. For other, non-NATO 
countries, meanwhile, defence is seen as a vital part of national sovereignty and should 
remain so (e. g. the cases of Ireland and Austria). Only a few PSC respondents claimed 
that the EU could eventually assume a role in defence. This group of officials included 
respondents from the 'ESDP enthusiastic' countries such as France and Luxembourg 
but also countries with a strong 'security deficit' such as Greece and Cyprus. The point 
of departure for strategic culture is the security of external threats and not the tackling 
of defence issues. 
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5.2.10. The Importance of Military and Civilian Tools in ESDP 
10. In the ESDP missions that the EU undertakes military and civilian tools are 
equally important. 
1. Agree 18 
2. Mostly agree but also depends on the circumstances 4 
3. Mostly disagree but also depends on the circumstances 0 
4. Disagree 0 
5. Don't Know/Don't Answer 0 
EU officials agreed overwhelmingly on this issue: there is a thick consensus regarding 
the importance of both military and civilian instruments in ESDP inissions. In this 
respect, it can be also argued that ESDP added a new dimension to the policies of the 
Member States as PSC officials claimed that the civilian aspects of ESDP went against 
the 'habits' of most EU member states (Interviews 12,14,19). Therefore, an EU 
strategic culture with a civilian dimension is emerging as national representatives both 
in Brussels and in the national capitals of the member states become more involved in 
developing ESDP civilian capabilities. 
However, most of the interviewees also mentioned that there is a gap between the 
rhetoric of ESDP and the implementation in practice that inhibits the development of a 
fully developed EU strategic culture in the civilian crisis management field (Interviews, 
3,20,21). Representatives claimed that the civilian capabilities of the EU need to be 
developed further but due to limited resources that states invest in the Civilian Headline 
Goals progress is still slow. This is a demonstration of the cautiousness of EU member 
states to invest further in ESDP. However, although difficulties exist it is possible to 
talk about a 'civilian turn' in ESDP as there is an ongoing discussion about reinforcing 
the civilian aspects of crisis management and investing more in them. 
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5.2.11. The Main Challenges of ESDP 
11. Briefly mention the main challenges ESDP faces (nitiltiple choice) 
1. Empowerment of ESDP institutions 10 
2. Investment in military and civilian capabilities 20 
3. Lack of trust of national governments in the ESDP project 7 
4. Competition with other organizations such as NATO 7 
5. Other (Please mention in detail): All the above 5 
Interviewees claimed that ESDP encounters all of the above suggestions to a certain 
degree. However, a considerable number of officials noted that although challenges 
exist, ESDP has managed to survive them. This is a fact which demonstrates the 
strength of the ESDP for, according to one official: 
"the dynamics of the ESDP are great and ongoing" (Interview 1). 
When interviewees elaborated more on these challenges they first talked about the lack 
of investment in military and civilian capabilities. Part of the problem is that the 
Member States do not want to spend more resources on issues of security as their 
budgets are restrained by EU financial rules as well as by other more important policy 
commitments at the national level. Although particular EU Headline Goals have been 
set up to develop military and civilian capabilities, all interviewees claimed that 
progress, while apparent, is still slow. 
The question regarding ESDP institutions was dealt with in the previous chapter. In 
short, when it comes to the institutions of ESDP most officials argue that institutions 
are flexible and decisions are easy to take due to the good will of the participants which 
facilitates the development of an EU strategic culture. Many officials also claim that the 
way ESDP works is the only possible way. According to one official: 
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"it is a bureaucratised and slow process but I cannot see a different way it can happen 
as you have to consult with the other 26 nations" (Interview 10). 
Of the other issues mentioned in the list, officials emphasise difficulties that have been 
already explored in previous sections (e. g. the NATO issue). In addition, some officials 
- especially from Eastern Europe- subscribed to the view that there is a lack of trust 
among national governments on ESDP. This is another point of divergence between 
East and West European governments that will be analysed in the section 6.3.2 of the 
chapter. This lack of trust further hinders the development of a consolidated strategic 
culture. 
5.2.12. ESDP Priorities 
12. The EU should (multiple choice): 
Intervene in case of a disaster in Europe 18 
Guarantee Human Rights 18 
Intervene in conflicts at the borders of the EU 16 
Defend the economic interests of the Union: 3 
Take part in humanitarian missions without UN approval 4 
Other (Please mention in detail) Petersberg tasks 13 
ESS: 2 All of the above state reasons 5 
The great majority of PSC officials chose the first three points as the main justification 
for intervention. Interviewees are critical or even dismissive when it came to the last 
two options. It is also interesting to observe that a spontaneous talk of the European 
Security Strategy was made by two PSC officials only. Other tasks such as dealing with 
terrorist threats, weapons of mass destruction and organised crime that form part of the 
ESS were not mentioned by PSC officials during the interviews. On the contrary, when 
asked this question many respondents suggested unprompted that one should take the 
Petersberg Tasks as a point of reference which demonstrates that, in this particular case, 
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the rhetoric of ESDP reflects a reality of ESDP. The Petersberg tasks include joint 
disan-narnent operations, humanitarian and rescue tasks, military advice and assistance 
tasks, conflict prevention and peace-keeping tasks, tasks of combat forces in crises 
management, including peace-making and post-conflict stabilisation (Article 1-41 (1) of 
the Constitutional Treaty). These tasks will define the strategic culture of the EU for 
some time to come. It is interesting to note that the challenges mentioned in PSC 
interviews are more modest than the ones mentioned in the ESS. 
A large number of PSC members said that both the civilian and military headline goals 
apparent in the official documentation of the EU are important points of reference but 
do not fully bind the EU towards a particular model of crisis management as these can 
be altered (Interviews, 1,4,10,17). According to interviewees, crisis management is an 
entirely political matter and a lot depends on the willingness of the EU member states 
to deal with a particular situation (Interviews 1,8,10). Although the numbers of the 
60,000 troops force and the 5,000 policemen are mentioned in the EU communicative 
discourse, some PSC officials did not disregard the possibility that in the future these 
numbers may increase in order to be able to deal with more challenging crises 
(Interviews 8,12,14). However, the limited ambitions of the EU states on ESDP do 
not, for the time being, encourage a stretching of capabilities. 
The possibility that the EU will assume missions in order to defend its vital geostrategic 
interests comes last in the list of answers but it is also interesting to mention that during 
interviews some respondents left this option open for the future. According to one 
interviewee: 
"ESDP is a new policy and so far we have not come across any cases where we have to 
defend vital national interests. What will happen though in a case where there is a 
problem with a particular pipeline or in cases of piracy? Shall we remain with our 
hands crossed? " (Interview 22). 
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Other officials also mentioned that while ESDP does not act in defence of economic 
interests it still fon-ns part of a wider EU toolbox which is connected to a particular long 
ten-n geostrategic interest. According to an official: 
"ESDP is an instrument. It is part of the wider EU toolbox. ESDP missions are not 
deployed to defend economic interests but in the long term ESDP also promotes a 
particular geostrategic order which is inspired by a European vision of personal 
freedom, democracy and liberal economy" (Interview 4). 
Interviewees generally mentioned that in the past there have been very few efforts to 
associate ESDP with economic interests and so far these ideas have failed miserably to 
become part of the agenda as they have been opposed by the great majority of the 
member states. One official claims that: 
"France usually has an aspiration to promote an econornic agenda and has tried to do 
that twice in the past but has failed miserably. Another effort where a notion of 
economic interest tried to penetrate the ESDP agenda took place at the Feira European 
Council in 2000 and also failed. Bringing an economic dimension within ESDP is not 
for the time being easy. Even if one country would like to do this, it will have to build a 
consensus amongst the 27 member states which is not an easy task" (Interview 13). 
Therefore, it is still early to talk about an EU strategic culture that will be based on the 
defence of the economic interests. By contrast, all PSC officials mentioned that ESDP 
is about the promotion of security and stability. The idea of security maintenance can 
also be regarded as an EU interest and will be further considered in Chapter Six when 
Bosnian operations will be taken into account. In this respect, the answers that were 
given by PSC officials on the importance of security in the Balkans coincide with those 
given from the second group of officials (see Chapter Six). Maintaining stability in the 
borders of the EU is an important element in ESDP because Europeans do not want to 
see the tragic images of the Balkan crises of the 1990s again (1,13,18). 
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5.2.13. The Importance of Dialogue as a Tool of ESDP Conflict 
Resolution 
13. Dialogue is an important tool for ESDP conflict resolution 
1. Agree 14 
2. Mostly agree but also depends on the circumstances 8 
3. Mostly disagree but also depends on the circumstances 0 
4. Disagree 0 
5. Don't Know/Don't Answer 0 
Dialogue on security issues forms an important aspect of the strategic culture of the EU. 
However, PSC officials also suggested that EU procedures must be more swift and that 
too much dialogue can lead to very little action being taken (as in the case of delay of 
the Bosnian operations) (Interviews 13,2 1). Therefore, dialogue should not be seen as a 
panacea to the security problems of the EU. It was also acknowledged that at the very 
beginning of a crisis too much time can be spent on discussions between various EU 
institutions in order to figure out institutional intentions. From this point of view 
dialogue can be also seen as a point of weakness in strategic culture, because: 
46we (meaning the Europeans) are talking too much without assuming responsibility or 
doing anything in reality" (Interview 8). 
Therefore, interviewees stated clearly that the EU needs a considerable amount of time 
in order to put its act together. Most interviewees pointed out that long discussions and 
detailed negotiations take place before the EU assumes an operation. These long 
discussions manifest that there is an element of cautiousness in the strategic culture of 
the EU. The high degree of EU cautiousness contradicts the vibrant spirit of preventive 
action which is mentioned in the ESS. 
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5.3. ESDP and its impact on EU member states 
5.3.1. ESDP as a Tool of National Policy Transformation 
1. By participating in ESDP the security and defence policies of my country have 
been altered. 
1. Agree 3 
2. Mostly agree but also depends on the circumstances 14 
3. Mostly disagree but also depends on the circumstances 5 
4. Disagree 0 
5. Don't' Know/Don't Answer 0 
PSC officials suggested that the policies of the Member States which they represent 
have been altered to a certain degree. However, during the interviews, officials 
suggested that national policies have not been altered radicallY due to ESDP. It is 
mostly the case that ESDP added an extra layer of activity to national policies. 
Enrichment rather than alteration is the key word that characterises the impact of ESDP 
on national policies. Furthennore, officials noted that the impact of ESDP is limited 
when it challenges strongly held beliefs on national security issues (e. g. through the 
promotion of security missions over defence which is vital for certain EU states). 
5.3.2. The Impact of ESDP on EU Member States 
2. ESDP had an impact on EU States as a whole. 
1. Agree 4 
2. Mostly agree but also depends on the circumstances 14 
3. Mostly disagree but also depends on the circumstances 2 
4. Disagree 2 
5. Don't Know/Don't Answer 0 
156 
3. If you agree or mostly agree with the following statement, mention any cases of 
policy change that have taken place because of ESDP: 
See section below for more details 
A majority of PSC officials agreed with the fact that ESDP has had an impact on EU 
Member States albeit a limited one. It has been the case for most EU countries that 
ESDP has not led to a major 'soul searching' on questions of security (Interviews, 1, 
10,12). However, respondents from all states, even from the most cautious ones 
regarding ESDP assimilation (e. g. East European states), claimed that there have been 
small changes in the national policies of all EU member states. These changes can be 
mostly located at the level of micro-developments in technical and operational 
practices. Furthen-nore, as mentioned previously, the civilian crisis capabilities 
programme that ESDP promotes has been also seen as an innovative policy for some 
EU countries that did not invest in this field in the past. 
In addition, ESDP has led to a new wave of bpreaucratisation by adding new 
procedures in ten-ns of military-civilian planning. In general, it is the case (but still with 
varied levels from country to country), that additional resources had to be allocated to 
new missions, thus overstretching the tight national security and defence budgets. New 
posts were created and personnel had to be employed both at the national level but also 
in Brussels in order to cover ESDP issues with each national representation now 
possessing its own ESDP department. As mentioned in the previous chapter, the trend 
of bureaucratisation has not been a unified one as some countries allocated more 
resources to ESDP than others. This asymmetrical pattern of bureaucratisation has had 
an impact on the assimilation of ESDP in national capitals. The limited institutional 
resources that some member states have allocated to the EU (e. g. the case of Eastern 
European states) have had a detrimental impact on the development of an EU strategic 
culture. This is due to the fact that ESDP decisions and issues that emerge after an 
ESDP discussion cannot always be fed into the national capitals. 
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Furthermore, PSC officials said that even within Member States there is some 
confusion concerning ESDP. For instance, officials mentioned that it is not a paradox to 
see member states whose defence ministries are socialised within a NATO framework 
to prefer direct dealings with NATO whereas their foreign ministries act mostly in a 
more multilateral and pro-ESDP environment (Interviews 4,18). In addition, the 
Ministries of Finance and the Interior are also two internal players that in certain 
countries have different views on how ESDP should develop (Interview 18). The 
national mosaic of ministries in each country and their conflicting priorities make it 
even more difficult for ESDP priorities to penetrate the national level. Therefore, the 
complicated national bureaucracies of each Member State also act as an obstacle to the 
creation of a cohesive EU strategic culture as the conflicting priorities of different 
internal actors fragment the influence that ESDP could have exercised in harmonising 
national policies. 
The impact of ESDP varies from country to country. For some East European countries, 
ESDP has been seen as a duplication of the work carried out by NATO and has not, 
therefore, been prioritised. However, even for these countries, a process of leaming is 
also under way. For instance due to the ESDP Bosnian experience, the Polish started to 
work on a deployable force that is similar to the Italian Carabinieri (Interview 6). In the 
Hungarian case, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has begun to develop a new security 
and defence policy which will revise the outdated two-page concept on ESDP from the 
year 2000 (Interview 7). Furthennore, due to the implementation of new ESDP 
missions the neutral EU states have had to cut down on their blue helmet UN missions 
and redirect their resources to EU missions (Interviews 7,13). According to one 
official, ESDP is also used in these countries as an alibi for reconstruction and passing 
decisions that would otherwise be problematic: 
"in the restructuring of the Swedish armed forces the Battlegroup concept was used as 
the pretext for change because imposing certain changes that affect external 
deployment have been a very difficult task otherwise" (Interview 7). 
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Officials also added that another change that has happened due to ESDP is that EU 
govenuTients collaborate more with each other on issues of security. When it comes to 
analysing different national perspectives on issues of security and defence it can be said 
that the creation of ESDP does not imply that national differences have disappeared but 
they have been partially eroded. Working together has contributed to a wider 
understanding of geostrategic realities, a slow han-nonisation of national perceptions 
and appropriate small adaptations of national policies. It has also contributed to a high 
degree of respect for issues that are sensitive for various Member States. However, 
4national' mentalities are still strong with many ESDP officials mentioning that there is 
still a long way to go until 'common understandings' on all major security issues are 
reached. No quick convergence is likely in the foreseeable future (Interviews 5,7,20). 
In addition, national bureaucracies that deal with ESDP issues have remained 'national' 
to a great degree. PSC officials generally claimed that there is a need for more intensive 
interaction between the national and the supranational ESDP level when it comes to 
fortnulating policies and deciding on security priorities. 
It is also evident that many Member States are usually cautious when it comes to new 
ambitious ESDP proposals especially when necessary resources for implementation are 
lacking. In addition, accepting an ESDP decision does not necessarily imply enthusiasm 
for it or real implementation on the ground. Smaller states find it difficult to digest all 
the information which comes from ESDP institutions as they have limited resources 
and expertise to allocate to it. Most of the time, when it comes to policy areas which do 
not form part of their regional agenda, smaller states accept mostly the issues that the 
'big three' EU states put on the table without blocking them. This does not necessarily 
imply an enthusiasm regarding the initiatives which are suggested but rather a belief in 
the idea that it is better to 'move along with the rest' rather than abstaining or, even 
worse, blocking decisions (Interviews 5,9,15,16). Therefore, the acceptance of ESDP 
decisions is not necessarily due to the fact that there is a common consolidated strategic 
culture. However, the belief that the ESDP should 'move on' also acts positively in the 
development of the newly established EU strategic culture as it facilitates the process of 
convergence. 
159 
5.3.3. ESDP as a Motivation Force for Further Intervention 
4. Due to ESDP my country has become more inclined to use inilitary/civilian 
instruments in its foreign policy. 
1. Agree 4 
2. Mostly agree but also depends on the circumstances 8 
3. Mostly disagree but also depends on the circumstances 3 
4. Disagree 7 
5. Don't Know/Don't Answer 0 
ESDP had a minor impact on EU states as a whole when it comes to further use of 
military and civilian elements in missions. All interviewees mentioned that ESDP is 
still a modest project. However, for some countries a policy transformation has taken 
place through participation in ESDP missions. For instance, the various contributions in 
Africa, Middle East and Aceh are seen as innovative missions for smaller EU countries 
that otherwise would not have participated in them (Interviews 6,7,9,15). However, 
participation in ESDP should not be seen as a new jump to interventionism as most 
countries have been already involved in various missions abroad - before ESDP came 
along - either through NATO or the UN. Therefore, although ESDP has enriched the 
national agenda of the Member States it did not lead to a pro; -interventionist 
breakthrough cffcct. 
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5.3.4. Importance of ESDP in National Agendas 
5. My country perceives participation in ESDP as a vital element of its security 
policy. 
1. Agree 12 
2. Mostly agree but also depends on the circumstances 6 
3. Mostly disagree but also depends on the circumstances 4 
4. Disagree 0 
5. Don't Know/Don't Answer 0 
On the question of the importance that EU countries attribute to ESDP, EU countries 
can be grouped in three main categories. National divisions regarding the prioritisation 
of ESDP is also another sign of the weakness of the EU strategic culture. The first 
group of countries can be seen as pro-ESDP countries who perceive participation in 
ESDP as a vital element of their security policy. This group consists of the majority of 
the pre-1995 enlargement EU12 countries (minus the UK). Cyprus and Malta are also 
included in this group although because of their particular circumstances regarding their 
non-NATO status they cannot fully participate in various ESDP initiatives. The second 
group of EU states is generally a pro-ESDP group which still maintains a degree of 
cautiousness vis-A-vis various ESDP initiatives which may lead to a loss of sovereignty 
in security and defence issues. This group unites the post-neutral states such as Finland, 
Sweden, Austria, Ireland, Hungary and the UK. Although Finland and Sweden will be 
gradually moving towards the first group of pro-ESDP countries, Ireland and Austria 
continue to maintain a passive stance on many ESDP initiatives and have not yet 
assumed their full potential regarding ESDP missions. Finally, the last group of EU 
states groups most of the Eastern EU countries which, for reasons related to the 
transatlantic relationship and the predominance of NATO, are unwilling to pay more 
attention to ESDP developments. The varying levels of importance that EU member 
states attribute to ESDP may lead to a division between EU active ESDP states and the 
EU 'observers' of ESDP. Such a division would be lethal to the development of a 
consolidated EU strategic culture. 
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In this respect one can also draw a line between the lagging behind or the Eastern 
Europe in ESDP matters and the threat to the internal cohesion of the security 
community that Deutsch described (1978: 244). According to Deutsch (1978: 244), 
rapid membership expansion may add an increase in regional and cultural 
differentiation which can cause problems to the integrative process. On tile other hand, 
one can adopt a more optimistic view by claiming that it took approximately five years 
for the neutral states to get accustomed to the workings of ESDP and so will be the case 
for the East European states which will gradually become assimilated into the process 
of consensus and ESDP implementation. However, for the neutral countries ESDP 
came at time that they were in search of a new identity in issues of security and this 
'soul-searching' period facilitated their integration into ESDP (Interviews 13,22). 
Nevertheless, the challenge to fully 'acclimatise' East European countries into the 
ESDP remains an important priority so that the EU strategic culture can reach a level of 
consolidation. 
5.4. Categorising the Strategic Culture of the EU 
By using the findings of the questionnaire and interviews conducted with PSC officials, 
the possible types of EU strategic culture can be categorised according to the types that 
were developed in Chapter Two. The elements that characterise the strategic culture of 
the EU are marked with X on in the following table. Three main types have been 
developed in Chapter Two: the Cautious Interventionist Europe (CIE), the Active 
Europe (AE) and the Super Active Power Europe (SAPE) types of strategic culture. 
These types of strategic culture are characterised by various elements which are 
grouped in the table below. Capital letters consist of the elements that form the majority 
of outcomes in each type whereas lower-case letters indicate that a particular outcome 
is still present in a given type although it is only evident in the minority of the policy 
outcomes reached. 
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Table Seven: Accessing the Strategic Culture of the EU 
Typeof CIE: Cautious AE: Active SAPE: Super 
Strategic Interventionist Europe Active Power 
culture Europe Europe 
Willingness Low Average Iliall b 
to act X 
Small S/m, S/M S/INI/L 
(S)/medium X 
(M)/Iarge (L) 
missions 
Low (L)/high L L/h L/11 
(11) risk 
X 
Geographic L/e L/E L/E 
remit: 
Limited (L), X 
Extended (E) 
Importance 11 WIN't 11/111 
of UN X 
mandate: 
High (11), 
Moderate 
(INI), Low (L) 
Europeanise S/C S/E E 
d X 
(E)/Sovereig 
n (S) nature 
ofESDP 
Unitary F/u U/f U 
(U)/fragment 
ed (F) X 
Atlanticist A/e A/E A/E or a/E 
(A)/ 
Europeanist X 
(E) 
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Multilaterali M MAI M/U 
st 
(M)/unflater X 
alist (U) 
Humanitaria H/m HAI M/11 
n x 
(H)/material 
(M) 
Difficulty n 11/1 h/L L 
deploying 
military/poli X 
ce 
instruments: 
High (H), 
Low (L) 
Institutionall W/s SAV S 
y strength of 
ESDP: Weak X 
(W), Strong 
(S) 
EU m MAI 11 
Consensus 
on the use of X 
force: 
Moderate 
(M), High 
(H) 
Security/Def S S/d S/D 
ence spill 
over: (S: x 
security, D: 
defence) 
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The strategic culture of the EU mostly fits with the Cautious Interventionist Europe 
type. This particular type of strategic culture is characterised by a low willingness to 
act, manifested in the deployment of mostly short-term small/mediurn and low risk 
missions. This type also displays a limited geographic remit. According to this type of 
strategic culture, the strategic culture of the EU is still a culture which is characterised 
by the belief that national sovereignty should be above EU prerogatives. National 
cautiousness regarding ESDP is also manifested in the difficulty Member States have in 
deploying troops and police forces in the name of the EU. Defence also remains under 
national auspices. Furthen-nore, the strategic culture of the EU has a strong Atlanticist 
aspect. Cautious interventionist Europe has a strong multilateral nature and the 
importance of a UN Security Council mandate still remains important as a tool of 
cohesion amongst its members. However, as mentioned previously there are also 
divisions on the utility of the UN and the UN Security Council resolutions amongst its 
members. Furthermore, the strategic culture of a Cautious Interventionist Europe is 
based on the protection of human rights and the promotion of law. Therefore, a 
humanitarian agenda is still important in issues of security. Still, there is no consensus 
on the promotion of economic elements through ESDP amongst EU member states. 
Finally, the consensus on the use of force is moderate as national opinions amongst EU 
states vary over geographic and political priorities. 
5.5. Conclusions 
This section will group all elements that emerged from the study of the questionnaires 
and interviews in order to shed light on the constituent elements of the strategic culture 
of the EU. 
First of all, replies from officials demonstrate that although there is a willingness to act 
in the Balkans there is no such willingness when it comes to assuming global 
responsibilities. For regions other than the Balkans, ESDP looks very much like a 'pick 
and mix' bag whose agenda depends on capabilities, risk assessment and political 
circumstances. As mentioned in the previous chapter, networks of countries which are 
willing to intervene are very important in galvanising the EU to move to certain 
165 
geographic directions. In this respect ESDP is a policy which is characterised by a 
certain degree of 'openness' as all EU countries can influence its final outcome. 
ESDP officials also claim that the EU has accepted the utility and legitimacy of military 
instruments in dealing with security crises. However, although officials claimed that 
building, harmonising and modernising capabilities is happening they also pointed to 
the slow pace of work and to the financial issues that Pose limitations to modernisation. 
Officials mentioned that national governments have been slow and sometimes not 
willing to cede national resources to ESDP, a fact that poses limitations to the 
development of the strategic culture of the EU. 
'European' values (democracy, rule of law, protection of human rights) are cited as 
important motivating factors for ESDP intervention and there is a humanitarian element 
in the strategic culture of the EU. It is also interesting to note that, although ESDP so 
far is not an economic-interest driven policy, a few officials hinted that the 
development of ESDP as an economic protection tool whereas other mentioned that 
ESDP is functioning as part of a wider EU agenda which also includes economic 
interests. Others also mentioned the primacy of the idea of security/stability provision 
as an ESDP priority. Securitising can be also seen as an EU security interest. During the 
interviews officials have been focusing mostly on regional conflicts, human rights and 
the importance of the Petersberg Tasks which attribute to the ESDP a relatively narrow 
remit of action than. Therefore, the base for the strategic culture of the EU mostly lies 
on selected cases of humanitarian intervention, the promotion of law and the protection 
of human rights. 
ESDP officials claim that both the status of the UN and the importance of Security 
Council Resolutions have been weakened by the EU's eastern enlargement. The 
importance of UN Security Council Resolution as an ESDP legitimacy tool is therefore 
not consolidated, although for the time being it seems that most, if not all, ESDP 
missions will occur under a UN mandate. Secuity dialogue is also important. However, 
although officials did not deny the importance of dialogue they also claimed that 
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sometimes too much time is wasted in talking. Therefore, dialogue can be seen as an 
opportunity for policy expansion but also as a hindrance to the development of the EU 
strategic culture as the opportunity to act is put second to discussions. 
Multilateralism in indeed important However, ESDP officials provide a more detailed 
version of ESDP multilateralism by adding the limitations and the difficulties of 
multilateralism as cooperating with other countries or organisations is not always an 
easy task. Furthermore, although all officials accepted that cooperation between the EU 
and NATO should take place the degree and depth of the cooperation is very much 
disputed with EU member states being divided between two opposing camps and a 
'flexible' group of states situated in between. The role of the US and NATO in ESDP is 
by far the most divisive issue and hinders the development of a consolidated strategic 
culture. So far deciding whether or not to collaborate with the US and NATO is 
happening after a careful discussion of missions which are under discussion. However, 
no thick consensus has been reached on the depth of EU-NATO relationship. 
Finally, ESDP policy-making is intergovernmental in nature and will remain so in the 
future as there is no desire for a supranational governance to take over the sphere of 
security and defence. ESDP institutions had an important role in bringing more of a 
European dimension to national policies but they have not always managed to promote 
their own agenda as national capitals still have the upper hand in the process. 
Furthen-nore, ESDP has been important in bringing officials together and adding an 
extra layer of policy initiatives into the national policies of EU Member States. 
However, the influence that ESDP exercises on national agendas is limited by a number 
of factors which were explained in this chapter. As argued previously, the type of 
strategic culture that best characterises the strategic culture of the EU is the Cautious 
Interventionist Europe type. The findings of this chapter validate the claim made in 
Chapter Four which argued that that the strategic culture of the EU is in a stage of 
transition and is characterised by a number of thin and thick consensuses on various 
security issues. The thesis will now examine how the ideas and practices of the strategic 
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culture of the EU are manifested in operations by studying the two ESDP missions that 
the EU has deployed in Bosnia Herzegovina. 
168 
Chapter Six 
The Operational Dimension of EU Strategic Culture: ESDP 
Operations in Bosnia Herzegovina 
6.1. Introduction 
According to the definition of strategic culture provided in Chapter One, ideas, beliefs, 
practices and values of strategic culture are also manifested in the way a country or an 
organisation acts in operations. For this reason, the current chapter will examine the 
development of EU strategic culture through a case study of the two ESDP operations 
in Bosnia Herzegovina (BiH). The chapter is not intended as a comprehensive case 
study of the two ESDP operations but rather constitutes a study of the attitudes of 
Brussels-based ESDP officials who have contributed in these missions. The Bosnian 
ESDP operations have been chosen because they have occurred in a geographic region 
(the Western Balkans) in which the EU has been most heavily involved. The area of 
BiH is one where the EU has deployed many different foreign policy tools since the 
beginning of the ethnic conflict in the 1990s. Therefore, conclusions on the strategic 
culture of the EU can be confidently made by drawing upon evidence from these 
missions. It is also acknowledged that ESDP has been heavily shaped by the Bosnian 
experience. For instance, the ESDP Headline Goals were drawn on the experiences 
stemming from the Bosnia crisis as according to one official: 
"ESDP is a by product of the Bosnian crisis, the 60,000 troops target was similar to the 
TOR experience" (Interview 33). 
This chapter is based on a sample of 23 interviews (Appendix IV) of policy-makers 
drawn from a range of EU bodies (PSC, EUMS, Council of the EU, COWEB, 
European Parliament), all of whom have dealt with security issues relating to BiH. A 
questionnaire similar to that used to interview the group of officials listed in Chapter 
Six has been drafted with a clear focus on ESDP operations in BiH (Appendix IV). The 
sample has been carefully selected in order to provide a balanced number of officials 
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from different countries and institutions. The interviews were carried out between 
January 2007 and December 2007. In much of the questionnaire the Likert scale was 
used in order to evaluate the answers of the interviewees. Officials involved in 
designing, implementing and evaluating ESDP operations in BiH largely confirm the 
main findings of the sample of interviews reported in Chapter Five. The convergence of 
ideas from the two interview samples reinforces the main arguments developed in the 
previous chapters and also demonstrates that the beliefs that were taken into account in 
Chapter Five are also held in wider EU circles. As it was the case with the first sample, 
the interviews were anonymous and the interviewees were reassured about the 
anonymity of the research. 
In the case of BiH, the EU has implemented two missions using the ESDP framework: 
the European Union Police Mission (EUPM) and Operation Althea (EUFOR). The 
chapter will provide some basic facts regarding the two missions. It will focus on the 
main strategic ideas that emerged from questionnaires and interviews of officials that 
have been involved in both of these missions. An account of the practices and ideas that 
have a positive influence on the development of the EU strategic culture will be 
provided. The last section of the chapter will deal with various limitations to the 
strategic culture of the EU that stem from the practical implementation of these 
missions. The thesis will now provide a short introduction of the aims of the two ESDP 
missions. 
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6.2. The European Union Police Mission (EUPM) 
According to the Council of the EU Website, EUPM started on I January 2003. The 
EUPM builds upon the work carried out by the UN International Police Task Force 
through monitoring, mentoring and inspection activities. 
(http: //www. consilium. europa. eu/uedoes/cmsUpload/Factsheet 060312. pd (accessed 
on 20/06/2007) 
According to the same source, some 500 police officers from more than thirty countries 
made up the mission in its initial phase (2003-2005). EUPM consists of international 
staff members. It includes seconded police officers as well as some 200 BiH nationals. 
As of mid 2007, the mission was made up of 24 contributing EU countries and six other 
states. 
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Furthen-nore, 
"EUPM is under the guidance and co-ordination of the European Union Special 
Representative (EUSR), and as part of the broader rule of law approach in BiH and in 
the region, aims through mentoring, and inspecting to establish a sustainable, 
professional and multiethnic police service in BiH, operating in accordance with the 
best European and international standards". (bold in original, EUPM website 
Official Website of the EUPM, http: //www. cupm. ort, ý/Documents/Weekly. pd 
(Accessed on 20/06/2007): 
EUPM is deployed so that it can pursue the following objectives: 
"a) Under the guidance of the EU Special Representative (EUSR), EUPM actively 
supports, advises and guides where appropriate, the preparation and implementation of 
police restructuring in line with the principles for police restructuring. 
b) Improve, through proactive mentoring, monitoring and inspecting, police 
managerial and operational capacities, especially at the State level, including relations 
with other law-enforcement agencies, in order to enhance BiH's capacity to fight 
organised crime in accordance with existing international and in particular regional, 
commitments and obligations. 
c) Assist the BiH Police in initiating and conducting counter-organised crime activities 
and follow up their actions. When inappropriate conduct is observed, refer to the High 
Representative for BiH for further action, in accordance with the detennined 
procedures. 
d) In close coordination with the EUSR, monitor the exercise of political control over 
the police and address inappropriate political interference in the operational 
management of the police. " 
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Source: (Council of the EU Website, 
httl2: //www. consilium. europa. eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/Factslieet 060312.12d (Accessed 
on 20/06/07) 
6.3. Operation Althea -EUFOR 
The Council of the European Union decided on 12 July 2004 to conduct a military 
operation in Bosnia Herzegovina. EUFOR-Althea was launched on 2 December 2004 
and was carried out with NATO assets and capabilities under the Berlin Plus 
arrangement. Co-operation between the two organisations in this regard had been 
facilitated by the establishment of a permanent EU Cell at SHAPE and due to the 
NATO permanent liaison team at the EUMS. 
According to the EUFOR website, the key objectives of ALTHEA EUFORBIH 
Website, http: //www. euforbih. or5z/mission/mission. htm (Accessed on 30/06/2007) are: 
"- To provide deterrence and continued compliance with the responsibility to fulfil the 
role specified. in Annexes IA and 2 of the Dayton/Paris Agreement (General 
Framework Agreement for Peace in BiH); 
- To contribute to a safe and secure environment in BiH, in line with its mandate, and to 
achieve core tasks in the OHR's Mission Implementation Plan and the Stabilisation and 
Association Process (SAP). ". 
The force started with some 7,000 troops, a number gradually cut down as the security 
situation in Bosnia Herzegovina improved. According to official figures, as of 30 May 
2007 there was a total of 2,502 troops in Bosnia Herzegovina. The participating 
countries and the number of troops deployed in Bosnia Herzegovina were as follows: 
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Source: EUFORBIIJ Website, http: //www. eufoi-bih. or[z/i-nissioii/missioii. hti-n (Accessed on 30/06/2007) 
6.4. Main Ideas Regarding the Strategic Culture of the EU as 
Manifested in ESDP Operations in Bosnia Herzegovina 
This section provides an account of the ideas, beliefs and values that emerged frorn the 
questionnaires and interviews with EU officials working on Bosnian issues. As noted 
above, these ideas largely correspond with the coordinative discourse of the PSC 
officials as studied in the previous chapter. 
6.4.1. The Assumption of Responsibility 
One of the basic characteristics of the development the strategic culture of the EU is the 
fact that that the EU has assumed a responsibility to maintain security in Bosnia 
Herzegovina. Furthen-nore, what is seen as the success of the BiH operations (Appendix 
IV, question 1) has contributed to the belief that the EU can assume important 
military/police missions. 
1. Do you feel that ESDP missions in Bill have been a success since their launch? 
1. Agree 20 
2. Mostly agree but also depends on the circumstances 3 
3. Mostly disagree but also depends on the circumstances 0 
4. Disagree 0 
5. Don't Know/Don't Answer 0 
All interviewees stressed the fact that the EU has decided to act decisively in the 
Balkans. In this respect, all interviewees mentioned that Bosnia has been an important 
point of strategic convergence, for the EU has had to assume its responsibilities in this 
area of the Balkans and had to deal directly with what has been viewed as a 'security 
deficit' in Bosnia. The previous chapter emphasized the fact that there is a wide 
consensus in dealing with the Western Balkans, in contrast to the lack of consensus 
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when it comes to dealing with other parts of the world. Indeed, certain second sample 
interviewees mentioned that the case of BiH is unique due the severe situation of its 
population during the time of war, its proximity to Europe and the particular challenges 
that the Bosnian crisis posed to the safety of the EU (e. g. immigration waves) 
(Interviews 33,35,42). Due to its particular circumstances, BiH can be seen as central 
to the development of the strategic culture of the EU. It is worth noting in this context 
that officials seemed confident of the long-term prospects of the strategic culture of the 
EU because this particular consensus on the importance of the ESDP missions in 
Bosnia is not threatened by the EU enlargement. This is because many East European 
countries (e. g. Romania, Bulgaria) are either part of the Balkans themselves or are very 
close to the region (e. g. Hungary, Czech Republic, Slovakia) and share an interest in 
maintaining security in BiH (Interviews 36,39,43). Geographically, then, the location 
of Bosnia is a good example of where Western member state priorities meet those of 
their Eastern counterparts. However, this is an example that is not necessarily 
happening with other crisis areas of the world as the previous chapter has already noted. 
6.4.2. Humanitarianism and Geostrategic fears as Strategic 
Culture Shapers 
It is interesting to note that both humanitarian and geostrategic concerns were necessary 
in the development of thick consensus regarding Bosnian security. The parallel lack of 
any of these two factors may provide the answer as to why a common strategic culture 
has not yet emerged in respect of other parts of the world. Thus, one official has noted 
that: 
"the case of Bosnia is different from Aceh because in Bosnia there was a multiple list 
of reasons to intervene that affected all EU countries to more or less the same degree. 
This is not the case with other ESDP missions" (Interview 33). 
177 
8. The EU intervened in Bill in order to (multiple answers): 
Promote law, order and good governance 15 
Guarantee Human Rights 20 
Solve a conflict in its borders 20 
Defend the economic interests of the Union 0 
Other (Please mention in detail): promote security/stability 13 
All of the above state reasons 3 
When interviewees were asked why the EU has become involved in BiH they usually 
replied by arguing that Bosnia had a 'humanitarian' impact on the minds of EU policy 
makers. The traumas of the early 1990s, the images redolent of Europe's past (violence, 
authoritarianism, refugee flows) and the willingness to end once and for ever the 
barbarity of the Bosnian atrocities are all common themes in EU thinking as expressed 
by the interviewees (Interviews 33,35,38). All officials also agreed on the fact that the 
6remedies' for the Bosnian conflict are the spread of democracy, the protection of 
minorities, the respect of human rights, the promotion of a multi-ethnic society and the 
establishment of the rule of law. Furthennore, interviewees claimed that the Europeans 
are committed to the maintenance of the Dayton agreement and have faith in the 
development of a multiethnic and multicultural Bosnia (Interviews 35,38). Therefore, 
ESDP is the product of a 'humanitarian' thinking which was developed in the EU as'a 
result of the atrocities of the Bosnian conflict. 
In addition, interviewees also mentioned that there were commonly accepted 
geostrategic reasons within the EU that contributed to a strategic culture of Bosnian 
prioritisation as the primary geographic spot for ESDP action. A major challenge to the 
stability of the EU identified by the interviewees was the immigration waves of 
Bosnians who had to leave their country (interviews 33,35,55). Because of the 
Bosnian war, Bosnian immigrants had to either relocate to neighboring countries or flee 
to West European states. Officials interviewed said that both outcomes were 
problematic because, in the first case, the change of regional demographics would have 
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led to a new wave of unrest in the fragile area of the Western Balkans. Secondly, the 
waves of immigration would lead to an increase of racism and xenophobia and would 
provide a fertile ground for the success of extremist politicians in Western political 
systems (Interviews 37,41,46,47). In order to stop Bosnian migration, the EU sought 
to stabilise'the country and thus encourage Bosnians to remain in their own locality. 
Therefore, the provision of security for the region was an important factor that pushed 
the Europeans towards the assumption of Bosnian responsibility. 
Furthermore, the existence of other security challenges (drugs/weapons/human 
trafficking, the spread of crime) were all considered by EU officials. Bosnia has been 
viewed as 'an insecure place in the EU's backyard' and consequently, strategic action 
through police and military instruments has been seen as necessary (Interviews 37,39, 
46,47,56). In the Bosnian case, ESDP serves the wider EU security interest. As one 
official put it: 
"first and above all, ESDP is about providing security for the continent and security is 
an important interest for all Europeans" (Interview 5 1). 
In addition, the fear stemming from US reluctance to maintain a presence in the region 
was also cited as a commonly accepted reason that galvanised the EU to act in the 
region. In conclusion, in the case of BiH, a humanitarian concern was combined with 
an EU security interest and the fear of American withdrawal which led to ESDP 
intervention. 
6.4.3. A Strategic Culture of Mixed Civilian/Military Elements 
A basic element of the strategic culture of the EU that emerged in Chapter Five was the 
importance of a mixed civil ian/mi litary strategy. A consensus on the deployment in 
ESDP of a mixture of military and civilian instruments has also been evident in the case 
of the BiH EU missions. According to the results of the second questionnaire, all 
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officials interviewed believed that civilian tools are as important as military ones 
(Appendix IV, question 6). 
6. In the ESDP missions that the EU undertakes military and civilian tools are 
equally important. 
1. Agree 19 
2. Mostly agree but also depends on the circumstances 4 
3. Mostly disagree but also depends on the circumstances 0 
4. Disagree. 0 
5. Don't Know/Don't Answer 0 
All officials interviewed mentioned that conflicts are multi-faceted and, in order to be 
addressed successfully, a comprehensive approach is necessary which ought to include 
a wide array of policy instruments. Interviewees agreed on the necessity of deploying 
the implementation force within a comprehensive civilian/military framework. They 
mentioned that both a military and police presence has been necessary in order to 
maintain peace in BiH but that these two elements should, in turn, be complemented by 
financial instruments in order to address social and economic challenges. According to 
one ESDP military official: 
"we know that giving financial aid alone will not solve the problems of Bosnia. We 
also know that the military and police cannot just remedy problems on their own. What 
is needed in Bosnia and also in every crisis point of the world is a comprehensive 
package of support" (Interview 35). 
Some interviewees also noted that EU strategy was complemented by the drafting of an 
EU-BiH Stability Association Agreement which may lead to a closer EU-Bosnian 
relationship in the future (Interview 37,38,39). 
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6.4.4. The Use of Police and Military Instruments as a 'Mild' 
Projection of Force 
Some officials noted that although multiple instruments are necessary in order to tackle 
the Bosnian crises, these should be used in a very careful manner. If a conclusion is to 
be drawn from the interviews concerning the strategic culture of the EU as manifested 
in its Bosnian operations it is that such a culture is based on a 'moderate' 
civilian/military projection of force (Interviews 37,39,43,53). This moderate approach 
is based on the deployment of limited amounts of projected arnmunition and a dislike of 
air strikes and heavy an-namcnts. As one official claims: 
"we all understand that heavy tactics will not solve the issues" (Interview 56). 
The insistence that military and policing instruments be used in a cautious manner also 
brings to light a process of 'EU/US differentiation' that is reflected in the strategic 
culture of the EU. This process of 'EU/US othering' has been studied in Chapter Three 
and is also validated in this chapter. In general, interviewees claimed that the EU has 
very strict rules of engagement and that both EU troops and police are bound by a 
stricter control of lethal power than is the case on the American side. The different 
views between the US and the EU on the use of police/military resources are also 
manifested when officials with direct experience on ESDP missions mentioned that the 
carrying of heavy ammunition by US soldiers (as well as the air strikes of the 1994- 
1995 period) is a strategy that the Europeans must not copy (Interviews 33,38,55). 
Furthermore, interviewees also drew attention to the fact that the training of EU troops 
and policemen is very strict when it comes to dealing with the local population. A lot of 
emphasis during training has been put on the fact that soldiers simply cannot fire on 
civilians for minor issues and that clashes with the local population should be avoided. 
ESDP officials who have dealt with BiH ESDP missions claimed that EU police and 
military forces are very unwilling to use arms in a crisis. In addition, when there is a 
crisis when ammunition needs to be used, there is a very gradual response to it and not 
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an immediate one (Interviews 33,37,38). Officials added that compared to the EU 
forces, the Americans are 'easier' when it comes to 'pulling the trigger' and carry 
heavier weapons and much more ammunition than the EU force (38,42,50,51,55). 
This has a direct influence on the psychology of the troops and police on the ground 
with the direct result that ESDP forces are more constrained when it comes to the use of 
ammunition. 
For instance, one official mentioned that there are two different perceptions of using 
force in Bosnia: 
"the Americans were always as heavily armed as 'ninja-turtles'. We take a different 
approach because we see this as counterproductive. If you carry too much ammunition 
with you all the time it is like saying you do not trust the locals. In Bosnia we (meaning 
the EU forces) were circulating as civilians with our everyday casual clothes. By 
carrying too much ammunition the psychology of the soldier changes. You feel in a 
different way when you have ten bullets and different when you have one hundred. The 
more ammunition one carries, the easier it becomes to use it. On the other hand, if a 
soldier holds ten bullets, a policy of resources restriction is employed as these bullets 
will only be used in cases of extreme emergency" (Interview 42). 
Another official made a similar claim: 
"we do not want to be seen as carrying heavy ammunition as the Americans do. And 
we, as Europeans, are good in doing this. For my country the best is to have a mission 
under a UN badge but the second best is the EU badge" (Interview 55). 
This demonstrates that the EU has a strategic culture which is related to an 
unwillingness to use heavy ammunition in its operations. This particular finding is also 
in accord with the historic trajectory of EU/US 'othering' that was analysed in Chapter 
Three and shows that in this issue there is a degree of historic continuity. 
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6.4.5. The Importance of the UN Mandate in the Strategic Culture 
of the EU 
On the question of the legitimacy of the operations, all interviewees noted that UN 
approval was an important step of legitimisation and were keen to point out that both 
EUPM and EUFOR operations were implemented after UN decisions. ESDP officials 
said that United Nations Security Council Resolutions (UNSCRs) 1575 and 1551 
legitimised the decision to intervene in Bosnia Herzegovina by employing the Althea 
mission. (Interviews 36,48,49) In addition, the EUPM is based on a Council decision 
which followed the UNSCR 1396 (37,40,42,54,55). The previous chapter argued 
that the lack of legitimisation for EU missions without a UN mandate can be a divisive 
issue for the EU. Officials of the second group mentioned that a UN mandate has 
facilitated EU cooperation and it has provided a 'vale of legitimacy' to the least 
intervention-friendly countries. The results of the questionnaire pointed to the fact that 
a UN mandate and the authorisation of the UN Security Council are desirable 
(Appendix IV, question 2). 
2. ESDP in Bill operations should be carried out with a UN mandate and under 
the authorization of the UN Security Council 
1. Agree 15 
2. Mostly agree but also depends on the circumstances 6 
3. Mostly disagree but also depends on the circumstances 2 
4. Disagree 0 
5. Don't Know/Don't Answer 0 
Although certain officials said that in the future operations may be deployed without a 
UN mandate for political reasons, they also claimed that such a scenario would cause 
various problems to countries-that require a legitimacy of military and police operation 
(36,42,44). The reasons that interviewees gave for such a perspective coincided with 
those given by the interviewees as reported in Chapter 6 (e. g. pressures from urgent and 
massive humanitarian disasters). 
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6.4.6. The Importance of Multilateral Institutions in the Strategic 
Culture of the EU 
The second group of interviewees generally agreed on the fact that ESDP is based on a 
multilateral and inclusive approach and that the ESDP Bosnian missions have 
welcomed contributions from third parties. One military official claimed that 
multilateralism is so entrenched in EU thinking that it also forms part of EU training: 
"we have a multilateral approach. We are trained like that; we have various liaison 
officers who work with other institutions. We are dealing with local ministries, local 
government and NGOs. We exchange information freely with them" (Interview 42). 
The results of the questionnaire thus show that as a matter of principle multilateralism 
is widely accepted amongst second group interviewees (Appendix IV, question three). 
3. ESDP ought to involve in its operations countries other than EU member states. 
1. Agree 20 
2. Mostly agree but also depends on the circumstances 3 
3. Mostly disagree but also depends on the circumstances 0 
4. Disagree 0 
5. Don't Know/Don't Answer 0 
For instance, interviewees mentioned that, during the implementation of the Bosnian 
missions, the EU had a genuine wish to collaborate with institutions such as NATO as 
well as with a number of third countries (Interviews 36,42,46,49). The importance of 
NATO in the ESDP Bosnian operations will be studied in the following section. On the 
question of the UN-EU relationship, none of the interviewees disagreed with the fact 
that one of the aims of the EU is to collaborate with the UN. Furthen-nore, all officials 
mentioned that there is a positive dialogue between the EU and the UN and a general 
willingness on the part of both organisations to collaborate, something manifest in the 
184 
frequent exchanges of infon-nation. However, difficulties exist at a more practical level 
as the two institutions are characterised by very distinctive hierarchical structures which 
sometimes inhibit further cooperation. Various officials also pointed to the fact that a 
new detailed strategy is needed so that the two organisations can act more closely 
together (Interviews 34,38,43). Therefore, although in terms of ideas multilateralism 
is highly valued, the practicalities of implementing multilateralism hinder the 
development of a strategic culture that would be characterised by strong patterns of 
cooperation between the EU and third parties. 
6.4.7. The Importance of the NATO-EU Relationship in BiH 
As noted above, Operation Althea has been carried out by putting into practice the 
Berlin Plus guidelines which set the framework of EU-NATO cooperation. In BiH, 
both NATO and the EU maintain their own command structures. Their activities must 
be constantly discussed during meetings. Although ESDP has assumed the heavy 
burden of Bosnian security, NATO still maintains a small caucus in BiH and is active 
on issues of intelligence as well as in the ongoing search for war criminals. Because of 
the mixed competencies of both NATO and the ESDP missions, frequent consultation 
takes place between the two organizations (Interviews 43,54). For this reason, both the 
PSC and the Chairman of the EUMC constantly update NATO on the progress of 
Althea. 
The second sample of interviewees pointed to the fact that there is a basic consensus 
amongst officials on the idea that the EU should maintain a good relationship with 
NATO. However, there was disagreement on the 'depth' that this bilateral relationship 
should have. It is interesting to note that in the case of the UN there was no objection to 
a deepening of the relationship. By contrast, there is no real consensus as to how far the 
NATO-EU relationship should go. One can see the existence of a basic division 
between those officials who claimed that interaction with NATO in Bill has been 
positive and those who had a more cautious assessment of the EU-NATO relationship. 
For instance, some of the most cautious ESDP officials claimed that the reluctance of 
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NATO to exchange confidential infori-nation regarding the deployment of future ESDP 
operations demonstrated a lack of trust and even a feeling of contempt for EU efforts to 
assume part of the security burden in the European neighbourhood (Interviews 48,49). 
Some ESDP officials mentioned that during the first months of the NATO hand-over to 
the EU, they were puzzled by the ambivalent stance of the NATO American officials as 
well as by their lack of cooperation (e. g. on the issue of intelligence exchange) 
(Interviews 54,55). 
The conclusions from NATO behaviour in BiH differ from one group of officials to the 
next. When it comes to the 'NATO cautious' group of officials, NATO rigidities were 
seen a proof that the EU should embrace further autonomy in strategic issues. By 
contrast, 'pro-NATO' officials claimed that the only way ahead is one of transatlantic 
cooperation through NATO and that the emerging problems of EU-NATO interaction 
were the outcome of a lack of a specified cooperation plan. Nevertheless, all officials 
involved in ESDP planning of the Bosnian missions emphasised the fact that the lack of 
European capabilities acted as the glue to the transatlantic relationship as Europeans 
needed to cooperate with NATO in order to address their capabilities deficit. The 
importance of the capabilities deficit on behalf of the EU is one of the primary reasons 
that second group officials are in favour of the statement that ESDP operations must be 
carried out by using NATO resources (Appendix IV, question four). 
4. Operations must be carried out by using NATO resources 
1. Agree 9 
2. Mostly agree but also depends on the circumstances 8 
3. Mostly disagree but also depends on the circumstances 6 
4. Disagree 0 
5. Don't Know/Don't Answer 0 
However, when it comes to the question of EU autonomy vis-ý-vis NATO, the 
interviewees were divided between those who would like to see the EU becoming more 
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independent and those who would like the EU to be in a close relationship with NATO 
(Appendix IV, question 5). 
5. The EU should develop capabilities that will allow it to dealwith crises 
independently of NATO 
1. Agree 8 
2. Mostly agree but also depends on the circumstances 6 
3. Mostly disagree but also depends on the circumstances 2 
4. Disagree 7 
5. Don't Know/Don't Answer 0 
The division over the 'pro-autonomy' and 'NATO-first' attitudes is also manifested at 
the political level in the European Parliament Subcommittee on Security and Defence 
(SEDE). Within the Subcommittee, MEPs are also divided over the extent of NATO 
cooperation and EU autonomy that the EU should develop (Interviews 39,40,44). 
Therefore, there is a strong political division that affects the development of strategic 
culture as well. Interviewees pointed to the fact that NATO-EU relations constitute a 
challenge to the development of an EU consolidated strategic culture. 
6.5. Structural Reasons for the Consolidation of the Strategic 
Culture of the EU in Bosnia Herzegovina 
This section deals with factors that have facilitated common understandings within the 
EU, thus making possible the emergence of a common strategic culture in the Bosnian 
case. Three main reasons were mentioned by officials as being important catalysts in 
bringing different European attitudes closer together. The first was the influential role 
of new ESDP institutions in the policy-making process. The second factor was the 
interaction between France, Germany and the UK (the so-called 'big three' group). This 
is a network which is influential in the prioritisation of BiH as the principal geographic 
location of ESDP missions. Finally, the third factor concerned the process of interaction. 
amongst ESDP officials which helped to consolidate common understandings regarding 
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the Bosnian crisis. In order to avoid duplication of arguments that were already studied 
in other parts of the thesis the chapter will only mention the importance of institutions 
and networks briefly. 
6.5.1. The Contribution of ESDP Institutions to the Making of an 
EU Strategic Culture 
Interviewees generally mentioned that ESDP institutions brought EU officials closer 
together by making them deal directly with Bosnian issues of security and by creating a 
genuine space of dialogue. Furthen-nore, as explained in Chapter Four, one can detect 
an 'esprit de corps' and a feeling of 'collectivity' in the answers of officials who have 
worked in institutions which deal with the more technical aspects of the Bosnian ESDP 
missions (e. g. the EUMS/EUMC). Furthen-nore, a scenario of competition amongst the 
two different missions involved in BiH as well as amongst all the ESDP institutions 
involved in the missions has not materialised so far. The smooth cooperation between 
different institutions also reflects the fact that there were common understandings on 
the nature of the Bosnian crisis as well as on the importance of civilian and military 
policy tools that had to be used in order to address Bosnian challenges (Interviews 39, 
40). Therefore, the strategic culture that was shaped due to the BiH experience has 
contributed to the fostering of a good level of cooperation amongst different ESDP 
institutions involved in the planning and administration of ESDP missions. - 
6.5.2. The Contribution of the'Big Three'Network 
Interview findings also demonstrate that networks are extremely important in 
promoting ESDP policy initiatives. The role of networks was examined extensively in 
Chapters Three and Four. This section, therefore, deals with them only briefly. 
Intervicwees mentioned that the network of the three biggest EU states (France, 
Germany and the UK) has been an important promoter of action in Bill but also in the 
wider area of the Western Balkans (Interviews 48,5 1). Furthermore, interviewees also 
claimed that the willingness amongst the big three EU states to intervene in Bosnia was 
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a catalyst to achieving a wider EU consensus regarding the importance of ESDP action 
in BiH (Interviews 37,48,5 1) 
A process of slow 'taking over' of Bosnian security by the 'Big Three' EU states is 
described by various interviewees (Interviews 43,46,47,55). This phenomenon is 
perceived as a gradual process as interviewees mention that during the early 1990s none 
of the EU states wanted to assume full responsibility for the future of Bosnia 
(Interviews 46,48). However, as mentioned in Chapter Three the 'big three' have been 
gradually reaching a consensus on assuming the security responsibility of BiH within 
the Contact Group. When ESDP structures were established a trilateral network similar 
to the one of the Contact Group was formed within the PSC. 
According to one official: 
"although in the beginning the big three were behaving as a 'directoire' it was evident 
that such a practice could not have worked in Bosnia as many nations had an interest in 
having their say" (Interview 46). 
Due to the establishment of ESDP institutions, the networking activities of the 'big 
three' EU states also became more transparent as the then other twelve EU states could 
see the outcomes of the 'big three' negotiations and actively participate in shaping 
them. As a result, these three countries had to integrate policy aspects which were of 
high concern to the other Member States and also had to communicate their Bosnian 
priorities in order to gain wider EU acceptance for their policy plans (Interviews 4,54, 
55). Furthermore, due to the intense network of communication with the other EU 
member states, the big three have been successful in promoting their ideas on the future 
of Bosnian operations especially on issues of practical implementation. This was due to 
their great expertise in out-of-area missions (Interviews 34,38). Therefore, one can 
claim that in technical and operational issues the big three have been influential in 
shaping common attitudes that crucially influence the development of an EU strategic 
culture. 
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6.5.3. Interaction Amongst ESDP officials 
Members of the second group of interviewees mentioned that interaction amongst 
ESDP officials during the implementation of the two ESDP missions had an impact on 
the shaping of common views vis-A-vis the Bosnian crisis. This is due to the fact that 
European troops and soldiers had to face common challenges and collaborate with each 
other in order to solve them. For instance, ESDP personnel have been required to act in 
a politically and ethnically fragmented environment. Troops and police from EU states 
have confronted common problems such as inter-ethnic animosity, the break up of 
governance structures, the territorial fragmentation of the Dayton Agreement as well as 
the lack of law and order (Interviews 54,55). The direct involvement of EU offlicials on 
the ground has had a unifying impact on the beliefs of EU officials regarding the 
implementation of the Bosnian missions because they had to assess the situation in BiH 
and reach common decisions. For instance, ESDP interviewees noted that it is a 
common view amongst ESDP officials that the importance of the imposition of law and 
order still remains an essential task of the EU forces in Bosnia (Interviews 33,34,49, 
54). Therefore, the practical implementation of the Bosnian missions acted as a positive 
factor in the strengthening of the strategic culture of the EU. 
The longevity of the Bosnian ESDP missions was seen as another important reason for 
the consolidation of cooperation and the establishment of common understandings. It 
was acknowledged that ESDP operations in BiH have had an empowering effect on the 
strategic culture of the EU because they have brought together different policy actors 
for long periods of time. This contrasts with ESDP missions of shorter duration 
conducted in other parts of the world (Interviews 54,55). The lengthy operations in 
BiH have empowered a pro-inteventionist strategic culture in the region for, according 
to one official, the spirit has changed from: 
"let's think and debate to lets plan and see it on the ground" (Interview 55). 
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Another positive aspect in the development of the strategic culture of the EU is the 
process of leaming that has taken place in BiH. For instance, officials noted that a 
process of learning is under way through berichmarking techniques and an ongoing 
exchange of views on what is best to do on the ground (Interviews 35,49,51,55). In 
this respect, the role of ESDP institutions as monitors of ESDP have been very 
influential as they have become the vehicles for lessons learrit from the BiH missions. 
Interaction of EU officials on the ground has also led to a number of changes in tactics, 
thus facilitating the copying of successful models by all participating countries. 
Therefore, the EU Bosnian experience has had a significant impact on the strategic 
culture of the EU due to the common learning experiences occurred. 
Officials interviewed claimed that monitoring is an important task because it leads to a 
common EU analysis of shortfalls and failures of implementation in ESDP missions in 
BiH. Policy amendments stemming from processes of learning have been manifest in 
decisions such as the creation of mobile inspector teams as well as the establishment of 
a Criminal Justice Interface Unit which was set up in order to maintain a link between 
the EUPM and the Bosnian authorities (Interview 38). EU participating countries in 
BiH have also agreed on a regular basis to employ border experts and fraud advisers in 
their operations (Interview 39). The creation of Civ/Mil Cell within the Council 
Secretariat is also perceived as the outcome of a lesson learned, one that stems from a 
perceived lack of clear communication between the civilian and military elements of 
ESDP (Interview 33). Finally, all ESDP practitioners interviewed, mentioned that one 
of the most important priorities of the ESDP Bosnian missions was the reaching of 
techniques that would ensure the inter-operability of different troop forces, thus paving 
the way for the emergence of common practices in troops deployment. 
6.6. Obstacles to the Development of a Consolidated Strategic 
Culture 
Although the two ESDP missions in BiH have encouraged the creation of common EU 
understandings in issues of security, all ofticials interviewed acknowledged the fact that 
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the strategic culture of the EU is still in transition and that it urgently rcquires 
consolidation. The issues that are analysed in this section constitute direct obstacles to 
the development of a consolidated strategic culture. 
6.6.1. Lack of Consensus on the Issue of EU-NATO Relations 
The Bosnian ESDP case study validates the point made in Chapter Six, namely, that the 
transatlantic relationship through NATO remains a thorny issue amongst the EU 
Europeans and that different Member States hold different priorities as on how far 
transatlantic security cooperation should develop (Interviews 39,40,54,55). -Although 
there is a general desire to collaborate with NATO, the importance of the NATO-ESDP 
relationship still varies in the minds of ESDP officials. The study of the Bosnian 
operations demonstrates the fact that the strategic culture of the EU is characterized by 
a thin consensus on how far cooperation with NATO should develop in the future. 
6.6.2. Lack of a Long-term Civilian Commitment 
The fact that the EU has put a police mission on the ground in Bosnia highlights the 
fact that there has been an emphasis on what some officials have described as 'civilian 
and human security' which confirms the view of the previous chapter that there is a 
civilian upgrading process within ESDP (Interviews 37,55). The civilian element of the 
ESDP was also reinforced by certain EU Member States (e. g. Sweden and Germany) 
which were cautious of the increasing militarization of the EU. The civilian side of 
ESDP now constitutes a vital element of ESDP agenda (Interviews 37,55). 
Furthermore, officials agreed on the fact that there is a common idea which is widely 
accepted by most capitals and ESDP officials: 
"the security sector cannot be refon-ned in small pieces but must be approached as a 
whole" (Interview 55). 
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The idea that military and civilian means are necessary in order to confront a crisis is 
the first step of convergence amongst the EU Europeans. 
However, the process of constructing a civilian aspect for ESDP is still an ongoing 
project. The EUPM has brought into the light the differing perceptions when it comes 
to prioritising civilian aspects of crisis management. Although not a single official 
disputes the necessity of having a strong civilian ESDP dimension, there is still no 
particular consensus on what an EU civilian identity within ESDP entails (Interviews 
with 33,37,42). On the question of where a civilian agenda lies for the EU, officials 
had limited answers. Some interviewees claimed that there has not been a detailed 
debate on the nature of the civilian crisis management that the EU should carry out 
(Interviews 38,39,48). Consequently, there is certain fuzziness on the issue. The 
definition of both civilian and military tasks is drafted according to each ESDP mission 
and by taking into account the particular interests and the limitations that Member 
States are facing with no clear long-term consensus on civilian issues. According to one 
official: 
"we have not yet developed an understanding on the needs required for effective 
civilian crisis management. Most of the work is on an experimental level" (Interview 
38). 
The lack of debate and dialogue on these issues adds another obstacle to the 
development of the strategic culture of the EU as: 
"ideas about security and lose policy concepts are difficult to be translated into practice 
and mean different things to different people" (Interview 48). 
6.6.3. The Impact of Intergovernmental ism 
The ongoing strength of intergovernmentalism and national sovereignty in ESDP also 
came up as important obstacles to the consolidation of an EU strategic culture. It was 
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commonly mentioned by officials that in regards to the Althea and the EUPM missions, 
the Member States were very cautious of any ESDP institutional moves that would 
weaken state control over the two operations (Interviews 33,35,37,54). Many officials 
stressed that the real problem in the forging of an EU strategic culture stcms from the 
predominance of national priorities as well as from the 'mentalities' and the 'habits' 
that have been entrenched in the national capitals of the member states. Therefore, 
different national strategic cultures are still predominant within the EU. According to 
one official: 
"in the field of operations there is no common language and one has to be constructed 
which is not always an easy task. However, due to the long time spent in Bosnia, both 
consensual language and practices have been invented for the two missions. But we 
cannot talk about a common European language in all EU strategic operations yet" 
(Interview 42). 
The Bosnian operations have fostered a considerable degree of cooperation and 
integration amongst participating nations (Interviews 42,54,55,56). However, 
according to EU officials, the existence of different national strategic cultures is also 
related to the fact that some troops and police forces are more flexible than others and 
have a wider degree of freedom. For instance, the British troops have a lot more 
flexibility on the ground as Generals can decide upon their own strategic plans and 
therefore their forces can be integrated more easily with other forces (Interview 37). 
However, this is not the case with many other countries which are still relying on 
detailed directions from the central Headquarters and their national capitals. 
Finally, two other examples from the Bosnian cases were given in order to demonstrate 
the point that the Member States are still cautious about ESDP. First, it is widely 
claimed that there is an unwillingness to share national resources for EU missions. For 
example, in the case of BiH, forensic experts were difficult to find because EU states 
were not willing to 'sacrifice' them on EU missions (Interviews 37,38,48). 
Furthermore, as the training and recruitment of EUPM/EUFOR officials is mostly 
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conducted through nation states' mechanisms it is difficult to consolidate a unified 
trend in procedures, guarantee flexible interoperability on the ground and propagate 
identical norms of operational behaviour. Therefore, the 'national ownership' of ESDP 
is also seen as an inhibition to the development of an EU strategic culture as EU 
missions cannot flourish without the necessary permanent capabilities and the common 
training procedures that would provide unified standards of strategic action. 
6.6.4. Unfinished Institutional isation 
The main conclusion of Chapter Four was that although institutions act as positive 
spaces of strategic consensus they are still relatively new and face various limitations. 
Interviews conducted with EU officials for this chapter confirmed this view. For 
instance, one of the main institutional problems that officials mentioned was that the 
lack of a permanent EU HQ is detrimental to the creation of an EU strategic culture as 
ESDP personnel still spend much of their time trying to negotiate strategies with many 
-different actors which are dispersed in the national headquarters of the EU states, the 
EU Headquarters in Sarajevo and the EU Cell in SHAPE (Interviews 42,54,55). 
Fragmentation of military institutions leads to a bureaucratisation of ESDP as most of 
the time officials only reach a lowest common denominator not necessarily because of 
national differences but because much time is spent talking and negotiating amongst 
different actors on various issues (Interviews 37,42,54,55). All officials directly 
involved in the implementation of ESDP Bosnian missions believed that if the EU 
Headquarters would become operational it would bring more cohesion to European 
views regarding strategic issues (Interviews 42,54,55). 
Interviewees also claimed that more interaction is necessary in order to bring together 
those institutions which deal with civilian agendas and those responsible for military 
issues. Although there is a commonly accepted wish to combine both civilian and 
military instruments further improvements are seen as necessary in coordination 
between EUFOR and the EU Police Mission. If actions between the two missions are 
not sufficiently combined an emergence of two different sub-cultures (civilian and 
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military) which will sometimes have conflicting priorities may be a possible scenario 
(Interviews 36,38,48). However, officials also added that this civilian/military 
coordination gap has been partially addressed in Bil-I as there has recently been a 
considerable effort to coordinate both missions fon-nally and informally (Interviews 37, 
54). In this sense, the experience in BiH points toward the future direction of ESDP by 
pushing the Europeans to coordinate their actions in both fields. In addition, the 
Bosnian learning process has contributed to an institutional alteration: the Civ/Mil 
caucus, which was established in 2005, was perceived by the interviewees as a positive 
development which gradually contributed to a deeper understanding and interaction of 
the civilian and military dimensions of the EU, thus leading to a consolidated strategic 
culture (Interviews 37,38,48,50,55). 
Finally, a severe problem in the creation of a consolidated strategic culture can also be 
traced within the wider institutional structures of the EU which not only affects the 
Bosnian missions but all ESDP missions. This issue has been already dealt in Chapter 
Four regarding the institutional isation of ESDP and will be only mentioned briefly here. 
Officials claimed that the complicated three pillar EU structure fragments policies, 
divides institutional practices and dilutes the ability to act in a united manner. For 
instance, it is claimed that as the first pillar deals mostly with economic cooperation, 
the second with foreign policy and the third with justice and home affairs issues, one 
can understand how difficult a united civilian approach is as civilian competencies are 
in between the three pillars (Interviews 35,36,37). It would be interesting to see 
whether the provisions of the Lisbon Treaty will manage to solve the structural issues 
that affect ESDP, thus contributing to the development of a consolidated strategic 
culture. 
6.7. Conclusions: Accessing the Strategic Culture of the EU 
through the Study of the Bosnian Operations 
The chapter has underlined the importance of the Bosnian ESDP operations in the 
development of an EU strategic culture. The strategic culture of the EU is premised on 
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the fact that the EU has agreed to assume responsibility for Bosnian security. It has 
done so for a mixture of reasons that are both humanitarian and geostrategic. The 
strategic culture of the EU consists of an agreement on the deployment of a mixed 
civil ian/mi I itary instruments, the use of military/police instruments in a cautious way, 
and the use of peacekeeping instruments within a framework of multilateral ism that 
includes relations with third countries and institutions such as NATO and the UN. 
The study of the development of the two Bosnian operations validates the findings of 
the previous chapters regarding the categorisation of EU strategic culture. In the case of 
the BiH operations, the strategic culture of the EU fits mostly with the intermediate 
type that was developed in Chapter Two. According to this type, increasingly dense 
networks of relationships amongst ESDP officials are influential in the development of 
common understandings in the field of security. A positive path dependency of 
cooperation has been consolidated through the deployment of military force in BiH 
which contributes to a spirit of exchange of views and practices on the issues of 
security. Furthermore, due to the development of extensive discussion of practices 
some countries have moved to a gradual transforination of their forces that in the long 
term may lead to the development of common rules and practices in the deployment of 
troops and police forces abroad. The development of trust, aid, respect and 
understanding are also evident. However, it is still early to talk about a common 
language in operations that is inspired by a common strategic culture. 
The findings also point out that the strategic culture of the EU belongs to the Cautious 
Interventionist Europe (CIE) type as described in Chapter Two. Officials mentioned 
that the Bosnian operations are the exceptions to the rule as the willingness to act and 
the resources committed to these missions are usually higher than the other ESDP 
missions. BiH missions are considered as medium/slow risk missions as the EU took 
over the BiH security burden when the stability of Bosnia was largely established. 
Furthermore, the UN mandate was important in legitimising these two missions, thus 
making it easier for the Member States to justify intervention. Although a consensus 
exists on the necessity of civilian instruments there is no thick consensus on how a 
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civilian agenda should develop. In addition, the difficulties stemming from an imperfect 
institutional isation of ESDP still pose a challenge to the development of a consolidated 
EU strategic culture. 
The strategic culture of the EU is limited by the fact that intergrovemmentalism is still 
very important and that Member States have still the upper hand on what the troops and 
police forces can do in BiH. Furthermore, coalitions of states such as the big three 
remain important in encouraging the development of the strategic culture of the EU. 
When it comes to the question of consensus on ideas regarding the use of police and 
military instruments, it can be argued that a thick consensus has been developed on the 
issue of Bosnian prioritisation, the importance of promoting an inclusive 
civilian/military strategy, the issue of multilateralism and the projection of 'i-nild' forms 
of force. Consensus is also evident on the geostrategic and humanitarian reasons that 
have led to Bosnian intervention. Nevertheless, when it comes to the question of 
NATO-EU relationship as well as to the importance of the UNSC mandate, differences 
amongst ESDP officials are still evident. Last but not least, the question of NATO-EU 
relations has been one of the most detrimental factors in the development of a 
consolidated strategic culture. This is due to the fact that national divisions on the 
question of the EU-NATO relationship remain unresolved. 
198 
Chapter Seven 
Conclusion: A Research Agenda for the Strategic Culture of the 
EU 
7.1. Major Findings of the Thesis: The Gradual Development of 
an EU Strategic Culture 
The thesis conducted a survey on ideas, beliefs, values and practices on the deployment 
of police and military instruments. Chapter One justified the main choices of the thesis 
and claimed that due to the particular state of the EU a study on the strategic culture of 
the EU needs to take into account the historic background of ESDP, the role of 
institutions and networks as well as the views of ESDP officials on the deployment of 
police and military instruments. This section summarises the main findings of the thesis 
and reflects on the term of strategic culture. The chapter ends with an update of the 
major policy developments at the EU level which are included in the Lisbon Treaty as 
well as with some policy recommendations. 
The thesis claimed that the Western Balkan crises of the 1990s provided an opportunity 
for various elements of strategic culture to appear. However, at this period, the EU only 
possessed a primary strategic culture. The primary strategic culture of the EU stemmed 
from a mutual security threat which emerged from the instability of the Western 
Balkans. This threat led to the idea that security cooperation amongst EU states can be 
mutually beneficial. The positive transactions that subsequently took place amongst 
various EU policy makers led to the first steps of security integration. As a result of 
increasing cooperation, new networks (for instance, within the Contact Group) emerged 
that have been influential in the shaping of ideas which make up the strategic culture of 
the EU. However, the thesis claimed that this process of cooperation amongst EU elites 
has taken a long time to materialise as officials from different states had different views 
on issues of security. Policy bargaining was part of this period as the big three had to 
negotiate continuously in order to reach an agreement that would allow the EU to 
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become a security player. The process of cooperation was slow and only in the second 
half of the decade of the 1990s did more extensive patterns of cooperation occur. 
The chapter also claimed that the EU Member States have gradually accepted the utility 
and legitimacy of military instruments as policy tools due to the Bosnian/Kosovo crisis. 
One main theme from this study points to the fact that NATO remained an important 
organisation for EU Member States who were members of it. However, in the 1990s, 
willingness emerged on behalf of the Europeans to provide an EU structure for security 
provision especially when priorities between NATO and the EU diverge. It was also 
claimed that Europeans do not wish to be cut off from NATO and neither can they 
conduct all military operations on their own as they lack the necessary military 
infrastructure. However, the policy stimulus has gradually shifted from NATO 
domination towards shared EU/NATO initiatives. 
The thesis claimed that the strategic culture of the EU today fits with the type the 
intermediate strategic culture. According to this type, the strategic culture of the EU is 
characterised by increasingly dense networks of relations as well as the existence of 
personal relations of cooperation. The development of trust, aid, respect and 
understanding has also taken place within ESDP institutions and networks. As the EU 
possesses an intermediate strategic culture, policy coordination and harmonization of 
national policies does take place but the pace of change is slow due to the 
predominance of national priorities. However, it should be also mentioned that there 
has been considerable progress from the primary strategic culture that characterised the 
EU in the 1990s. Therefore, it can be argued that both ESDP institutions and networks 
have contributed positively to the development of ESDP. In general, ESDP institutions 
have been characterised by a lack of big internal debates. They have managed to 
consolidate themselves as important shapers of the EU strategic culture. Furthen-nore, 
the thesis concluded that the French-British-German network is very influential. Other 
networks that influence the strategic culture of the EU is the network of the neutral 
countries as well as the network that consists of Greece, Cyprus and Malta. 
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Special attention in the thesis was paid to the Political and Security Committee (PSC) 
which was officially characterised as the 'linchpin of ESDP'. Indeed, the thesis 
validated the importance of the PSC on the development of the EU strategic culture. 
The PSC has been seen as an influential institution because it binds officials together in 
a pattern of continuous interaction and collaboration, thus contributing to the 
development of common ideas in the field of security. The high levels of trust and 
confidentiality within the PSC are influential in the development of an EU strategic 
culture as they encourage in-depth discussions in the field of security and encourage 
common understandings. Nevertheless, opportunities of cooperation have been also lost 
due to national sensitivities stemming from EU capitals. 
Chapter Four also considered the work carried out by the European Union Military 
Committee (EUMC), the European Union Military Staff (EUMS) and the Committee of 
Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management (CIVCOM) who are influential in the 
development of an EU strategic culture. These institutions are important because they 
work on the technical aspects of the ESDP, thus producing a strategic culture in a 
'bottom-up' manner. The above mentioned institutions have managed to work on the 
technical details and rules of deployment of the ESDP police and military forces. 
Through the development of training sessions and the elaboration of strategies that are 
developed within these institutions, new rules become part of the EU 'acquis' in the 
field of security. However, they still face the cautiousness of the national capitals. 
The thesis concluded that the strategic culture of the EU is in a process of transition as 
ESDP remains a policy of limitations. The still early state of ESDP has an important 
impact on the strategic culture of the EU because consensus within the PSC is many 
times constructed on an ad hoc basis and depends on the mission under discussion. 
Thus, more time is necessary for common understandings to emerge amongst the 
Europeans in the field of security. The success of ESDP so far has helped to consolidate 
the view amongst PSC officials that the EU is a security player. Policy initiatives 
spread from previous ESDP missions and new strategic plans are generated due to the 
ongoing ESDP missions. This has led to the development of a 'can do' attitude amongst 
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ESDP officials that contributes to a pro-active mentality in issues of security. However, 
different strands of opinions emerge on national security priorities. One of these 
differences is manifested in the way EU Member States invest in ESDP. For instance, 
the priority of investing in defence territory against a particular enemy is still very 
strong in certain EU countries (e. g. Greece, Poland, and Cyprus) and poses a challenge 
to the development of an EU strategic culture which mostly develops in the field of 
external security missions. 
The study of the geographic remit of ESDP is also of interest as it points to the 
existence of different national priorities. As answers from officials suggest, the trauma 
of the Western Balkans had a positive impact on pushing the Europeans to work 
together in issues of Balkan security. However, as both Chapters Five and Six claim, it 
is difficult to trace a similar mixture of pragmatic and humanitarian motivations for 
other parts of the world. Many officials suggest that Africa is the next most important 
spot for ESDP action. However, because of the different historic and colonial 
experiences of the EU member states in this continent, it is still difficult to talk about a 
common ESDP strategic culture in Africa. European ambitions in Africa are limited by 
the large scale of the crisis as the fear of bodybags haunts the minds of many EU 
officials. Another important internal EU division also emerges between the countries 
that have the capabilities to act globally and have been active in out-of-area affairs and 
those that do not. Therefore, when it comes to dealing with areas which are far from the 
Balkans, reaching a consensus is a difficult process. 
An issue of complication for the strategic culture of the EU is the question of the UN 
Security Council mandate which some Member States see as an important prerequisite 
in order to assume a security mission. East European countries regard it as less 
significant. There are still also certain countries which have particular parliamentary, 
legal and political problems when it comes to endorsing a security mission without a 
Security Council authorisation (e. g. Finland, Cyprus, Sweden, Hungary). However, in 
general, it can be claimed that the importance of the UN SC resolution is losing ground 
amongst various EU countries as a point of strategic reference. Escalating humanitarian 
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crises, the need to act quickly and the pressures stemming from various political leaders 
to assume responsibility in certain crises are all reasons that may lead to a by-passing of 
the Security Council in the future. However, it must be also stressed that for the time 
being all ESDP missions have been justified by UNSCRs and there are strong 
incentives to continue to do so in order to avoid various political and legal difficulties. 
The thesis claimed that the strategic culture of the EU is one which is based on 
multilateral ism. ESDP multilateralism has been manifested in strategic cooperation 
between the EU and other organisations such as the UN and NATO but also with the 
inclusion of other non EU countries in ESDP missions. However, PSC officials also 
mentioned that cooperation with third parties differs from one actor to the other and so 
does the appreciation of the Europeans when it comes to collaborating with various 
external actors. Therefore, a form of 'varied multilateralism' characterises the strategic 
culture of the EU. 
A similar complicated image emerges when it comes to the importance of NATO in the 
strategic culture of the EU. It was claimed that there is a basic consensus amongst 
ESDP officials that NATO still has an important role to play in issues of security and 
defence and that a degree of cooperation must be sought with it. Furthen-nore, the 
limited resources of ESDP and the unwillingness of EU Member States to invest more 
in new capabilities also contributes to the maintenance of EU-NATO cooperation in 
issues where NATO wants to get involved. Disagreements amongst PSC officials exist 
regarding the depth of EU-NATO cooperation as well as the degree of autonomy that 
the ESDP ought to possess. However, the idea that in certain cases, an ESDP mission 
can only happen under an EU flag is slowly consolidating in the minds of PSC officials. 
The American unilateralism of the Bush administration has also encouraged this 
particular thinking. However, on the question of defence, the responses point to the fact 
that it is still too early for the ESDP to assume such responsibility. For most EU 
Member States the question of defence is related to the primacy of NATO or to the idea 
of national sovereignty. For these particular reasons it would be difficult for the EU to 
expand its remit on such a sensitive issue, thus the strategic culture of the EU will 
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continue to develop in the field of out-of-border missions. Therefore, the Petersberg 
Tasks will, for the time being, define the strategic rernit of ESDP. 
The importance of security dialogue also forms part of the strategic culture of the EU. 
Nevertheless, interviewees also mentioned that sometimes too much time is wasted on 
talking without assuming action. They also claimed that it is highly unlikely that ESDP 
action will take place in support of a clearly defined EU material interest as for the time 
being the interviewees could not identify commonly accepted material interests upon 
which EU member states could reach unanimity. However, stability can be also seen as 
an EU interest per se. In addition, some ESDP officials did not reject the possibility that 
in the future, ESDP may be used for economic purposes whereas they also mentioned 
the fact that ESDP missions provide geopolitical security and that this can be also seen 
as an EU interest per se. Therefore, ESDP is a policy of flexibility and relies very much 
upon the political will of the EU Member States. 
The thesis claimed that the impact of ESDP on national policies has been limited. 
ESDP enriched national policies rather than altered them and reinforced already 
existing trends of change. National policy changes stemming from ESDP can be mostly 
located at the level of micro-developments in technical and operational practices. In 
addition, for some countries, EU contributions in Africa and other parts of the world are 
seen as innovative items for their national policies. Civilian crisis management is 
another element that has been added to the agenda of various EU Member States due to 
pressures stemming from ESDP. 
Finally, the thesis provided a case study on the ESDP Bosnian missions in order to see 
which beliefs and practices are influential in the development of the EU strategic 
operations. The chapter concluded that there is considerable convergence of views 
between PSC officials and the second sample of EU officials. Therefore, the 
coordinative discourse of the two groups coincides in many ways and demonstrates that 
there is continuity of ideas regarding the EU use of force. 
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7.2. Current Developments: The Impact of the Lisbon Treaty on 
the Strategic Culture of the EU 
Will the implementation of the Treaty strengthen the strategic culture of the EU? The 
Lisbon Treaty does not refer extensively to ESDP. However, it remodels the CFSP 
framework which may also affect the development of ESDP. For instance, The Lisbon 
Treaty envisages a new role for the High RepresentativeNice President of the 
Commission who will be appointed by the Council and will replace the Presidency as 
the main CFSP player. In this way, the High Representative will have an influential role 
of coordination and implementation of CFSP. The High Representative will chair the 
new Foreign Affairs Council and will nominate the chair of the PSC as well as tasking 
the PSC with work. In theory, the relationship between the PSC and the High 
Representative may be strengthened if cooperation amongst the two actors will be 
followed. In addition, the High Representative will be assisted by the External Action 
Service (EEAS) whereas the European Commission delegations in third countries will 
be placed under his/her authority. All these changes may bring more cohesion to the 
external action of the EU and consequently may also have a positive spill-over effect in 
the development of ESDP. The High RepresentativeNice President of the Commission 
will have new powers but will need still to be in close contact with the President of the 
Council. A similar interaction in the past (The Patten/Solana relationship) demonstrates 
that such an approach can function. Nevertheless, the personal chemistry of the two 
persons that will fill the two new posts will be of high'importance. Whether a strong 
personal relationship will reinforce the strategic culture of the EU still remains to be 
seen. 
The provisions of the Lisbon Treaty on the Permanent Structured Cooperation 
(PSCoop) will institutionalise what already was happening through networking. It will 
enable countries which are willing to move further in issues of security to implement 
joint initiatives in issues of capabilities. However, the details of PSCoop are still 
unknown and at the current stage, the PSCoop proposal is still vague. Many scenarios 
follow from this ambivalent position on the functioning of the PSCoop. In Brussels 
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there are those who fear that the PSCoop may lead to a potential duplication of NATO 
capabilities as the pro-EU autonomy group of states may start a round of collaboration. 
This may still contribute to division between pro-NATO and pro-EU states, thus 
making it difficult for the strategic culture of the EU to reach a consensus on tile 
transatlantic relationship. Furthermore, such a legal initiative may serve to consolidate 
the trend between ESDP-enthusiasts and ESDP-laggards, as the first will be able to 
caucus and move on with their projects whereas the others will continue to rernain 
passive. On the other hand, according to the most positive scenario, PSCoop may lead 
to clearer division of labour within the EU of who does what and can also exercise 
pressures on those countries which are staying behind so that they should join the 
PSCoop groups. However, PSCoop is about capabilities, not about operations. If 
Member States have not managed so far to close the capabilities gap what guarantee is 
there to demonstrate that PSCoop will be effective? 
Other Lisbon Treaty provisions provide room for moderate optimism but will have to 
be tested in practice. Although unanimity remains the rule, the Council can use QMV in 
cases when 4 proposal will be presented by the High Representative. There is also a 
provision which allows the Council to adopt a unanimous decision for the extension of 
areas which are now covered by majority voting. Only time will tell if the area of 
security will be one of them. Furthermore, the Treaty states that Mernber States can 
seek a common approach on matters on foreign and security policy which are to be 
pursued by member states through their representation in third countries and 
international organisations. Whether these provisions constitute an empowering 
instrument for the foreign policy of the EU or a simple spin still remains to be seen. 
Unfortunately, there is no guarantee that all these measures will contribute to the 
development of a more dynamic strategic culture although they may contribute to the 
amelioration of EU actorness in foreign affairs. 
An interesting point when it comes to ESDP is related to the extension of the Petersberg 
Tasks which, according to the Lisbon Treaty, cover the following: 
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"joint disannament operations, humanitarian and rescue tasks, military advice and 
assistance tasks, conflict prevention and peace-keeping tasks, tasks of combat forces in 
crisis management, including peace-making and post-conflict stabilisation. All these 
tasks may contribute to the fight against terrorism, including by supporting third 
countries in combating terrorism in their territories. " 
The addition to the previous concept on the Petersberg Tasks has to do with the issue of 
combating terrorism. However, the study on the strategic culture of the EU so far 
claimed that the issue of terrorism has not figured prominently in the minds of ESDP 
officials. It will be interesting to see whether the idea of combating terrorism through 
the Petersberg Tasks remains a paper tiger or whether it stems from a real re-evaluation 
of the security needs of the EU. 
Furthermore, constructive abstention remains in the Lisbon Treaty text. However, the 
blocking majority of one third of member states needs to comprise at least one third of 
the population of the EU. The text also recognises the existence of the EDA and states 
that membership of the EDA is optional. The Treaty though does not lead to a major 
upgrade of the EDA neither does it provide a breakthrough on the issue of capabilities 
modernisation which is much needed so that the EU can possess an effective ESDP. 
Instead, it simply mentions the recognition of the 'fait accompli' of the EDA 
establishment. One of the negative aspects of the new institutionalisation is that the 
Lisbon Treaty has not managed to solve the problem of fragmentation of civilian crisis 
management. CCM continues to lie in between different policies and pillars, thus 
continuing the current fragmentation of initiatives and making it difficult for the EU to 
reach a consolidated strategic culture in issues related to CCM. In this respect, the 
Lisbon Treaty remains inconclusive and vague. It tries to address the problem of 
fragmentation through the development of the post of High Representative but does not 
deal with the wider institutional dimension that poses problems to ESDP. 
In conclusion, the Lisbon Treaty can be seen as another example of the ambivalent 
spirit that characterises the minds of Europeans when it comes to the field of foreign 
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affairs and security. On the one hand, there is a wish to provide the EU with more 
instruments in order to become an effective policy player. If owever, on the other hand, 
there is considerable caution and even fear of giving too much power to the EU through 
new institutionalisation. This contradictory situation is detrimental to the establishment 
of a consolidated strategic culture as it does not allow for the development of clear-cut 
structures that can facilitate the development of common understandings. Within the 
Lisbon Treaty there is not a major breakthrough that can lead to major developments in 
the field of security but rather small and inconclusive measures that fail to address 
current policy challenges. In addition, the Treaty leaves space for further 
bureaucratisation and complexity and does very little to bridge the divisions of 
mentalities amongst different national traditions in foreign affairs. 
7.3. Towards a Consolidated Strategic Culture? An EU Agenda 
for the Future 
Although considerable progress has been achieved in the development of an 
inten, nediate strategic culture, the EU now has to make brave steps in order to acquire a 
consolidated strategic culture. For instance, the study demonstrated that structures with 
a clear mandate and strong structures such as the PSC can have a positive development 
in the strategic culture of the EU whereas other 'weaker' institutions cannot play such 
a role effectively. Therefore, a major upgrade of the functions and resources of the 
EUMC, EUMS and CIVCOM is necessary. An EU permanent Operational Headquarter 
based in Brussels is necessary so that more effective policy-making can be achieved. 
Furthermore, a stronger relationship between the ESDP institutions and the national 
capitals will also contribute to the effective implementation of the 'acquis' of security. 
Nevertheless, structures alone will not solve the problems of the gap of ideas amongst 
the different EU Member States. More discussion, interaction and common initiatives 
are necessary so that the EU can assume a consolidated strategic culture. Longer and 
bigger ESDP missions that resemble the Bosnian ones are more likely to bring common 
understandings in the field of security. However, political will is necessary in order for 
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such a development to take place. Whether such political will exists is the big question. 
In this respect, a new generation of ambitious policy-makers that will rcnder security a 
truly EU priority may contribute to the development of a consolidated strategic culture 
through the implementation of a more active ESDP agenda. 
A comprehensive discussion on the utility of ESDP must take place at the national 
level. This will contribute to sorting out the paradoxical situation where various 
Member States have ministries (e. g. Defence, Foreign Affairs, Interior) which hold 
different views of how ESDP should be developed. This should take place along a pan- 
European dialogue in order to provide clear guidelines on the priorities of ESDP. 
Finally, the EU can only reach a consolidated strategic culture if EU member will agree 
to address divisive political issues. EU Member States will have to gradually harmonise 
their geographic priorities, find a consensus on the importance of the UNSC mandate 
and reach an agreement on the ESDP-NATO dimension. They will also have to address 
the issue of underinvestment in civilian and military capabilities and find new ways of 
synergy and cooperation amongst themselves. 
7.4. Weaknesses of the concept of strategic culture. A research 
agenda for the future 
The thesis concerned itself with the beliefs, ideas and values held by Brussels-based 
ESDP officials when it comes to the deployment of the police and military elements of 
the EU. This exercise was undertaken in order to define what the main elements of the 
strategic culture of the EU are. In Chapter One of the thesis it was claimed that various 
limitations have been encountered during the conduct of research. This Chapter 
underlined the main challenges of the concept of strategic culture. These challenges 
constitute a research agenda for scholars who would be interested in elaborating the 
concept of strategic culture of the EU even further. 
As the introduction of the thesis claimed, the research focused on the ideas, beliefs, 
values and practices which are manifested amongst Brussels-based policy officials in 
Brussels based institutions. However, it did not deny the fact that ESDP is an 
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intergovernmental policy in which member states have the upper hand. It stated that 
due to research limitations, the views stemming from all the member states cannot be 
covered in detail as it is impossible to include the views of 27 national ministries into a 
Phl). However, such experiment can be a future task for researchers of strategic culture. 
In particular, more work needs to be conducted on the national ministries and on how 
EU states perceive ESDP. For instance, a future study on strategic culture will have to 
research to what degree national ministries in all EU mernber states harmonise ideas, 
beliefs, values and practices which are related to the use of force. In addition, 
interesting case studies can be provided on the extent to which the 'acquis securitaire' 
of the EU Brussels-based officials is adopted by nationally based elites of the twenty- 
seven member states. In this respect, the thesis has already made a first contribution as 
it underlined the main problems stemming from the relationship between supranational 
and national institutions. However, the task of covering the strategic cultures of the 
twenty seven member states is beyond the capabilities of one researcher and requires 
contributions from groups of researchers in order to cover successfully the ii-flpact of 
ESDP developments on the security and defence policies of all the EU member states. 
Furthennore, such study would require a cross fertilization between the concept of 
strategic culture and the various theories of Europeanisation that have so far been 
adopted in the field of European studies. 
In addition, further work needs to be conducted on the notion of strategic culture and its 
methodology. As mentioned in Chapter One strategic culture scholars have 
considerable freedom in choosing the methods that underpin their studies of strategic 
culture. Although this methodological freedom has contributed to considerable 
creativity it may also encourage various skeptical researchers to accuse strategic culture 
scholars of lax methodology and a lack of theoretical focus. Work needs to be 
conducted on the methods that underpin the concept of strategic culture in order to 
achieve methodological consistency and accuracy. Such methodological elaboration 
would consolidate the notion of strategic culture and would consequently facilitate the 
successful conduct of further studies on the strategic culture of the EU. A discussion on 
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methods and theory that underpinned the thesis is included in Appendix One. Some 
examples of possible theoretical and methodological elaboration are mentioned below. 
First of all, discussion needs to take place amongst scholars oil where strategic culture 
stands vis-A-vis theories of IR. In their work both Howorth (2007) and Meyer (2006) 
have included the notion of strategic culture amongst the family of social 
constructivism. However, further elaboration and clarification is required in order to 
clarify the common grounds that strategic culture shares with social constructivism. 
This would facilitate the study of strategic culture and would consolidate its 
contribution in the field of IR. Appendix I is one attempt to provide such a link. 
However, the focus of the thesis is not upon the theoretical dimension of strategic 
culture and therefore more work needs to be conducted by scholars who are dealing 
with IR theories. 
Another possible exploration for future research may include elements of discourse. 
This was also out of the remit of the thesis which did not deal with discourse analysis. 
So far the studies of strategic culture have not provided a comprehensive link between 
strategic culture and discourse. However, various strategic culture studies use elements 
of discourse without engaging in a deep exploration of what discourse is, its meanings, 
implication and influence. Some questions for further elaboration may include the 
following: is discourse a tool of empowen-nent for policy officials who deal with issues 
of security? Can discourse lead to the development of strategic culture? Is there a 
public discourse aimed at propagating values and promoting policies alongside a more 
'private' discourse amongst ESDP officials? To what degree ESDP declarations reflect 
the real values of ESDP? 
In order to grasp the subtle elements of the strategic culture of the EU, extensive 
ethnographic work needs to be conducted within the major ESDP institutions that the 
thesis named previously. Furthermore, such an exercise needs to cover a wide period of 
time in order to reach safe conclusions. This can be done through continuous direct 
observation of the meetings of ESDP officials in the ESDP institutions that the thesis 
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already mentioned. An observation of ESDP institutions will contribute to the drafting 
of the security consensus that is achieved amongst ESDP officials. It will provide 
valuable information on the language of policy elites and the quality of consensus that 
is achieved amongst them. Once more, this task cannot be conducted by a single 
scholar and requires extensive work from a group of researchers as more that one ESDP 
institutions need to be covered. Indeed, groups of researchers are required in order to 
deal with most of the challenges to the study of strategic culture. However, the issue of 
access to the meetings of various ESDP institutions is a problem that renders the study 
of the strategic culture of the EU even more difficult. Furthermore, it would be 
interesting to study the influence of norms propagated by various influential institutions 
such as NATO on the EU. Furthermore, the pool of case studies on the EU member 
states requires enrichment. It is surprising that there are already a number of studies on 
particular countries (e. g. Germany, the UK, France) while other European countries 
have not been covered extensively or have been fully ignored (e. g. most Mediterranean 
and Eastern European countries). 
Additional links need to be made between strategic thought and action. In this respect 
the concept of strategic culture will benefit from an input from studies on political 
psychology (such as the work by Cottam 2004, Jost and Sidanius 2004). By using 
political psychology methods strategic culture scholar can demonstrate more efficiently 
how thinking affects action. The thesis tried to address this challenge through the 
inclusion of a case study on Bosnia Herzegovina. Unfortunately, due to time and 
resources restrictions it was difficult to cover the views of BiH based EU officials who 
were currently working in ESDP missions. Future case studies on the strategic culture 
of the EU need to cover the views of practitioners who are residents in the field of EU 
operations. This exercise needs to be undertaken in order to see how experiences on the 
ground affect the beliefs of the Brussels based EU officials and whether there is a 
'learning' experience that affects the strategic culture of the EU. A comprehensive 
study on strategic culture may include more than one case study which would provide 
details on how Europeans perceive the use of force in various parts of the world and 
how they react to challenges that stem from the ground deployment of troops and police 
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officials. Once more, it was difficult for the thesis to address this challenge due to time 
and resource limits. 
Finally, further contributions are needed in order to cover a more detail thernatology 
regarding the use of force. Specialists with particular knowledge on an-narnents and 
procurement need to be brought together in order to discuss how different EU countries 
use different armaments and how they deal with new technological updates. 
Furthermore, as Howorth (2008) claims, strategic culture scholars need to broaden their 
research by including other elements which are not related directly to issues of police 
and military deployment but are directly linked to the notion of security. Such issues 
are: the response to terrorism, the question of nuclear deterrence and the management 
of weapon systems (Howorth 2008: 192-199). 
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Appendices 
Appendix 1. Methodological/theoretical Statement 
INTRODUCTION 
The study of European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) has been dominated by 
IRJEuropean Studies theories that have largely neglected the role of ideas, beliefs, 
values and practices regarding the use of police and military instruments. The thesis 
addresses this gap by studying those ideas, beliefs, values and practices which form the 
strategic culture of the EU. It builds upon studies of the strategic culture of states 
(Snyder 1977, Klein 1990, Longhurst 2000) and international organizations (Risse- 
Kappen 1996) including the limited number of studies on the strategic culture of the EU 
(Cornish and Edwards 2001, Rynning 2003, Hadfield 2004). These works are relevant 
to the present study insofar as they deal with ideas, beliefs and values regarding the use 
of force through the deployment of military and police instruments. 
Strategic culture is a concept as according to Berg (2007: 20) a concept: "may 
communicate ideas or introduce particular perspectives, it may be a means for casting a 
broad generalization. In terms of ideas, concepts are important because they are the 
foundation of communication and thought". Chapter One provided a definition of the 
concept of strategic culture and outlined the variables that the thesis takes into account. 
As various international organizations are considered to possess their own strategic 
culture, the thesis claimed that there is a possibility that the EU also possesses its own. 
This Appendix explains why the notion of strategic culture can be categorized as a 
concept that is related to social constructivism according to which: "the world is 
socially constructed" (Marsh and Furlong 2002: 19). The Appendix alsojustifies the 
methods that have been used in the thesis. 
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THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
According to McQueen and Knussen (2002: 5): "theory is simply a general set of 
beliefs about the way the universe, or a part of it, operates - often, in fact, those very 
intuitions, rule of thumb heuristics and general beliefs [ ... ]". According to Fierke 
(2007: 168) social constructivists have sought to explain change at the international 
level by emphasizing the social dimensions of international relations such as rules, 
norms and ideas. Although the system of security and defence may consist of weapons 
and armed forces according to a social constructivist view (Jackson 2007: 165): "it is 
secondary to the intellectual element which infuses it with meaning, plans it, organizes 
it and guides it". Strategic culture is a concept that is directly linked to social 
constructivism as it studies the importance of ideas, beliefs and practices on the use of 
force though the deployment of police and military instruments. 
In the case of the strategic culture of the EU, the thesis put the emphasis on the social 
construction of reality: it subscribes to the view that: "the social world is a world of 
human consciousness: of thoughts and beliefs, of ideas and concepts, of languages and 
discourses, of signs, signals and understandings among human beings, especially 
groups of human beings, such as states and nations" (Jackson 2007: 165). The world 
does not exist independently of the thoughts and ideas that are held by ESDP Brussels 
based officials. Therefore, the thesis agreed with the major social constructivist claim 
that: "social structures are defined, in part, by shared understandings, expectation, or 
knowledge" (Wendt 1992: 73). The most important focus is the 'social' one. For this 
reason the study covered the role of beliefs and ideas that constitute such social reality 
in ESDP. This orientation is in accordance with the lines of social constructivism as 
according to Jackson (2007: 162): "the study of international relations must focus on 
the ideas and beliefs that infon-n the actors on the international scene as well as the 
shared understandings between them". 
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The thesis did not neglect the fact that material interests exists. flowevcr, these are 
mediated by ideational forces. According to Tannenwald (2005: 19): "ideas are mental 
constructs held by individuals, sets of distinctive beliefs, principles and attitudes that 
provide broad orientations for behaviour and policy" and consequently, are vital for 
defining interests. Therefore, the thesis aligned with the claim that: "social realities are 
as influential as material realities in detennining behaviour. Indeed, they are what 
endow material realities with meaning and purpose" (Finnemore 1996: 128). Material 
interests do not emerge in a social vacuum. They are influenced by a set of collective 
ideas that influence the individual. Social interaction influences interest fon-flation and 
subsequently behaviour. Furthermore, another social constructivist scholar, Wendt 
(1992: 3 94), prioritized the study of interaction amongst policy makers as it creates 
identities and interests. For this reason the focus of the thesis was on the exploration of 
social rules (which in the thesis are categorized as behavioural and structural elements 
of behaviour). These structural and behavioural elements were covered in Chapters Two 
and Four of the thesis. 
In Chapter One the strategic culture of the EU was defined as: 
the ideas, beliefs, values and practices of Brussels based ESDP officials regarding the 
current and potential use of force though the deployment of police and military 
instruments. These ideas, beliefs, values and practices are manifested in the way ESDP 
Brussels-based officials think about the deployment of the military and police resources 
of the EU as well as in the way they plan missions of the European Security and 
Defence Policy (ESDP). The strategic culture of the EU is also characterised by various 
structural and behavioural elements which are manifested through the interaction of 
ESDP officials in institutions and networks. Elements of strategic culture are also 
developed through the historic evolution of the European security debate. 
The primary goal of the thesis has been to contribute to a better understanding of the 
ideas, beliefs, practices and values of Brussels based ESDP ofticials that underpin 
ESDP. For this reason, the thesis has included the views of ESDP Brussels based 
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officials as a case study in order to outline the strategic culture of the EU. It traced the 
development of the security debate within the EU since 1989 and has shown how 
institutions (and networks therein) brought to life a primary EU strategic culture which 
culminated in the development of ESDP. As ESDP is directly linked to the deployment 
of police and military instruments, the thesis focused on the development of this 
particular EU policy through its deployed missions and its extensive institutional isation. 
It traced the debate on intervention in the Western Balkans in order to identify specific 
ideas related to the use of military/police force. The thesis followed a deductive 
approach (Bryman 2008). Inspired by the concept of strategic culture, provided a 
hypothesis by stating that it is possible for the EU to possess its own strategic culture. It 
then moved on with the data collection and analysed the findings. The findings led to 
the fact that the EU possesses an EU strategic culture. 
Chapter One claimed that the concept of strategic culture is influenced by the way 
historic incidents have shaped institutional approaches to the use of force. This claim 
was further developed in Chapter Four. The thesis covered the European debate on the 
use of force since the end of Cold War (1989) up to December 2007. The thesis 
concluded that the Bosnian and Kosovan crises have acted as critical junctures 
influencing European views on the use of force and thus shaping the strategic culture in 
a particular way. As BiH has been at the centre of security discussions amongst the 
Europeans since the early 1990s, the thesis dedicated the last chapter of the thesis to the 
study of ESDP operations in that country. Chapter One justified the independent 
variables that are taken into account in the study of the EU through an extensive 
analysis of the secondary literature on the concept of strategic culture. 
Furthermore, one should take into account that strategic culture is not a theoretical 
concept as such; rather it is a conceptual framework for analyzing the position a 
particular group of actors hold toward utilizing instruments of force. Consequently, it is 
important to examine how a strategic culture is manifest in practice; in the EU case 
through the deployment of ESDP missions. The chapter on the longest running ESDP 
police and military missions in BiH thus formed an important part of the thesis. As it 
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was claimed in Chapter Six, this chapter was not intended as a comprehensive case 
study of the two ESDP missions deployed in Bill but rather as an examination of how 
the attitudes of Brussels-based officials have impacted upon the implementation of 
ESDP activities in this country. 
Another important aspect of the thesis was the study of ESDP institutions and 
networks. According to March and Olsen (1989: 17), institutions influence the 
behaviour of actors by shaping their: "values, norms, interests, identities and beliefs". 
The thesis explores the degree to which ESDP institutions determine 'appropriate 
behaviour' within a given institutional setting (March and Olsen 1989: 17). It focused 
on the influence of Brussels-based ESDP institutions (through the establishment of 
various structural and behavioural elements) in the development of the strategic culture 
of the EU. The thesis explored these structural and behavioural elements in Chapter 
Two with an attempt to find the rules that keep the security community of the EU 
together. Many scholars claim that the EU is a security community with its own 
characteristics (Williams 2001: 525, Rumelili 2003: 213, Waever 1998: 69). Being such 
community, the EU carries its own values which have an impact on the way it uses its 
military and police instruments, and consequently, on the way it develops its strategic 
culture. It claimed that the principal institution of note in this regard is the Political and 
Security Committee (PSC) but also of note are the European Union Military Committee 
(EUMC), the European Union Military Staff (EUMS) and the Committee on the 
Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management (CIVCOM). 
Due to a lack of formal institutionalization in the 1990s, EU strategic culture developed 
within policy networks rather than EU structures as such. In this respect it is argued that 
the certain networks that were developed during the 1990s continued their functioning 
within ESDP institutions (Chapters Three and Four). The thesis adopted the ten-n 
'policy networks' in order to define a group of ESDP officials who work together and 
share common ideas on issues of security. The thesis has avoided other terms such as 
discourse coalitions (Hajer 1993). This was because propagating a 'public' discourse in 
order to convince the public about the utility of a particular policy was not the aim of 
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the thesis. Furthermore, the thesis used the tenn 'policy network' as the emphasis is on 
networking practices which the thesis claimed that they constitute a working reality 
amongst ESDP officials. However, the thesis did not aim to study the process of 
network negotiation and bargaining itself. Rather, it has sought to explain the impact of 
policy networks on the strategic culture of the EU. Furthermore, the thesis adopted the 
term 'policy networks' as it claimed that the agents that are influential are policy 
officials rather than a group of individuals which may even include scientists or 
journalists as it is the case of discourse coalitions and epistemic communities (Haas 
1992). 
The thesis makes use of historical/sociological institutionalist approaches (see Chapter 
Four) which are useful in assessing the current level of development of EU strategic 
culture. However, it does not deny the fact that Rational Choice Institutionalist patterns 
were evident at a previous stage where the EU possessed a primary strategic culture. 
The thesis claimed that currently the EU possesses an intermediate strategic culture 
which can best be explored through historical and sociological institutionalism. For this 
reason, the thesis does not fully agree with hard core Rational Choice Institutionalists 
who according to Lowndes (2002: 95) deny that: "institutional factors 'produce 
behaviour' or shape individuals preferences, which they see as endogenously 
determined and relatively stable (favouring utility maximization)". The thesis also 
agrees with McAnnula's (2002: 277) criticism of Rational Choice theory whose 
66narrow view of motivation ignores the ways in which people may act according to 
habit, imitation, external compulsion and impulse". Indeed, part of the thesis traced the 
development of particular habits, path dependencies and impulses which fonn the 
structural and behavioural elements that underpin the strategic culture of the EU. 
According to Risse (2004: 5): "the target of constructivist attack is likely to be the 
methodological individualism emphasized by rational choice and its overly agency- 
centrered approach. The reason for this can be found in the way in which social 
constructivists conceptualise how social structures impact on agents and their 
behaviour". On a rationalist account, social institutions are seen as tools of behavioural 
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constraint (March and Olsen 1989) which make individuals use strategic behaviour in 
order to pursue their own aims. The main issue is how individuals maximize benefits. 
Social constructivism by contrast places emphasis on a logic of appropriateness 
(March and Olsen 1998: 95 1). This leads actors to adopt a behaviour that fits a given 
social situation and such behaviour may even contradict their narrowly defined 
interests. 
A central question of the thesis is the extent to which ESDP institutions have 
established a particular behaviour (amongst ESDP Brussels-based officials) that, in 
turn, has influenced to the development of EU strategic culture (Chapter Four). The 
thesis claims that institutions are important as they affect values, ideas, beliefs and 
practices (based on Checkel 2003: 352-54). The influence of ESDP institutions and 
networks lies in the fact that they promote certain structural/behavioural rules which are 
vital for the strategic culture of the EU (see Chapter Two). The thesis also suggested 
that some institutions (notably the PSC) 'matter' more than others when it comes to the 
development of the strategic culture of the EU. 
Where does the thesis stand in the question of agency and structure? Do structures 
determine actions? Or do they mostly constraint and facilitate? Can ESDP elites who 
are based in Brussels change structures? In sociology, Giddens proposed the concept of 
structuration (1984) according to which structures constrain actors but actors can also 
transform structures by acting within them. According to Jackson: "IR constructivists 
use this as a starting point for suggesting a less rigid view of anarchy" (2007: 163). The 
thesis adopts the idea that structure and agent can be seen as two different entities that 
mutually influence one another (Giddens 1984). Social structures, in other words, do 
not exist independently of agents. The thesis concluded that institutions have been 
influential in promoting structures, rules and patterns of behaviour that bind individuals 
to certain modes of interaction. In this respect, institutions do influence the behaviour 
of agents as agents have to follow certain informal rules that are the product of 
institutional interaction. Sociological and historical institutionalism that the thesis 
subscribes to see individual widely interrelated with their environment. For instance, 
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according to Blyth's (2002: 309) view of historical institutional ism: "once institutions 
are established they 'embody and give continuing content to agents wants. 
Consequently, just as institutions could be ontologically prior to individuals, so could 
ideas". However, this does not imply that individuals are powerless. Indeed, agents 
have an influential role to play as, especially within the PSC, individuals are important 
carriers of Brussels based ideas to the national capitals. This role provides them with 
considerable influence when it comes to convincing their particular states about the 
utility of ESDP policies. 
The thesis does not neglect the fact that the development of the strategic culture of the 
EU has been a 'paradoxical' process with various limitations. For this reason, it sheds 
light on a number of limitations that ESDP institutions and agents have faced in 
Brussels. For instance, various nationally based institutions in charge of foreign and 
security issues have their own interests and priorities thus slowing down the process of 
integration in the field of security and defence. However, due to time and resource 
constraints it has not been possible to conduct research at the level of the EU member 
states. Nevertheless, the thesis did take into account the influence that EU member 
states exercise on EU strategic culture of the EU by questioning Brussels based ESDP 
officials about such influence. Furthen-nore, as all EU member states have their own 
representatives in the PSC, they are perforce directly embedded in the study. 
METHODS 
Methods according to Crotty (2004: 3) are "the techniques or procedures used to gather 
and analyse data related to some research methods or hypothesis". The Appendix will 
now address the issue of methods as they have been used in the thesis. The strategic 
culture of the EU formed the 'dependent variable' of the thesis. Independent variables 
that have been taken into account are rules of behaviour stemming from interaction in 
institutions and networks (named in the thesis as structural/behavioural elements), ideas 
on the use of police and military instruments as well as beliefs and practices stemming 
from critical historic junctures such as the Bosnian and Kosovan conflicts. The thesis 
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used several types of primary and secondary sources. EU documents were mostly used 
in order to find the main ideas that stem frorn ESDP in order to construct a 
questionnaire that would be then given to ESDP officials (Appendix 11). The period 
covered ranged from 1999 up to 2007. In order to draft the questionnaire the thesis 
checked the consistency of these ideas in EU documents so that the questions that were 
asked would rely on ideas that were persistent across time. In order to see which ideas 
are related to the use of force the thesis studied the Presidency Conclusions of each 
Presidency since the establishment of ESDP in 1999 and up to December 2007 (18 
Conclusions in total). The Treaty establishing a European Constitution and the 
European Security Strategy were also taken into account as they constituted two very 
important documents that held extensive summaries on ESDP and on the use of police 
and military instruments. Finally, the two Council declarations for launch of the two 
police and military missions in BiH were also taken into consideration as the Bosnian 
missions fon-ned part of the thesis. By studying these documents the thesis aimed for a 
wide coverage of EU documents as ideas had to be extracted from a wide sample of 
official documentation. Secondary sources included scholarly journals and academic 
books as well as newspaper articles. The use of secondary sources were important in 
developing various typologies that were deployed throughout the thesis. 
In Chapter Four, it should be stressed that the thesis uses primary sources from policy 
officials, ministers and Heads of State who were in charge of their member states and 
had direct influence over the formulation of the security policies of the states they 
represented during the 1990s. The study of history focused on how policy elites and 
policy officials perceived the crises of the Western Balkans (especially the Bosnian and 
Kosovo conflict). The study period that was covered starts from the end of Cold War in 
1989 up to the establishment of ESDP in 1999. The documents that were used in the 
chapter were those that had direct quotes to the Kosovo and Bosnian crises and the 
elements of force need to be used (if any) in order to control these crises. Memoirs from 
US officials were also used in a complementary way in order to highlight the security 
dilemmas that the Europeans had when they were dealing with these crises. 
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Typologies play a valuable role in defining cases that can be compared and contrasted 
by providing different types of EU strategic culture. According to Berg (2007: 207), a 
typology is: "a systematic method for classifying similar events, actions, objects, 
people, or places, into discrete groupings". The first typology of the strategic culture of 
the EU deals with ideas, beliefs, values and practices regarding the use of force whereas 
the second set distinguishes between different types of structural/behavioural elements. 
These sources are complemented by the use of a questionnaire as well as the conduct of 
semi-structured interviews with ESDP practitioners who are based in Brussels. By 
using different methods such as questionnaires, interviews as well as primary and 
secondary material it was possible not only to cross-check the infori-nation gathered but 
also to shed light on the subtle elements of the strategic culture of the EU. 
Writing about qualitative and quantitative methods Berg (2007: 3) mentions: "quantity 
is elementally an amount of something. Quality refers to the what, how, when, and 
where of a thing - its essence and ambience. Qualitative research thus refers to the 
meaning, concepts, definitions, characteristics, metaphors, symbols, and descriptions of 
things. In contrast, quantitative research refers to counts and measures of things" 
(italics in the original). Ideas, beliefs values and practices which make up the strategic 
culture of the EU cannot be directly measured by precise criteria as it could have been 
the case with other positivist studies. Thus, quantitative studies such as those focused 
on electoral participation, voting behaviour, and party membership (Read and Marsh 
2002) are not comparable to the research framework that the thesis follows. Further 
types of quantitative data which would contribute such as government statistics are 
inappropriate for the purposes of this study. Although the thesis used questionnaires it 
does not fully bind itself to quantitative measurements. According to Berg (2007: 4); 
"qualitative research tends to assess the quality of things using words, images, and 
descriptions whereas most of quantitative research relies chiefly on numbers" However, 
questionnaire data on its own is not sufficient on its own to explain the deeper 
implications of the ideas, beliefs, practices and values that ESDP Brussels based 
officials subscribe to. For this reason, the study also used qualitative material as 
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extracted from in-depth interviews with ESDP Brussels based officials in order to 
analyse the more subtle meanings behind these beliefs. 
As mentioned in the theory section above, the thesis claimed that agents do not exist 
independently from their social environments and the shared systems of values that 
these environments reflect. Methods should take into account that agents are interelated 
with their social environment. Inter-institutional relationships amongst ESDP officials 
lead to various rules and patterns of behaviour that need to be considered in detail (as 
these constitute the structurallbehavioural elements of the strategic culture of the EU). 
Therefore, although the thesis used both qualitative and quantitative tools, it puts 
additional emphasis on the analysis of the qualitative material gathered through 
interviewing. This choice is deliberate for according to Read and Marsh (2002: 232): 
cresearchers who utilize qualitative analysis use their inductive empirical analysis to 
generate interpretations or understandings of the social world'. Furthen-nore, as Berg 
claims (2007: 8): "qualitative researchers, then are most interested in how humans 
arrange themselves and their settings and how inhabitants of these settings make sense 
of their surroundings through symbols, rituals, social structures, social roles and so 
forth. " The interviews were conducted in a semi-structured way. Although the 
conversation followed the answers of the questionnaire the interviewer was free to 
move the conversation in a direction of interest that may come up. 
Furthennore, according to Devine (2002: 201): "intensive interviews are appropriate 
when seeking to understand people's motives and interpretations". The main idea 
behind this method is to listen to policy actors who are willing to talk about their beliefs 
and experiences in order to gain some insight into their world views. In-depth 
interviews allowed ESDP Brussels based officials to express their views on particular 
topics and to elaborate on issues that they thought were influential for the strategic 
culture of the EU. As discussions on security issues dealt with 'sensitive' issues that 
require secrecy, tape recording or the use of any other type of audiovisual means was 
avoided in order to allow interviewees to express their opinions freely. In order to cover 
the gap of audiovisual data, extensive notes were taken by the author during the 
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interviews in order to make detailed inferences concerning the beliefs of ESDP policy- 
makers. Other qualitative methods such as direct observation of the PSC meetings were 
attempted. Unfortunately due to the highly secretive nature of the PSC meetings it was 
impossible to observe them. 
Two samples of interviews were conducted after careful purposive sampling. This 
strategy was used in order to get an image of the beliefs of two groups of ESDP 
Brussels based officials. Heterogeneity of the sampling was one of the basic elements 
of the task in order to achieve diversity. The first sample included participants from the 
PSC. Answers from this particular sample provided a general overview regarding the 
state of the strategic culture of the EU. Twenty two participants took part in this first 
sample. The aim of the interviews was to talk to PSC officials who had an influential 
position in ESDP structures. For this reason, the first interview invitation was addressed 
to the PSC ambassadors. In cases where PSC ambassadors were not available for 
interviews, a 'second best' possible contact person was sought who was usually chosen 
by the Ambassador as a replacement. The questionnaire was first given to PSC officials 
during the interview meeting. After officials have filled in the questionnaire they were 
also interviewed on questions stemming from their answers so that more details 
regarding their strategic ideas would be obtained. 
The saine process also took place with the second group of interviewees. A second 
questionnaire was drafted for officials who worked in ESDP related missions in Bill. It 
included many of the questions asked in the first sample of officials but also tested how 
the strategic culture of the EU affected the implementation of ESDP missions in Bill. 
This second group of interviewees included participants from the PSC, the EUMS, the 
Council of the EU, the European Commission and the European Parliament. The main 
idea behind the conduct of a second sample interviews was to test whether ideas and 
practices described by the PSC participants were followed by policy makers in other 
EU institutions. By undertaking this exercise the thesis aimed to investigate whether 
these ideas, values, beliefs and practices that were mentioned by PSC officials are ideas 
that characterise EU officials as a whole. 
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In both cases, the sample of participants was carefully selected in order to provide a 
balanced number of officials from different countries (small/big states, south/north EU 
states, east/west EU states). During the conduct of interviews the interviewer drew 
lessons from Devine (2002: 199) who claims that: "qualitative methods draw particular 
attention to contextual issues, placing an interviewee's attitudes and behaviour in the 
context of their individual biography and the wider social setting". Indeed, part of the 
work carried out in Brussels included the tracing of biographical data of the 
interviewees (such as previous career, government positions or party affiliation if 
possible). This 'personal tracking' was of particular value as the interviewees could 
then be asked to elaborate more on particular issues in which they had considerable 
experience. The interviews were carried out during the period of January 2007 up to 
December 2007. 
in much of the questionnaire the Likert Scale was used with a set of statements and 
propositions mentioned in order to evaluate the feelings of the interviewees (Arksey 
and Knight 1999: 92). One of the most common versions of the Likert scale categorises 
answers of the interviewees according to: 'I. Agree/ 2. Neither Agree and 3. 
Disagree/. Disagree' groups. Although this is an interesting categorization, the field of 
answers in the 'Neither Agree of Disagree' category adds a big 'grey area' which is 
difficult to interpret. In order to address this issue, the questionnaire used af ive-layered 
pattern which was based on the following choices: 1. Agree, 2. Disagree, 3. Mostly 
agree but also depends on the circumstances, 4. Mostly disagree but also depends on 
the circumstances. 5. Don't Know/ Don't Answer. Finally, the study included various 
6open' questions which allowed participants to express their own concerns and raise 
issues that they considered important. At the end of the questionnaire officials were 
asked to elaborate further on issues of their own interest and to add anything else that 
may consider as important. All officials who participated in the questionnaire/interview 
sessions were reassured about the confidentiality of the survey. 
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The questions that were included in the questionnaire can be categorized into three 
main themes. The first part of the questions is closely related to ideas and beliefs on 
ESDP. The results of this section provided a link between ideas on ESDP and how they 
are related to the strategic culture of the EU. The second part of the questionnaire is 
related to the behaviour of elites within ESDP institutions. Finally, the impact of ESDP 
on nation states forins the third part of the questionnaire. When interviews were 
conducted respondents were asked to articulate national positions when issues were 
related to national issues. Interviewees were also asked to express their personal views 
when their role on ESDP institutions was discussed as well as when their influence on 
ESDP was taken into account. 
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Appendix II. The drafting of the Questionnaire 
The questions can be categorized into three main thernes. The first pail of the questions 
is closely related to ideas and beliefs on ESDP. The results of this section provide a link 
between ideas on ESDP and how they are related to the strategic culture of the EU. The 
questions that were included in the questionnaire emerged after a study of ESDP 
documents. In order to see which ideas are related to the use of force the thesis studied 
the Presidency Conclusions of each Presidency since the establishment of ESDP in 
1999 and up to December 2007 (18 Conclusions in total). The Treaty establishing a 
European Constitution and the European Security Strategy were also taken into 
account. Finally, the two Council declarations for launch of the two police and military 
missions in BiH were also taken into consideration. The thesis undertook this exercise 
in order to cover a wide range of EU documentation. It tested ideas that were persistent 
in these pieces of documentation in order to establish a map of ideas in the form of 
questions that would addressed to ESDP officials. 
The second part of the questionnaire is related to the behaviour of elites in order to find 
out whether they have an important role to play in the process of ESDP and to what 
extent they can be influential carriers of strategic culture both within ESDP structures 
but also in relation to their home institutions. Finally, the impact of ESDP on nation 
states forms the third part of the questionnaire. The main aiin behind this particular 
section is to find whether ESDP has influenced the strategic cultures of EU member 
states and, if so, then to what extent. When interviews were conducted respondents 
were asked to articulate national positions when issues were related to national issues. 
Interviewees were also asked to express their own views when their role on ESDP was 
discussed as well as when their influence on ESDP was taken into account. 
The sample of participants has been carefully selected in order to provide a balanced 
number of officials from different countries (small/big states, South/North states, Eat, 
West States). Part of the work carried out in Brussels also included the tracing of 
biographical data of the interviewees (such as previous career, government positions, 
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party affiliation if possible). This was of value because the intervicwces could then be 
asked to elaborate more on particular issues in different interviews (e. g. tile Bosnia- 
Herzegovina missions). The interviews were carried out from the period of January 
2007 up to December 2007. The first part of the material presented in this chapter deals 
with interview data from the Ambassadors and officials who are working in the PSC. 
As mentioned in the previous chapter, the PSC was chosen as the primary institution for 
research as it is the most important ESDP institution. The airn of tile questionnaire was 
to talk to PSC officials who were high in the ESDP scale. For this reason a first 
invitation was addressed to the PSC ambassadors. In cases where PSC ambassadors 
were not available for interviews, the 'second best' possible contact person was sought 
who was usually chosen by the Ambassador as a replacement. The questionnaire was 
first given to PSC officials during the interview meeting. After they have filled in the 
questionnaire they were also interviewed on questions included in it so that more details 
regarding ESDP could be obtained. 
In much of the questionnaire the Likert Scale was used with a set of statements and 
propositions mentioned in order to evaluate the feelings of the interviewees (Arksey 
and Knight 1999: 92). One of the most common versions of the Likert scale categorises 
answers of the interviewees in the following according to :'I. Agree/ 2. Neither Agree 
or Disagree/3. Disagree' groups. Although this is an interesting categorization, the field 
of answers in the 'Neither Agree of Disagree' category adds a big 'grey area' which is 
difficult to interpret. In order to limit this , the questionnaire used a five-layered pattern 
which was based on the following choices: 1. Agree, 2. Disagree, 3. Mostly agree but 
also depends on the circumstances, 4. Mostly disagree but also depcnds on tile 
circumstances. 5. Don't Know/ Don't Answer. Finally, the study included various 
'open' questions which allowed participants to express their own concerns and raise 
issues that they considered important. At the end of the questionnaire officials were 
asked to elaborate further on issues of their interest. All officials who participated in the 
questionnaire/interview sessions were interviewed were reassured about the 
confidentiality of the survey. 
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Questionnaire Sample 
The questionnaire is divided into three short sections. The first set of questions is 
general and covers ideas and values in ESDP. The second section concerns ESDP 
institutions and policy fon-nulation. Finally, the third section is about the impact of 
ESDP on the foreign policy of your country 
The information of this questionnaire is confidential and anonymous. No quotes and 
personal data will be used in public and after the end of the survey all questionnaire 
samples will be destroyed. 
Personal Data 
Gender 
Male 
Female 
Age Group: 
25-34 
35-44 
44-56 
57 and over 
Country of origin: 
Institution: 
General guestions on ESDP 
1. Do you feel that ESDP has been a success since its launch? 
1. Agree 
2. Mostly agree but also depends on the circumstances 
3. Mostly disagree but also depends on the circumstances 
4. Disagree 
5. Don't Know/Don't Answer 
2. Is ESDP equipped with adequate military and civilian resources? 
1. Agree 
2. Mostly agree but also depends on the circumstances 
3. Mostly disagree but also depends on the circumstances 
4. Disagree 
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5. Don't Know/Don't Answer 
3. Do you feel that so far ESDP missions have been successful in promoting human 
rights, the rule of law and the protection of civilian populations? 
1. Agree 
2. Mostly agree but also depends on the circurnstances 
3. Mostly disagree but also depends on the circumstances 
4. Disagree 
5. Don't Know/Don't Answer 
4. ESDP should focus on operations in the following regions (multiple answers): 
1. The Balkans 
2. The Middle East 
3. Caucasus 
4. Western Newly Independent States (Moldova, Belarus, Ukraine, Russia) 
5. Or Africa 
6. The Mediterranean 
7. South East Asia/Oceania 
S. Latin America 
5. ESDP operations should be carried out with a UN mandate and under the 
authorization of the UN Security Council. 
1. Agree 
2. Mostly agree but also depends on the circumstances 
3. Mostly disagree but also depends on the circumstances 
4. Disagree 
5. Don't Know/Don't Answer 
6. ESDP ought to involve in its operations countries other than EU member states. 
1. Agree 
2. Mostly agree but also depends on the circumstances 
3. Mostly disagree but also depends on the circumstances 
4. Disagree 
5. Don't Know/Don't Answer 
7. Operations should be carried out using NATO resources. 
1. Agree 
2. Mostly agree but also depends on the circumstances 
3. Mostly disagree but also depends on the circumstances 
4. Disagree 
5. Don't Know/Don't Answer 
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8. The EU should develop capabilities that will allow it to deal with crises 
independently of NATO. 
1. Agree 
2. Mostly agree but also depends on the circumstances 
3. Mostly disagree but also depends on the circumstances 
4. Disagree 
5. Don't Know/Don't Answer 
9. In the future the EU should assume responsibility for issues of defence. 
1. Agree 
2. Mostly agree but also depends on the circumstances 
3. Mostly disagree but also depends on the circumstances 
4. Disagree 
5. Don't Know/Don't Answer 
10. In the ESDP missions military and civilian tools are equally important. 
1. Agree 
2. Mostly agree but also depends on the circumstances 
3. Mostly disagree but also depends on the circumstances 
4. Disagree 
5. Don't Know/Don't Answer 
11. Briefly mention the main challenges ESDP faces (multiple answers). 
1. Empowerment of ESDP institutions 
2. Investment in military and civilian capabilities 
3. Lack of trust of national governments in the ESDP project 
4. Competition with other organizations such as NATO 
5. Other (Please mention in detail) 
12. The EU should (multiple answers): 
Intervene in the case of a disaster in Europe 
Guarantee human rights 
Intervene in conflicts on the borders of the EU 
Defend the economic interests of the Union 
Take part in humanitarian missions without UN approval 
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Other (Please mention in detail) 
13. Dialogue is an important tool for ESDP conflict resolution 
1. Agree 
2. Mostly agree but also depends on the circumstances 
3. Mostly disagree but also depends on the circumstances 
4. Disagree 
5. Don't Know/Don't Answer 
Institutions and your role in formulating ESDP 
1. The institution in which I work has been influential in shaping ESDP. 
1. Agree 
2. Mostly agree but also depends on the circumstances 
3. Mostly disagree but also depends on the circumstances 
4. Disagree 
5. Don't Know/Don't Answer 
2. The degree of cooperation amongst employees within ESDP institutions has 
increased over the years. 
1. Agree 
2. Mostly agree but also depends on the circumstances 
3. Mostly disagree but also depends on the circumstances 
4. Disagree 
5. Don't Know/Don't Answer 
3. Most of the time there is a good degree of cooperation Nvith my ESDP colleagues. 
1. Agree 
2. Mostly agree but also depends on the circumstances 
3. Mostly disagree but also depends on the circumstances 
4. Disagree 
5. Don't Know/Don't Answer 
4. To which EU Member States do you talk first when it conics to a policy 
initiative? Mention the five countries with which you collaborate mostly. 
5. How much does the national capital value the work of the institution for which 
you are working? 
Quite a lot. There is frequent interaction between my institution and the national 
capital 
There is a substantial interaction but there is still room for improvernent 
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Not a lot 
6. Due to my ESDP post I have considerable influence over the formulation of tile 
ESDP policy of the state I come from. 
1. Agree 
2. Mostly agree but also depends on the circumstances 
3. Mostly disagree but also depends on the circumstances 
4. Disagree 
5. Don't Know/Don't Answer 
7. My main function is to strike a balance between the national and the EU 
position but national interest always comes first. 
1. Agree 
2. Mostly agree but also depends on the circumstances 
3. Mostly disagree but also depends on the circumstances 
4. Disagree 
5. Don't Know/Don't Answer 
S. More powers should be given to ESDP institutions even if this goes against 
national sovereignty 
1. Agree 
2. Mostly agree but also depends on the circumstances 
3. Mostly disagree but also depends on the circumstances 
4. Disagree 
5. Don't Know/Don't Answer 
ESDP and votir countrv 
1. By participating in ESDP the security and defence policies of my country have 
been altered. 
1. Agree 
2. Mostly agree but also depends on the circumstances 
3. Mostly disagree but also depends on the circumstances 
4. Disagree 
5. Don't Know/Don't Answer 
2. ESDP has had an impact on EU States as a whole. 
1. Agree 
2. Mostly agree but also depends on the circumstances 
3. Mostly disagree but also depends on the circumstances 
4. Disagree 
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5. Don't Know/Don't Answer 
3. If you agree or mostly agree with the following statement, mention ally cases of 
policy change that have taken place because of ESDP: 
4. Due to ESDP my country has become more inclined to use military/civilian 
instruments in its foreign policy. 
1. Agree 
2. Mostly agree but also depends on the circumstances 
3. Mostly disagree but also depends on the circumstances 
4. Disagree 
5. Don't Know/Don't Answer 
5. My country perceives participation in ESDP as a vital element of its security 
policy. 
1. Agree 
2. Mostly agree but also depends on the circumstances 
3. Mostly disagree but also depends on the circumstances 
4. Disagree 
5. Don't Know/Don't Answer 
6. More powers should be given to ESDP institutions even if this goes against 
national sovereignty 
1. Agree 
2. Mostly agree but also depends on the circumstances 
3. Mostly disagree but also depends on the circumstances 
4. Disagree 
5. Don't Know/Don't Answer 
Do you have any comments on the questionnaire? Is there anything else that ), on 
think is important on ESDP and has not been covered so far? 
Thank you for your responses! 
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Appendix 111. Questionnaire Results 
Personal Data 
Gender 
Male 20 
Female 2 
Age Group: 
25-34: 0 
35-44: 6 
44-56: 14 
57 +: 2 
Country of origin: 22 EU Member States (France, Germany, UK, Sweden, Finland, 
Lithuania, Latvia, Austria, The Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg, Ireland, Portugal, 
Greece, Cyprus, Slovakia, Poland, Hungary, Spain, Italy, Malta, Czech Republic) 
Institution: PSC 
General guestions on ESDP 
1. Do you feel that ESDP has been a success since its launch? 
1. Agree 20 
2. Mostly agree but also depends on the circumstances 2 
3. Mostly disagree but also depends on the circumstances 0 
4. Disagree 0 
5. Don't Know/Don't Answer 0 
2. Is ESDP equipped with adequate military and civilian resources? 
1. Agree 2 
2. Mostly agree but also depends on the circumstances 8 
3. Mostly disagree but also depends on the circumstances. 12 
4. Disagree 0 
5. Don't Know/Don't Answer 0 
3. Do you feel that so far ESDP missions have been successful in promoting human 
rights, the rule of law and the protection of civilian populations? 
1. Agree 18 
2. Mostly agree but also depends on the circumstances 4 
3. Mostly disagree but also depends on the circumstances 0 
4. Disagree 0 
5. Don't Know/Don't Answer 0 
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4. ESDP should mostly focus on operations which should be implemented in tile 
following regions (multiple answers): 
1. The Balkans 19 
2. The Middle East 4 
3. Caucasus 10 
4. Western Newly Independent States (Moldova, Belarus, Ukraine, Russia) 4 
5. Affica 14 
6. The Mediterranean 2 
7. South East Asia/Oceania 2 
8. Latin America 0 
5. ESDP operations should be carried out with a UN mandate and under the 
authorization of the UN Security Council 
1. Agree 12 
2. Mostly agree but also depends on the circumstances 4 
3. Mostly disagree but also depends on the circumstances 4 
4. Disagree 2 
5. Don't Know/Don't Answer 0 
6. ESDP ought to involve in its operations countries other than EU niernber states. 
1. Agree 17 
2. Mostly agree but also depends on the circumstances 5 
3. Mostly disagree but also depends on the circumstances 0 
4. Disagree 0 
5. Don't Know/Don't Answer 0 
7. Operations must be carried out by using NATO resources 
1. Agree 8 
2. Mostly agree but also depends on the circumstances 8 
3. Mostly disagree but also depends on the circumstances 4 
4. Disagree 2 
5. Don't Know/Don't Answer 0 
8. The EU should develop capabilities that will allow it to deal with crises 
independently of NATO 
1. Agree 8 
2. Mostly agree but also depends on the circumstances 5 
3. Mostly disagree but also depends on the circumstances 2 
4. Disagree 7 
5. Don't Know/Don't Answer 0 
9. In the future the EU should assume responsibility for issues of defence. 
1. Agree 3 
2. Mostly agree but also depends on the circumstances 3 
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3. Mostly disagree but also depends on the circumstances 0 
4. Disagree 16 
5. Don't Know/Don't Answer 0 
10. In the ESDP missions that the EU undertakes military and civilian tools are 
equally important. 
1. Agree 18 
2. Mostly agree but also depends on the circumstances 4 
3. Mostly disagree but also depends on the circumstances 0 
4. Disagree 0 
5. Don't Know/Don't Answer 0 
11. Briefly mention the main challenges ESDP faces (multiple answers) 
1. Empowerment of ESDP institutions 10 
2. Investment in military and civilian capabilities 20 
3. Lack of trust of national governments in the ESDP project 7 
4. Competition with other organizations such as NATO 7 
5. Other (Please mention in detail) 5 
12. The EU should (multiple ansivers): 
Intervene in case of a disaster in Europe 18 
Guarantee Human Rights 18 
Intervene in conflicts at the borders of the EU 16 
Defend the economic interests of the Union: 3 
Take part in humanitarian missions without UN approval 4 
Other (Please mention in detail) Petersberg tasks 13 
All of the above state reasons 5 
13. Dialogue is an important tool for ESDP conflict resolution 
1. Agree 14 
2. Mostly agree but also depends on the circumstances 8 
3. Mostly disagree but also depends on the circumstances 0 
4. Disagree 0 
5. Don't Know/Don't Answer 0 
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ESDP institutions and vour role in formulatina ESDP 
1. The institution in which I work has been influential in shaping ESDP. 
1. Agree 18 
2. Mostly agree but also depends on the circumstances 4 
3. Mostly disagree but also depends on the circumstances 0 
4. Disagree 0 
5. Don't Know/Don't Answer 0 
2. Most of the time there is a good degree of cooperation with my ESDP colleagues. 
1. Agree 20- 
2. Mostly agree but also depends on the circumstances 2 
3. Mostly disagree but also depends on the circumstances. 0 
4. Disagree 0 
S. Don't Know/Don't Answer 0 
3. The degree of cooperation amongst employees within ESDP institutions has 
increased over the years. 
1. Agree 14 
2. Mostly agree but also depends on the circumstances 3 
3. Mostly disagree but also. depends on the circumstances 0 
4. Disagree 1 
5. Don't Know/Don't Answer 4 
4. Networking: To which EU Member States do you talk first when it conles to a 
policy initiative? Mention the five countries with which you collaborate mostly. 
For further details regarding the results of this question please see chapter five 
5. llow much does the national capital value the work of the institution for which 
are wor 
1. Quite a lot. There is frequent interaction between my institution and the national 
capital 12 
4. There is a substantial interaction but there is still room for improvement 6 
5. Not a lot. 4 
6. Due to my ESDP post I have considerable influence over the formulation of the 
security policy of the state I come from. 
1. Agree 14 
2. Mostly agree but also depends on the circumstances 4 
3. Mostly disagree but also depends on the circumstances 3 
4. Disagree 0 
5. Don't Know/Don't Answer I 
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7. My main function is to strike a balance between the national and the EU 
position but the national interest always comes first. 
1. Agree 14 
2. Mostly agree but also depends on the circumstances 8 
3. Mostly disagree but also depends on the circumstances 0 
4. Disagree 0 
5. Don't' Know/Don't Answer 0 
8. More powers should be given to ESDP institutions even if this goes against 
national sovereignty 
1. Agree 4 
2. Mostly agree but also depends on the circumstances 9 
3. Mostly disagree but also depends on the circumstances 9 
4. Disagree 
5. Don't' Know/Don't Answer 
0 
0 
ESDP and your countr 
1. By participating in ESDP the security and defence policies of my country have 
been altered. 
1. Agree 3 
2. Mostly agree but also depends on the circumstances 14 
3. Mostly disagree but also depends on the circumstances 5 
4. Disagree 
5. Don't' Know/Don't Answer 
0 
0 
2. ESDP had an impact on EU States as a whole. 
1. Agree 4 
2. Mostly agree but also depends on the circumstances 14 
3. Mostly disagree but also depends on the circumstances 2 
4. Disagree 2 
5. Don't Know/Don't Answer 0 
3. If you agree or mostly agree with the following statement, mention any cases of 
policy change that have taken place because of ESDP: 
See analysis in chapter 6 for more details 
4. Due to ESDP my country has become more inclined to use military/civilian 
instruments in its foreign policy. 
1. Agree 4 
2. Mostly agree but also depends on the circumstances 8 
3. Mostly disagree but also depends on the circumstances 3 
4. Disagree 7 
5. Don't Know/Don't Answer 0 
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5. My country perceives participation in ESDP as a vital clenient of its security 
policy. 
1. Agree 12 
2. Mostly agree but also depends on the circumstances 6 
3. Mostly disagree but also depends on the circumstances 4 
4. Disagree 
5. Don't Know/Don't Answer 
0 
0 
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Appendix IV: Questionnaire Results on Bosnia 
institutions covered: PSC, EUMS, Council of the EU, COWEB, Commission, 
European Parliament 
Questionnaire Results 
Personal Data 
Gender 
Male 17 
Female 6 
Age Group: 
25-34: 1 
35-44: 5 
44-56: 15 
57 +: 2 
General guestions on ESDP 
1. Do you feel that the ESDP missions in Bill have been a success since their 
launch? 
1. Agree 20 
2. Mostly agree but also depends on the circumstances 3 
3. Mostly disagree but also depends on the circumstances 0 
4. Disagree 0 
5. Don't Know/Don't Answer 0 
2. ESDP in Bill operations should be carried out with a UN mandate and under 
the authorization of the UN Security Council 
1. Agree 15 
2. Mostly agree but also depends on the circumstances 6 
3. Mostly disagree but also depends on the circumstances 2 
4. Disagree 0 
5. Don't Know/Don't Answer 0 
3. ESDP ought to involve in its operations countries other than EU member states. 
1. Agree 20 
2. Mostly agree but also depends on the circumstances 3 
3. Mostly disagree but also depends on the circumstances 0 
4. Disagree 0 
5. Don't Know/Don't Answer 0 
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4. Operations must be carried out by using NATO resources 
1. Agree 9 
2. Mostly agree but also depends on the circumstances 8 
3. Mostly disagree but also depends on the circumstances 6 
4. Disagree 0 
5. Don't Know/Don't Answer 0 
5. The EU should develop capabilities that will allow it to deal with crises 
independently of NATO 
1. Agree 8 
2. Mostly agree but also depends on the circumstances 6 
3. Mostly disagree but also depends on the circumstances 2 
4. Disagree 7 
5. Don't Know/Don't Answer 0 
6. In the ESDP missions that the EU undertakes military and civilian tools are 
equally important. 
1. Agree 19 
2. Mostly agree but also depends on the circumstances 4 
3. Mostly disagree but also depends on the circumstances 0 
4. Disagree 0 
5. Don't Know/Don't Answer 0 
7. From your Bill experience briefly mention the main challenges ESDP faces 
(multiple ansivers) 
1. Empowerment of ESDP institutions 10 
2. Investment in military and civilian capabilities 20 
3. Lack of trust of national governments in the ESDP project 10 
4. Competition with other organizations such as NATO 7 
5. Other (Please mention in detail) 0 
8. The EU intervened in Bill in order to (multiple answers): 
Promote law, order and good governance 15 
Guarantee Human Rights 20 
Solve a conflict in its borders 20 
Defend the economic interests of the Union 0 
Other (Please mention in detail): promote security/stability 13 
All of the above state reasons 3 
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